THE
DIMENSIONS
OF
INSECURITY
IN URBAN AREAS

RESEARCH ON THE ROOTS OF UNSAFETY AND FEAR OF CRIME IN EUROPEAN CITIES

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PREFACE

One of the fundamental necessities for man is safety, without which a well-functioning society can hardly be imagined. The basic need of individuals and communities is to feel safe in the places of their everyday lives. The image of security is shaped by a number of factors, such as fear of crime, possible previous victim experiences, the quality of the living environment, the orderliness of the neighbourhood and transparent and illuminated spaces as well as a predictable economic environment, fear of unemployment and illness, social relations, or even a marginalized social situation.

The perception of insecurity is an important problem for today’s European societies. This is especially true of large cities, where a large proportion of the population live and therefore where the problems are concentrated. Cities are home to more than half of the world’s population and are expected to grow with 2.5 billion new residents by 2050, while more than two-thirds of crimes are committed in urban environments. At the same time, these areas are the least affected by social and community cohesion and members of the local community looking out for and supporting each other. Lack of cohesion further increases unsafety, along with real social and daily individual problems.

The need for security, therefore, is becoming ever stronger nowadays, while globalization challenges the authorities and citizens alike in new and previously unknown situations. All this leads to a situation where crime continues to decline in the official statistics in Europe, yet the perception of insecurity not only does not improve, but actually increases, as pointed out by the research findings. This phenomenon was the starting point for the MARGIN² project, which deals with the primary topic of this book.

This is a book dealing with one of the most urgent and most controversial issues for European countries, by addressing the questions related to the perception of insecurity among the populations of big cities.

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1 https://goo.gl/AjtgWi
2 The Tackle Insecurity in Marginalized Areas No. 653004 research was funded within the framework of the Horizon 2020 program, with funding from the European Commission.
The first part of the book provides an insight into the main achievements of the MARGIN Project supported by the EU Horizon 2020 program, examining the questions related to the perception of insecurity in the marginalized areas of big cities. The second part of the book presents the findings of those research projects conducted in Europe’s major cities that are closely related to the issues of insecurity in everyday life. Finally, we get to know the work of the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS) organization, which focuses on urban crime.

The project entitled *Tackle Insecurity in Marginalized Areas*, (abbreviated name: MARGIN project) was conducted by a consortium headed by the University of Barcelona, and its members included the National Institute of Criminology (OKRI), the National Observatory of Crime and Criminal Justice from France, the University of Milano-Bicocca (UNIMIB), EuroCrime, as a non-profit independent international research, training and consultancy institute from Italy, University College London (UCL), and the Department of Interior of the Government of Catalonia.

The starting point was that the perception of insecurity arises as a very heterogeneous concept, not limited to actual crime rates but encompassing a wide range of other aspects including personal well-being, trust in public institutions, justice and social integration. MARGIN addresses the topic of insecurity by taking into account this heterogeneity.

The MARGIN project’s aim was to coordinate and support public intervention in the field of (in)security by providing policy makers with high quality tools for creating and evaluating strategies targeted at the reduction of insecurity among different demographic groups. To achieve this general objective, the project has been designed to establish an international environment for knowledge exchange that enables the identification and analysis of factors influencing public and personal perceptions of (in)security.3

The research that took place in Barcelona, London, Milan, Paris and Budapest, in two selected districts each, combined quantitative (data processing and questionnaires) and qualitative (depth interviews, participant observation and focus group discussions) research methods. In the first part of the book we can read about the research findings.

3 http://marginproject.eu/
In the first chapter, a study by Sonia Stefanizzi and Valeria Verdolini provides an overview of the issues related to the perception of insecurity and urban security in Europe, using an example from Italy. This chapter presents the theories that served as the basis for the MARGIN research. The study devotes special attention to the city of Milan, where immigration from the Mediterranean Sea is currently causing social conflicts. In Milan, as in other cities in Italy, the presence of immigrants is closely linked to the perception of insecurity and the stigmatization of immigrants. Regular changes make the residents of the neighbourhood distrustful and distant, which then may trigger conflicts.

In the second chapter, Riccardo Valente, the leader of the MARGIN project, and Lucrezia Crescenzi Lanna provide an overview of the mix method approach model for assessing the perception of insecurity in an urban environment. Their study describe the main objectives and phases of the project, and define the four dimensions of insecurity. The MARGIN project examined multiple dimensions of the perception of insecurity: the objective dimension (victimization), the subjective dimension (fear of crime), the socio-economic dimension (social vulnerability) and the socio-geographic dimension (the impact of the neighbourhood).

The research took place in an urban environment and aimed at establishing a link between the spatial and social dimensions of the perception of insecurity. Focusing on these contexts, the study presents its findings to the reader. In order to provide more comprehensive knowledge on security issues and to identify the factors influencing the perception of insecurity, the project has employed a special methodology. This newly developed and tested methodology can be helpful for future research projects on similar topics.

In the third chapter, a study by Francesc Guillén Lasierra entitled Detecting and tackling the different levels of subjective security describes different key factors of subjective security, including the components of subjective security, and the possible means of measuring it through the methods and results of the MARGIN research. It deals in detail with the issue of groups, territories and the approach to their security and provides several examples as illustrations. Finally, it describes the process by which research can be used to develop preventive strategies based on the diagnosis and reports on good practices based on them.
In the fourth chapter, Hugo d’Arbois de Jubainville presents the second work package of the MARGIN project measuring crime and the perception of insecurity (Collecting data on crime and perceptions of insecurity across Europe). The data come mainly from two sources, Police Recorded Crime Statistics (PCR) and Crime Victimization Surveys (CVS). One of the objectives of the research was to provide decision-makers, other researchers and the general public with the right tools and know-how to understand the multiple dimensions of the perception of insecurity. The data collection resulted in the MARGIN database being created, as well as an up-to-date report on the tools and resources to help evaluate data. The study presents data selection, country-specific problems, and the process of developing databases.

In the fifth chapter, a study by Sonia Stefanizzi and Valeria Verdolini compares the findings of the MARGIN research from the perspectives of well-off and marginalized communities. The authors present the characteristics of the areas of the countries participating in the research on the basis of the results of the anthropological study, and summarize, along the four dimensions of the research, the factors that play a role in developing a perception of insecurity at each location. In the second part, they portray the links between socio-economic divisions and subjective insecurity. They point to the role of marginalization in the development of a perception of insecurity, and they finally examine the role of social cohesion and make recommendations.

In the sixth chapter, Andrea Tünde Barabás, Gergely Koplánya and Ákos Szigeti report on the findings of the Hungarian research: The chapter presents a summary and the conclusions of the research methods and findings on two respective neighbourhoods in two different districts of Budapest. The authors point out significant differences in terms of the perception of insecurity measured in the areas inhabited by the socially disadvantaged on one hand and by those of a high social status, examine their causes and origins, and confirm the notion that marginalization, lack of cohesion, and socio-economic and socio-geographic factors play a significant role in the development of people’s feelings. The study presents all these issues through the results of the fieldwork in Hungary.

Following the presentation of the findings of the MARGIN project, chapter seven examines a specific local security issue: Camille Vanier and Hugo d’Arbois de Jubainville explore Unsafe Feeling on French Public Transport. Their starting
point is that public transport is a community space that participants can use to their liking, yet they must also comply with certain social standards. In most cases, public transport is supposed to be a closed environment, which may create fear in passengers under certain circumstances, so this area is particularly interesting for criminological research. The research gives a glimpse into the fears of people using French public transport.

In the eighth chapter, Sandra Appleby-Arnold, Noellie Brockdorff, Simon Dobišek, Sveva Avveduto and Lucio Pisacane report on the results of the Rules, Expectations and Security through Privacy-Enhanced Convenient Technologies (RESPECT) project in their study entitled Citizens’ Perception of Security and Surveillance.

The RESPECT Project is a comprehensive study aimed at examining the effectiveness of the surveillance systems and procedures for preventing and reducing crime in the European Union. The project explored the phenomenon of the perception of security using a comprehensive, multi-disciplinary approach. An important aspect of the research is the creation of a decision-making toolkit for policy-makers that enables the proper monitoring of surveillance systems, while taking legal, economic and social considerations into account. The study presents this research, built upon three pillars, to the reader.

In the ninth chapter, Carla Napolano’s study entitled The experience of the European Forum for Urban Security (EFUS) describes the work of the organization, which was established in 1988 with the support of the Council of Europe, and serves as a knowledgebase that provides opportunities for a dialogue between cities to clarify local public security issues, and to outline security directives. Over the last thirty years, the Forum has been active in many areas of work and has contributed to the development of security. The study describes these activities of the organization.

We live in a changing world where people and authorities need to adapt continuously to changing circumstances. As Sonia Stefanizzi and Valeria Verdolini state, regular changes make people distrustful and distant, which can lead to conflicts. The public is increasingly self-reliant and, in the absence of the usual social net, they have to create security for themselves. In this situation, some already marginalized social groups are excluded even more and declared to be
scapegoats. The most common example of this is the criminalisation of immigrants and the poor, as the study points out. The perception of security, or the lack thereof, i.e. the perception of insecurity, is subjective, i.e. it depends largely on people’s perceptions and feelings. Although the number of crimes and the risks are objectively measurable, their impact on society is influenced by a number of factors.

Exploring these factors is indispensable when formulating policies aimed at reducing fear. The findings of the MARGIN project and the studies in this book can contribute to that effort by providing validated research methods for diagnosing and by assisting in the development and application of the appropriate tools.

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Finally, I would like to express my appreciation for support in our participation in the MARGIN project by the National Institute of Criminology, and specifically its director, Prof. em. Dr. György Vókó DSc, as well as by Hungary’s Prosecutor’s Office. In addition, I would like to express my special thanks to my Hungarian colleague Ákos Szigeti for his dedicated work throughout the research and the authoring phases of this book.

Budapest, November 2018

The Editor
Chapter 1

Overview of insecurity, urban security and safety with special regard to Italy

Sonia Stefanizzi – Valeria Verdolini

Security and safety: a definiory issue

The concept of insecurity comes semantically complex, with a plurality of meanings. According to Zygmunt Bauman (1999), insecurity refers to three main dimensions: cognitive uncertainty, linked to the growing loss of intelligibility and predictability of contemporary societies; an existential insecurity, linked to the increasing social and geographical mobility and to the ongoing changes of the labour market, because of the obsolescence of specific skills and professional roles and because of the weakness of social relations which involve all of us; and an insecurity linked to personal safety and to property (civil insecurity).

The concept of “freedom from fear” is necessary to open the reflection on insecurity and its production and reproduction. The concept of fear is defined by anthropologists (Scheler, 1976; Bolk, 1926; Gehlen, 1961, 1966; Appadurai, 1996, 2001, 2002, 2006; Zolo, 2011) as the interaction between human fragility and the dangerousness of the natural habitat. This definition connects the two dimensions of fear and insecurity: the objective dimension (the dangerousness of the natural habitat) and the subjective dimension (the human fragility and the perception of the danger) (Ceri, 2003).

1 This article is partially based on two previous works, Sonia Stefanizzi (ed.) (2012): Il teatro della sicurezza. Milano: Et Al, and the Deliverable 5.1 of the Horizon 2020 Project “Margin”: tackle insecurity in marginalized areas. Even if the work is made by collective reflections, § 1.3 are attributable to Sonia Stefanizzi; § 2-4-5 to Valeria Verdolini.
The concept of fear is particularly explored in recent years, especially connected to the process of the individualisation of society. In particular, some seminal references are the pioneering work of Delumeau (1978), the reflection of Bauman (2006) on liquid fear, Davis (1999), exploring fear and space relations, Day (2006) on the relations between fear, masculinity, race and public space; the work of Escobar (1997) on the metamorphosis of fear, the work of Robin (2004), of Soyinka (2004) and the reflection of Sunstein on the right to fear (2010).

The distinction between objective risk and subjective perception of insecurity is the preliminary assumption needed in order to reflect on urban unsafety.

The concept “urban security” does not only refer to the sphere of phenomena described by the framework of “public order and security” (crime commission, deviance and connected acts), but it also extends to that set of processes capable of altering the social perception of insecurity, beyond the more or less concrete presence of a criminal threat. The adjective “urban”, moreover, recalls the territorial area where the problems of insecurity and the social dynamics connected to it emerge with greater evidence and must therefore be dealt with more effectively. Regardless of the global or merely local nature of the processes that are upstream of the “security issue”, it is quite clear that the city is the place where the fallout from these problems is concentrated in a more visible way and is experienced by citizens in a more worrying manner.

Citizens’ demands for security could come both from an actual exposure to the menace of crime, or from a subjective perception of the risks, based on many different assumptions.

It is fundamental to answer the question of the meaning of the feeling of insecurity and the causes that can generate and feed it in deeper detail. The probability that the dreaded event occurs (the objective basis of the perception of threat) is however relatively independent of the perception of insecurity: it basically represents the result of a social construction.

Such a construction can be traced back to more than an empirically verifiable threat that intensified (increased crime rates, beyond the offences that create the greatest social tensions) to some important transformations of the social
dynamics in the communities (Belluati, 2004). Such a feeling of insecurity could only be understandable to the end by analysing these kinds of changes, leading to a complex game of social interactions.

According to Castel (2003), Garland (2004) and Wacquant (1999, 2009, 2011), if we can say that globalisation represents the planetary success of the market economy, it is also true that this process is weakening the social and political structures of nation-states, downgrading their identity and social cohesion.

The increasing demand for security is facing the limits of the political answers and the loneliness of the global citizen in search of politics (Bauman, 1999). There is increasing criminal law production and levels of intervention, even if, according to Baratta, the “right to security” is an illusion (Foucault, 1975). The protection of socio-economic and civil rights can be a good solution, in the author’s opinion, to reduce insecurity, with the slogan “from the right to security to the security of rights” (Baratta – Giannoulis, 1997).

In this sense, highlighting the literature on the fear of crime seems necessary: the reflection on the genesis of the fear is proposed by Lee (2001) for a complete review, the work of Hale (1996) offers a wider perspective on the subject. The work of Balkin (1979) on victimisation rates and fear of crime and the contemporary reflection of Garofalo (1979); the reflection on the costs (economic and social) of this fear proposed by Dolan and Peasgood (2007); the relation between crime and social order explored by Farral, Jackson and Gray (2008, 2009) and the psychological perspective analysed by Jackson (2009), Santinello, Gonzi and Scacchi (1998) and Gabriel and Greve (2003). Finally, the relations between fear and incivilities are part of the works of Lewis and Salem (1986) and Hirtenlehner (2008). A critical realistic approach is indeed proposed by Richard Sparks (1992).

In contemporary societies, people have reached a level of prosperity never known before: the growing economic development, science and technology undoubtedly contributed to transforming the society in which we live into the safest ever but, contrary to the “objective” evidence, in recent years, the evolution of the fears and obsessions for security has been surprising. Although no one doubts that in our society we have reached a higher level of security than in the past, it is referred to by scholars as “risk society” (Short, 1984; Beck, 2008;
Luhmann, 1988). The term, which has become commonly used, is used in different contexts and with different meanings, often making it difficult to formulate a clear definition of the concept of risk.

In this regard, it is useful to refer to the notion of “social vulnerability” – the condition of deprivation resulting from being deprived of the resources (material, symbolic and relational) to face existential difficulties of various kinds – which refers, in turn, to the issue of quality of life. The intensity of the feeling of insecurity, and therefore the level of social vulnerability will vary: as such it is much higher the more precarious the social position of the subject seems to be. Neither the condition of relative poverty, nor social class would appear, in itself, to be able to explain the intensity with which, for example, the fear of a specific risk such as crime, is perceived. Much more important, on the contrary, seems to be the degree of social integration – the strength of social ties and trust shared – in a word, the level of “social capital” of a community.

As individuals, so every society has its “risk portfolio”: every social context develops the individual’s vision of an ideal society and, therefore, the types of risks on which to focus (Douglas – Wildavsky, 1982).

By focusing on the question of security, we can argue that, in the national context, this risk has also been conditioned in its emergence by internal logic to the policy framework and the relationship with the media. It is, in essence, based on acceptance and on the reaffirmation of the definition of “restricted” security as a public good, generated by interventions by criminal-repressive acts to counter the resurgence of micro street crime, assuming that a more efficient and effective enforcement action could help to address the problems successfully.

With the assumption that derives from Douglas and Wildavsky’s cultural theory of risk perception, according to which each company generates a kind of responsibility and focuses on particular risks, it is helpful to understand how urban insecurity could work if the severity of the perceived risk were connected to a social judgment.

Given this semantic complexity, the continued revival by the public and policy makers of the link between security and crime has overshadowed other crucial
dimensions of insecurity that relate directly to the quality of urban life (as its economic and social dimensions).

The presence of delinquent or deviant phenomena, as well as changes that affect both urban and architectural aspects, as the social morphology of cities produce insecurity in the population: if the crime is more feared than the consequences produced by the transformations of the urban habitat, is probably because the proposed security model coincides with the preservation of the social status quo (security against crime).

In light of the above, it is likely correct to assume the existence of a link between risk assessment and membership of a social group that shares the same core values, including risk perception and social judgment and political opinions. For these reasons, there is a clear need to extend the scope of the semantic concept of security to a number of issues of direct relevance to the quality of urban life: changes in the morphology of the neighbourhoods, the arrival of new populations, competition for the use of public spaces, etc. It may seem paradoxical, but the explosion of conflict seems to respond to the need to restore a form of control over an urban environment that is increasingly unfamiliar. Such conflicts, however, are framed in securitarian terms with ever-increasing frequency and see those who still hold a position of relative advantage (in general, the long-time residents in the district) evoke a repressive and preventive intervention by public institutions to restore a social order that cannot be derived from endogenous social processes and informal means. The obvious outcome of such a conflict between groups placed in a strongly asymmetrical position, as in the interests of the social legitimacy they bring and resources (economic capital, social and cultural) that may benefit, is made by the intensification of the disadvantage towards the weakest and the occurrence of acute forms of social exclusion.

The spread of the claims to the “right to security” that come from increasingly high expectations by the people of living in a risk-free society, inevitably infect the political system that, in the medium to long term, can only be influenced by a public opinion that demands guarantees for stable and more social welfare.

As some scholars have ably pointed out (Douglas – Wildavsky, 1982), the activation of pre-emptive measures can, on the one hand, help reduce the chances that known risks will occur; on the other hand, they can increase the likelihood
that unforeseen events can have a significantly negative effect. The activation of this perverse mechanism is mainly for two reasons: the first is the lack, on the part of public institutions, of available resources (which are already exhausted) to deal with new contingencies. The second reason is that, very often, the adoption of a preventive measure aimed at creating “protected environments” in the population creates a false sense of security, and this makes them more vulnerable when living conditions change.

The metropolis in a historical perspective: issues and developments

Metropolis and danger have not always been inseparable. Over the centuries, urban centres have been at the same time the nerve centre of change, of tolerance (the Stadluft macht frei of German cities towards serfdom) yet also the beating heart of fears, theorised in urban ecology essays and the exemplar of so-called “Social disorganisation” (Shaw – McKay, 1923).

According to this theory, which shares the ecological perspective proposed by the Chicago School, “social pathologies” would not belong among subjectivities, or to individuals’ innate qualities, but would, on the contrary, be related to the socio-cultural area of belonging (ibidem). For the Chicagoan authors, the city would then be determined, in its urban geographies, through the organic and natural processes of internal displacements and settlements (Park – Burgess – McKenzie, 1925). The ecological studies of the Chicago School represent the first systematic theorisation of the relationship between place, subjectivity and the production of deviance, and they have been refuted and widely revived over the last century. With a lively genealogical analysis, Dario Melossi (2002) leads back the responsibility for the birth of the concept of “social control” to the urban transformations near the beginning of the twentieth century. Security and insecurity are thus connected to the exquisitely urban dimension of dangers and to potentially deviant subjects. However, since the thirties, the ecological discipline identifies a further variable that would determine not only the relationship between subjects and perception of security, but the social and urban structure of cities: the economic dimension. The studies of Thomas and Znaniecki (1918–1920) on Polish peasants, taken up in the larger works on the city by Park, Burgess and McKenzie (1925), the studies of Wirth (1928) by Zorbaugh (1929) and Anderson (1923); they are all affected by the imbalances
of the capitalism of the twenties, of the crisis and of the gap between the new rich and poor, of the class struggle that entered the daily agenda but, above all, of the increase in mobility.

Social mobility is connected to the inner nature of the city; it imposes its geometry and structure, determines its conflicts and unleashes the processes of control and constant change. As claimed by Jane Jacobs (2000 [1961]), the city is the place where social processes take place. The American city acts as an early model for European ones. Thus, the post-war city, in America as in Europe, first settles on the model of the industrial city, and then turns more and more into the so-called City of Welfare (Petrillo, 2006).

As anticipated by Lefebvre (1976) in the city of the seventies, the welfare state guarantees the preservation and distribution of urban planning in Western and European contexts, to the point of describing and conferring a real “right to the city”. In fact, he writes: “The city is a projection of society on the ground, but it is perceived and conceived by thought, [...] the city is the place of confrontations and of (conflictual) relations [...], the city is the ‘site of desire’ and site of revolutions” (Lefebvre, 1976: 109).

Through the welfare system, the city used to reduce the polarisations between groups, while housing policies offer metropolitan alternatives and prevent, in fact, the spread of urban slum systems. The crisis of the industrial model triggered a domino of events that strongly impact the urban model, with the transition from the post-industrial city to the so-called “global city” (Sassen, 1997, 1999, 2002). The crisis of the social state reveals itself in the urban context before other ones, and the greater the insecurity and criminal response from the state (Garland, 2004).

The welcoming city soon became, in the collective imagination, the attractive pole of the new dangers, of the deviant subjects and of excessive inequalities (Wacquant, 2009). Mike Davis proposes some dystopian reconstruction (1990, 2000) of the new geographies of fear, and anticipated – in Los Angeles and New York – the tensions and the new security practices that have transformed the “city that liberates” into the place of urban segregation, dominated by private spaces, control technologies and video surveillance: it is the advent of the city of Quartz (Davis, 1990; Blumstein – Wallman, 2000; De Giorgi, 2000; Wacquant,
The city, as a vital pole, gradually becomes a receptacle of fears, of weakening social ties, the symbolic seat in the collective imagination of danger and “dangerous” subjects.

**Security actors and policy in Italy**

As most people know, the term “police” is derived from the Greek root “polis”, and it is also very similar to the word “policy”. The relationship between the terms, however, is not entirely etymological, as “police” refers to a set of institutional activities of managing a company; moreover, the Greek word “politeia” means the way of governing, the form of government. There is therefore a strong proximity between the police and the idea of government, seen as the executive. It is this link between the police and the administration of public affairs that makes the police itself an object of interest when dealing with the central management of public security (Recasens i Brunet, 2004).

On the other hand, the period between the 80s and the 90s (the crisis of major political parties and the beginning of an era of alternating currents and parties in government) led to a weakening of influence exerted by police forces, that were trying to adapt, out of increasing necessity, to a security question posed by citizens who were increasingly disconnected from the direct manifestation of phenomena or criminal offences; that question increasingly takes the form of a request for reassurance (Palidda, 2000; Selmini, 2004).

These macro-processes, which have taken place from above and below in transforming the roles and functions of the police, are the signal of the emergence of a new way of thinking about and understanding safety (Braccesi – Selmini, 2005).

In particular, referring to the Italian case, urban security is understood as not just “order and security” and, therefore, not attributable to the criminal and deviant phenomena, protection against which is traditionally entrusted to the State and the national police forces, but to a series of aspects that directly concern the quality of urban life, and directly involve, in preventing such phenomena and protecting its residents, the local authority. Following a series of legal and social transformations that took place in the 1980s and the 1990s, the local authority (especially at the municipal level, i.e. the mayor) became...
the interlocutor and the main referent of citizens’ requests. This role has contributed to favouring the separation of the traditional instruments of guaranteeing public security (the police force and the instruments of formal control) and the complex set of instruments, methods and practices for regulating civil coexistence in the urban security government. In the field of security, the redefinition of interactions between State and society, through new ways of exercising public power, has produced new preventive policies that have provided for the use of instruments other than those of the penal system, an enlargement of objectives (from the reduction of security-related crime) and interventions (from the perpetrators to the victims), the importance of the local dimension and accountability. Most of the prevention and security policies can be summarized in two ideal-typical models: the first Anglo-American matrix provides for the protection of the right to security; the second, of French imprint, is rooted in the security of rights (Baratta – Giannoulis, 1997), and aims to develop social-community prevention (Selmini, 2004). Over time, in Italy as in other European countries, the distance between the two models appears less clear and policies have been developed that propose a mix of both “social” and “situational” interventions, in which by now the situational aspect tends to prevail. The Italian experience has started to try and grasp the limits and the opportunities of the two models. However, as we will see from the testimonies gathered in the Lombard municipalities, in the balance of security policies, in a melange of social and situational interventions, situational safety policies tend to emerge (Selmini, 2004; Pitch, 2006).

In this perspective, the State is no longer – apparently – the *deus ex machina* in the field of urban security, since it is no longer able to guarantee security, order and crime control on its own, but is flanked by other institutional actors, with a redistribution of responsibilities, which directly involves local authorities. There is thus an increasingly evident bifurcation: the power of judging and punishing remains an affair of the State and of the agencies traditionally assigned to these tasks; control and prevention are however tasks that are increasingly devolved by local administrations to other agencies, or assumed by them.

This process has affected all the countries of the European Union: in the field of urban security from the nineties onwards there has been a transformation of security policies, with a fragmentation of skills and roles in the governance of
cities. The Italian case has its own characteristics that distinguish it compared to other European contexts (Selmini, 2005) summarised the following aspects:

1. The division of powers between the State and the Regions (outcome of the reform of Title V of the Constitution), introducing new responsibilities for regional governments, has initiated a new interpretation of the concept of security, together with the changing role of the regions in the elaboration of policies aimed at increasing the well-being of citizens and, more generally, social inclusion. Hence the emphasis on the “integrated” nature of urban security policies that only local governments can (theoretically) guarantee by attributing a multidimensional (and therefore not strictly criminological) character to urban security and developing integrated approaches (combining situational forms of prevention with those of social prevention).

2. The creation of partnerships and concerted local security policies. At the end of the nineties, we witnessed throughout the country the development of a multiplicity of local projects in terms of security, which leads the state to be receptive towards the local dimension of security. The so-called “contracting strategy” period opened: the State, in the figure of the Ministry of the Interior, began to sign memorandums of understanding that established forms of cooperation regarding information and also operationally, between the prefectures, police stations and local authorities with some large municipalities, whereby the issue of security became a responsibility of both contractors. As we will see in the following pages, apparently this strategy seems to allow, on the one hand, the (at least partial) renunciation by the State of its monopoly on public order policies and, on the other hand, the strengthening of the differentiation of the institutional roles at stake. In fact, if the activities to be carried out are agreed between the parties involved, the responsibilities among the actors involved are distinct: public order and crime repression for the State, prevention and social welfare for local administrations.

3. The role that the community plays in the design and implementation of local security policies. Compared to other contexts, such as France and Great Britain, where numerous initiatives have involved the involvement of communities in prevention policies, in Italy the contribution of the community to planning preventive interventions has not yet been fully realized.

The concept of urban security presents itself, therefore, to theoretical and political reflection with a more complex meaning than is commonly understood;
not only as public order in the strict sense, as the enforcement of legality and the repression of crimes, but as urban quality, both physical and social; in other words, “feeling good” in the city and in social relations.

The tendency of the national police force to converge on the local is the result of a series of transformations that characterise post-modern societies more generically (Wacquant, 2009). The increasing uncertainty in the paths of life of the individual, coupled with the growing variety of roles and functions within the company complex also reduce the possibilities of control that they will tolerate. This new status quo therefore, implies a new management of social control. In order to “control the uncontrollable” the prevailing view is that the actors should become controllers of themselves and others. In the field of social control and then the “police of the company”, the traditional police are no longer enough; states then “naturally” see the new role of citizens participating in the new government of safety (Palidda, 2000: 244; Simon, 2007).

The new local interactions between state police and locals arising from these new practices lead to partially overlapping areas of expertise and make the convergence process an interesting object of investigation. In particular, it is interesting to record the specifics of how they are managed.

The increased interest in the local dimension is accompanied by the search for better and wider collaboration with citizens.

In practice, this predisposition to listening directly to the population manifests itself in a greater focus on the petitions, letters or actions initiated by individual citizens or by committees of citizens. The changes just outlined justify questioning whether it is appropriate to speak of effective cooperation with the city in the direct control of the territory. It is also of particular interest to investigate more deeply the practical arrangements for managing this institutional partnership with the population.

The increased interest in the local, and the desire for direct involvement of the population in the management of security in the area have led, at the operational level, to the introduction of new professionals. In this sense, the idea of police proximity appears as an innovation, not only from the organisational point of view, but also in the practical modalities of intervention. This issue has
been written about in the English-speaking world (Palmiotto, 2000; Skogan – Hartnett, 1997), and there is equally lively discussion on the *police de proximité* in French-speaking countries (Demonque, 2001; Jankowski, 1993; Mouhanna, 2002; Smeets – Strabelle, 2000). A comparative reading of the European and US experience of proximity is offered by Roché (1992).

Underlying this new profession is a new relationship with the city, aimed at implementing measures not only targeting the maintenance of public order and control over the territory, but also the prevention of episodes of deviance and/or incivility, through an immediate response to the needs of the citizen. His search for direct contact with the city police is addressed directly, through the use of a fixed and constant presence in the area to solve existing problems in some neighbourhoods. This is a trend that is not exclusive to the Italian context, since virtually all European countries have undertaken attempts, some more successful than others, at community policing (Selmini, 1999).

This new relationship between citizens and police forces can be read in two distinct perspectives. At the macro level, the citizens belong among the ranks of actors who build safety requirements to which the police are obliged to respond. At the micro level, the citizens are the main interlocutors with whom police officers interact with the actual performance of their actions in the area. Both views deserve to be discussed in-depth and more fully in the following pages.

Among the macroeconomic factors behind this increasingly widespread instability, one can certainly count the current transformations of the welfare state and labour market (Piketty, 2014; De Giorgi, 2000; Standing, 2015), the easing of relational networks and the consequent loss of social solidarity (Pitch – Ventimiglia, 2001). The processes of transformation of contemporary cities listed above affect the vulnerability of citizens, not so much exposing them more to real risk, but they perceive they have a poor ability to control the situation, and defend themselves in the event of actual risk (Douglas, 1985). It is above all the vulnerability, in fact, more than the risk, that creates a feeling of fear and insecurity in people. There is a demand for security in increasingly diverse and widespread ways. In the process of constructing the social demand for security, the role played by a number of other actors, such as the press and other mass media, which occupy a privileged position not only in giving voice
to the demands of the population for security, but also in generating new forms of citizenship against widespread insecurity can be found. For example, the role played by the media in the genesis of the phenomenon of moral panic and in controlling the mechanisms that contribute to the creation and dissemination of new objects of collective fear have been widely shown (Pitch – Ventimiglia, 2001).

The semantic shift in the concept of security and the multidimensionality of its empirical manifestation has progressively introduced into the debate other concepts, such as participatory management of security policies with citizens. The city, in this regard, occupies a central place in the work of the police, not only as an end user, but also as potential partners. We pass, then, from a model of policing to a concerted pattern of “security governance” at the local level.

The works of Bittner (1980 and 1990), for example, offer a dense description of how the work of the police corresponds to the art of peacekeeping and how it articulates the relationship between citizens’ expectations and responses from law enforcement. Similarly, the research work of Monjardet (1996) shows, from everyday interactions, how the job of a policeman flexes along the ambiguity of his role, since the police force is both an instrument of power and of public service. Taken together, these authors refer to the prospect of ethnographic research and, through direct observation in the field, to capture the interpersonal interactions that take place between the police and citizens and infer considerations of a more general nature from these.

Closely related to the operators’ reading skills when it comes to insecurity are the considerations about the usefulness of prevention rather than cure. According to a recent contribution by Pitch, “prevention therefore is characterised as a public undertaking, which must be removed or at least mitigate [...] the conditions that facilitate the onset of diseases” (Pitch, 2006: 82). Operators should not act exclusively in the penal/punitive domain, but also seek the cooperation of the people in the joint management of the security issue; in this way an important preventive value is assigned to the police. It is on this side, in fact, that the partnership between the police and citizens is principally based. Acts of prevention, it should be pointed out, are not restricted to combating the causes of crime and hardship, but are grouped to minimise the impact caused by these phenomena on citizenship. Just as preventive, in fact, this policy “is rather to
direct potential victims to potential criminals” (Pitch, 2006). So that the police forces are able to provide such a service, however, it is necessary to commit to equipping their operators with cognitive tools, diagnostics and appropriate responses. In particular, law enforcement officials should not simply be prepared when they are called to enforce repressive legislation, but must also be prepared when they are called to be an active guarantor of rights and freedoms (Recasens i Brunet, 2004: 242) and, in a singular expression, responsible for the area of the wider policies for the quality of life.

**The case of the city of Milan**

The city of Milan was shaped by a strong industrial tradition, a constant turnover of people coming from rural parts of Italy, and is now affected by migration from the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Placed in the richest region of Italy, in past years the city represented a working-class destination while nowadays it has become a “smart city”. Milan has seen deep transformation in the last twenty years, with the decline of its industrial areas and a change in the model of production. This transition deeply influenced the city structure by fostering a process of gentrification of some areas (Isola/Garibaldi, Tortona/Savona, Bovisa, Lambrate) and the creation of a new urban complex (Bosco Verticale, Porta Nuova Varesine, City Life, Santa Giulia, and some years before Bicocca). Together with these architectural changes, the composition of the population represents a major cause of social conflict as shown by the emergence of the housing movement in the aftermath of the economic crisis.

It has also been argued that the radical change in the commercial activities in some neighbourhoods is due to the arrival of newcomers, most significant of all being migrants. As is the case in other cities, this process raised concerns in Milan (Martinotti, 1993) and in the last twenty years many studies have explored the phenomenon (Ambrosini, 2005; 2010; Cancellieri – Scandurra, 2012; Colombo, 1998; Dal Lago, 1994; Gambino, 2003; Landuzzi – Tarozzi – Treossi, 1995; Semprebon, 2011; Zajczyk, 2005). These works underline how socio-economic transformations move in parallel with the arrival of migrants in urban areas and the specific effects this process can have on the real estate market, with the opening of new ethnic markets and stores. Dal Lago and Quadrelli (2003) argued that this process reinforces citizens’ feelings of “bewilderment”
in terms of perception) related to the massive change of the residents in their neighbourhoods (Petrillo, 2006). The emergence of conflicts between social groups that use urban spaces in a very different way appears directly connected to a broader crisis in citizens’ identification with the idea of public space, and an increasing fragility of social networks and social ties (Vianello, 2006). Milan, as in most other Italian cities, faces the interrelation between the foreign presence and the perception of insecurity, especially because migration is still perceived as a recent phenomenon and migrants are strongly stigmatised (Dal Lago, 1999) and profiled by police (Chiodi, 2004; De Giorgi, 2000; Palidda, 2009; Quassoli, 1999; Stefanizzi, 2012). The city has become a place where stereotypes are more radicalised and emphasised by the media. Ranci (2007) recognises the crisis of protection networks and the weakness of local communities as the main cause of fragmented social relations and the loss of solidarity and neighbourhood relations, in turn impoverishing the capacity of community networks to offer informal social protection. As Bonomi (2008) argued, this transformation can be described as the emergence of a “society of grudges” (see also Benassi, 2005; Benassi – Colombini, 2006; Bonomi – Abruzzese, 2004; Zajczyk, 2003). Several ethnographic and qualitative works tried to explore these fragile neighbourhoods in the city of Milan, perceived and stigmatised as “difficult” and unsafe places. Some areas have received closer attention: Via Padova (Agustoni – Alietti, 2009; Naldi, 2001; Stefanizzi 2012), Bovisa-Dergano (Stefanizzi 2012); Corvetto, Molise-Calvairate, Stadera (Zajczyk, 2005) Quarto Oggiaro (Stefanizzi 2012) and Lazzaretto (Stefanizzi 2012). Recently, authors such as Stefanizzi (2012), Calvaresi and Cossa (2013) have started a prominent field of research in order to analyse the municipality and the local government interventions into some of the marginalised areas of the city that have come to be known as “safety agreements”.

Impact in the city and open questions

In the late seventies and early eighties of the last century there was a slow shift from political to social security policies (Melossi, 2002; Pitch, 2006), by models of the “welfare state” to those of a “warfare state” (Castells, 1974), with a widespread distribution of the so-called “culture of control” (Garland, 2001), today this paradigm does not seem to be the most effective in the face of major events, such as this economic crisis, which upset the social order to its roots. The topic
of criminal jurisdiction of the state and its consequences on the practices of social control has also been discussed by De Giorgi (2000), speaking of “actuarial” control aiming at inhibition, eviction and imprisonment of a whole class of subjects drawing up a priori social risks. In this way, the city is divided into parts and “spurious” bodies that, for their frailty, are moved to the margins. All this may also be termed social suffering (Kleinman – Das – Lock, 1997), as also discussed by Bourgois and Schonberg (2009). Drawing from his own ethnographic material collected at Edgewater, Bourgois setting out from the idea of agency to formulate the notion of “lumpen abuse”. The word “abuse” suggests extreme emotional, psychological and physical suffering. Such a definition refers to the personal experience of intolerable levels of suffering (often conveyed through self-destruction and interpersonal violence) among socially vulnerable individuals in a context with structural forces (political, economic, institutional, and cultural) and physical manifestations of distress (illness, physical pain, emotional deprivation) (Bourgois, 2011: 35).

In his analysis Bourgois refers to lumpen speaking about a generalized condition of vulnerability and suffering non simply related to the working conditions of lumpenproletariat, but to the forms of structural violence, what Farmer (2003) called “pathologies of power”. According to these analyses, the new “war on the poor” develops a higher level of affection, connecting work, social rights and health conditions, and creating conditions of permanent extreme vulnerability.

References


The Dimensions of Insecurity in Urban Areas


CHAPTER 2

MIXED METHOD APPROACH TO STUDYING INSECURITY IN URBAN SETTINGS

Riccardo Valente – Lucrezia Crescenzi Lanna

Introduction

Project MARGIN, an acronym standing for *Tackle Insecurity in Marginalized Areas*, started on May 1\textsuperscript{st} 2015 and ran for 24 months, until the end of April 2017. In line with its purpose of creating sustainable modes of cooperation between stakeholders dealing with security issues, the project set up an international environment for knowledge exchange involving some of the leading EU institutions in Crime Victimisation Surveys (hereinafter referred to as CVS). In particular, seven institutions of different natures (universities, public institutions and research institutes), backgrounds (sociology, criminology, law, psychology) and national traditions (Spain, France, Italy, Hungary and the UK) were represented within the Consortium\textsuperscript{1}.

The project had three main objectives:

1. Identify, validate and analyse factors influencing public and personal perceptions of insecurity;
2. Analyse the relationship between socio-economic inequalities, victimisation and crime; in other words, to explore the impact of insecurity on different demographic and socio-economic groups;

\textsuperscript{1} The institutions integrating the Consortium were the University of Barcelona (coordinator of the project), the Department of Interior of Catalonia, the French National Institute for Advanced Studies in Security and Justice, University College London, the University of Milano-Bicocca, EuroCrime srl and the Hungarian National Institute of Criminology.
3. Provide policy makers with high quality tools for creating and evaluating strategies targeted at the reduction of insecurity.

The underlying assumption of the MARGIN project was that there is a mismatch between crime trends and the perception of insecurity since, as far as up-to-date figures show, despite a decreasing trend in crime at the EU level, people feel more insecure (De Wever, 2011). So, why is there this mismatch? And, what factors intervene beyond actual crime rates in the definition of the perception of insecurity? In order to answer these questions, the project was divided into four phases plus a transversal phase of dissemination and exploitation.

First, the partnership carried out a desk-based review with a view to comparing two kinds of data: official crime statistics and CVS data. The rationale was to complement police statistics with information on what is called the “dark figure” of crime, as well as people’s understanding of insecurity (i.e. insecurity as a subjective phenomenon). During this phase, the partnership generated a database allowing the comparison of crime and CVS data at an international level. In other words, the results of the first phase led to the conceptualisation of what in the literature are known as the objective (i.e. crime) and the subjective (i.e. perception) dimensions of insecurity.

During a second phase, the focus was on two further dimensions in order to analyse socio-economic and socio-geographic determinants of the perception of insecurity. Socio-economic insecurity is defined as any situation that reduces an individual’s ability to care for his or her own social independence (poverty, low social capital, educational deficit, social exclusion), while the aim of the analysis of the socio-geographic dimension was oriented towards the selection of a set of indicators exploring whether levels of perceived insecurity depend on where people live.

During the third phase, a panel of 12 experts was involved in a participatory design process (using, for example, the Delphi method) in order to select and validate a set of items to be included in an innovative victimisation survey (MARGIN survey) the main objective of which is the assessment of the impact of insecurity among different demographic and socio-economic groups. This survey was implemented in Italy among a stratified sample of 15,428 respond-
ents. Simultaneously, it was translated and piloted in the remaining countries (around 100 respondents in each scenario).

A fourth phase was dedicated to the anthropological fieldwork in five EU urban areas (Barcelona, London, Milan, Paris and Budapest). At the beginning of this phase, training sessions were organised in Barcelona for the researchers who were in charge of collecting data in their respective countries. The following data collection techniques were performed: in-depth interviews (n = 50), focus groups (n = 10) and participant observation (over 6 months, 5 days per week, 8 hours per day). Each one of these techniques was carried out in two neighbourhoods in the selected urban areas with differing degree of insecurity.

Apart from traditional measures of dissemination (publications, participation in congresses, networking, public events), a transversal phase of the project was devoted to the definition of an exploitation plan for further application of the MARGIN survey, as well as the development of an agenda of best practices targeted to end-users dealing with security issues. The main objective of this agenda² was to compile a set of scientifically evaluated practices that could help to orient public intervention in the field of reducing insecurity.

Towards a comprehensive conceptualization of (in)security

Currently, a vast amount of information on factors affecting insecurity is available for researchers and policy makers, but a lot of work still lies ahead. For instance, since the beginning of the draft proposal, the partnership identified a common interest in filling a gap present in the literature, namely the lack of research allowing for a comparative analysis of two kinds of sources that have been studied separately (crime statistics and figures on perception of insecurity). At first glance, it appeared urgent to produce a ‘smarter aggregation’ of crime and criminal justice data (Hunt et al., 2010), enabling the collection of information on crime-related issues while considering contextual, definitional and methodological differences between EU countries. Even if it has been proved that CVS and police statistics “both offer valuable and unique information about crime problems” (Van Dijk et al., 2007: 8), comparisons between these two sources are challenging. Based on the progress made by previous

research, the MARGIN project addressed this challenge by involving five different EU countries with highly divergent national systems of police statistics and victimisation surveys.

Even more important, several challenges need to be addressed in order to enable decision makers to develop targeted policies aimed at reducing insecurity, especially among vulnerable populations. In this sense, one of the most important challenges addressed by this project was to gain further knowledge of the impact of insecurity on different demographic groups by taking into account the high diversity among EU Member States in terms of crime trends, crime policies and socio-economic composition. From this perspective, the proposed research is part of a tradition of studies aiming at addressing demographic and socio-economic factors influencing public and personal insecurity (Vieno – Roccato – Russo, 2013; Hummelsheim et al., 2011; Wacquant, 2007; Downes – Hansen, 2006; Grieve – Howard, 2004).

In an attempt to deepen the understanding of the significance of insecurity, the MARGIN project aimed to focus on the following four key dimensions of insecurity:

a. **Objective dimension**: the project envisaged the collection of secondary data from official police statistics throughout EU countries. A main focus was given on two typologies of crimes, namely: (a) contact and violent crimes (e.g. sexual offences, murder, injury, robbery, etc.) and (b) property crimes (e.g. burglary, theft, larceny, vandalism, etc.). This approach was based on the assumption that these indicators encompass criminal offences that suppose a direct attack on people and, accordingly, a greater feeling of insecurity. Moreover, findings from previous victimisation surveys clearly show that these typologies of offences are directly associated with the perception of insecurity.

b. **Subjective dimension**: which refers to a continuum including emotional and cognitive factors affecting perceived insecurity. In order to provide the project with a pertinent conceptual framework, the project stressed a classic distinction between fear of crime and perception of insecurity. As stated by Valera and Guàrdia (2014), fear is usually related to emotional features, while insecurity is related to both risk theories and cognitive processes. Assuming this difference, we pointed out that risk perception and fear of crime are well-distinguished constructs. The conceptual framework adopted by
the MARGIN project drew on Rader (2004), who sets forth a more inclusive concept of the victimization threat involving three components: affective (fear of crime), cognitive (perceived risk), and behavioural (restricted behaviours). These three components all share complex relationships with each other.

c. **Socio-geographic dimension:** referring to neighbourhood characteristics that have effects on the perception of insecurity. The analysis of what is often called the ‘neighbourhood effect’ was threefold here: first, by analysing physical characteristics of spaces or areas that could have an impact on residents and drive them to adopt a restricted range of behaviours; second, by taking into account the interaction between people and the space in which they live through an analysis of individual lifestyles and their consequences on risk perception; and third, the MARGIN project stressed a further dimension that refers to the presence or absence of strong social capital, which helps citizens deal with their everyday life in the neighbourhood (Sampson – Raudenbush, 2004). Addressing these factors has been proved to be crucial in order to reduce the feeling of insecurity and to create community resilience practices that allow citizens to face their anxieties, fears and feelings of insecurity (Stefanizzi, 2012; Soomeren et al., 2008).

d. **Socio-economic dimension:** or social insecurity, referring to the social consequences of poverty and deprived living conditions for ontological security (Valente – Valera, 2018; Valente, forthcoming). By including this dimension, the project was expected to complement core statistics on crime with secondary statistics from institution dealing with social groups at risk of exclusion.

**MARGIN’s research design**

Identifying factors affecting the perception of insecurity and the relationship between them is a complex goal, not only because perception is an experience involving cognitive and affective causes but also due to the different ways of understanding public and personal security, depending on contextual factors (different cultural and political background, situational and environmental conditions, etc.). Understanding the relationship between individual and wider socio-cultural insecurities posed a principle challenge for our research and underlines the importance of developing a robust analysis of security cultures.
at the level of EU member states. In order to meet this challenge, MARGIN’s research design included both qualitative and quantitative research methods aiming at achieving a comprehensive investigation of public and personal perceptions of insecurity. In particular, a set of research activities was deployed in an attempt to identify individual factors (gender, age, nationality, income, lifestyle), socio-cultural factors (actual crime rates and differences in perception among the five countries of the consortium) and situational factors (socio-economic features of neighbourhoods, urban layout, etc.) that could influence perceptions of insecurity.

It is equally important to point out that the MARGIN project focused its attention on studying insecurity in urban contexts. Several reasons justified this approach. At the broadest level, research has demonstrated that people living in cities are more likely to be victims of crime than those in rural areas (Brunton-Smith – Jackson, 2012; Dixon et al., 2006). At the same time, it is widely recognized that the world is affected by increasing urbanisation and, according to demographic forecasts of the United Nations Human Settlements Program (UN-Habitat), by 2050, 7 out of 10 people will live in cities. Moreover, in the case of a project addressing vulnerable subjects, an additional concern arises due to the fact that, as the world is becoming increasingly urban, there is also an increase in the number of urban poor. As such, this project was oriented toward the creation of a link between the spatial and the social dimension of insecurity and, more precisely, it differentiates three levels of analysis: a macro-level (city), a meso-level (district) and a micro-level (neighbourhood). This three-level design has been contemplated as a central element for carrying out the overall empirical study (analysis of secondary data on crimes and CVS, data collection on demographic and socio-economic determinants of insecurity, and anthropological fieldwork).

The research design was made up of a sequence of steps. After reviewing the results of past and on-going research on the topic, the first phase of the study was dedicated to collecting secondary data on: (1) crime and victimisation, (2) demographic and socio-economic factors affecting insecurity perception and (3) neighbourhood characteristics that have been found to have an effect on individual and public perception of insecurity. The subsequent statistical analysis allowed for the identification and definition of a set of indicators assessing insecurity, which were to be used as a consensual basis for discussion
throughout the project activities. Based on the conclusion of this preliminary phase, a panel of international experts on the topic of insecurity assessment was involved in an iterative design process in order to define a number of indicators enabling the assessment of insecurity among different social groups. In particular, the Delphi method was chosen as the most appropriate technique for reaching a reliable consensus among the participants included in the panel of international experts. The results obtained through the Delphi method represented an agreed framework to inform the selection of a set of items to be included in a new thematic survey. Last, results from qualitative research at the national level were contrasted with quantitative data collected in order to identify potentially overlooked factors influencing perceptions of insecurity.

A new thematic survey in the field of crime and victimisation studies

One of the main achievements of the MARGIN project consisted of the design, implementation and analysis of a new thematic survey in the field of crime and victimisation studies. Since the 1980s, the use of crime and victimisation surveys (CVS) has spread throughout Europe. Survey-based data constitute an alternative source to police statistics and are often considered more reliable because they can allow the identification of crimes that are not usually reported to or noticed by police services (i.e. the so-called ‘dark figure’ of crime). Moreover, unlike police statistics, CVS data can directly address the various dimensions defining the perception of insecurity.

Based on an in-depth review of five CVS at the EU level, a panel of 12 international experts on the topic of assessing insecurity was involved in an iterative design process in order to define a number of indicators enabling the assessment of insecurity among different social groups. Details on the whole process will be available in a forthcoming paper by Valente, Crescenzi and Chainey (under revision). The main outcome of the Delphi method was the design of the MARGIN Questionnaire on Perceptions of Insecurity, which is available online in six languages (English, Spanish, Catalan, French, Hungarian and Italian).

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3 The following surveys were considered: Cadre de vie et sécurité (France), Crime Survey for England and Wales (UK), Encuesta de Seguridad Pública de Cataluña (Spain), Sicurezza dei cittadini (Italy) and Victims and Opinion Research (Hungary).

The final draft of the questionnaire consisted of a module including a set of items enabling how demographic, socio-economic and socio-geographic variables might influence public and personal perceptions of insecurity to be assessed. Further modules included standardised questions on victimisation and perceptions of insecurity derived from existing CVS.

A large-scale survey was carried out in Italy using the MARGIN questionnaire on a sample of 15,428 respondents and the questionnaire was also piloted in its different language versions. The survey in Italy was carried out from July to September 2016 in Italy through the CATI method (Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing). The sample was geographically distributed across three subgroups, the first including the Italian municipalities with a resident population between 50,000 and 199,999 inhabitants, and a second one consisting of all the Italian municipalities with more than 200,000 inhabitants. The third subgroup is composed of the four major Italian municipalities (Rome, Milan, Naples and Turin), which were allocated around 1,500 interviews each. The first two subgroups were sampled using a proportional criterion, whereas the one defined as the major Italian cities was sampled on a purposive sample design. The sample was divided among the three subgroups in a non-proportional manner. This was done to guarantee the estimates at the district level for all the four major cities involved (Rome, Milan, Naples and Turin).

Inferential analysis was performed by observing the $p$-values of the Mann–Whitney U, Spearman rho and Kruskal–Wallis statistical tests to explore potential associations between the different variables associated with the perception of insecurity and the sociological variables of interest (sex, age, nationality, educational levels, employment status, health status, lifestyle, and self-perception of social exclusion). Empirical evidence reveals differences when people are asked about fear of crime. Despite the emergence of critical positions (Reid – Konrad, 2004), many studies have shown, for instance, that women are more likely to experience feelings of insecurity than men. Following the vulnerability theory, people who perceive themselves to be more physically vulnerable tend to develop a greater fear of crime and feelings of insecurity (Cossman – Rader, 2011). In the case of women, these effects could have negative consequences on their well-being (Sulemana, 2015; Mesch, 2000) and in many cases compel them to adopt avoidance behaviours when they are in public spaces (Gardner, 1990; San Juan – Vozmediano, 2012). Results obtained in the context of the present survey
show moderate support for the hypothesis that there is a difference on the basis
of sex. In fact, while differences between the sexes are statistically significant
in terms of the subjective perception of insecurity (t = 16.89; df = 10016.155;
p < .001) and lack of community cohesion (t = 7.665; df = 10030.035; p < .001),
differences in the perception of neighbourhood-based concerns are not significant.

Grounded on similar arguments to those used to justify women’s fear, elderly
people are also frequently considered to be a demographic group that is compar-
atively more exposed to fear of crime and perceived insecurity (Lloyd-Sherlock –
Agrawal – Minicuci, 2016), with some exceptions (Jackson, 2009). Nevertheless,
all things being equal, the effect of fear and perceived insecurity seems to in-
crease when people live in socially deprived environments (Buffel –Phillispin –
Scharf, 2012). Conversely, vulnerability effects may be reduced when neigh-
bourhood attachment and collective efficacy increase (Gaine – Alper – Chap-
pell, 2010; Joong-Hwan – Sangmoon, 2009; Oh – Kim, 2009). In the case of
this study, the results reveal elderly people are more likely to express concerns
in terms of community cohesion (r = –.101; p < .001) and are also more con-
cerned about future-oriented anxieties (r = .173; p < .001) but, quite surprising-
ly, they show lower levels of subjective insecurity (r = –.028; p = .005). At the
same time, the results show generally poor correlations.

The results also show that people who had been living in the neighbourhood
longer tended to be more confident about community cohesion (r = –.171;
p < .001), they felt more socially integrated (r = .086; p < .001) but, at the
same time, they tended to be more concerned about physical and social disorder
(r = .106; p < .001) in the neighbourhood and more exposed to subjective ele-
ments of the perception of insecurity (r = –.047; p < .001).

Looking at the differences on the perception of insecurity by country of
birth, the sample was divided into three different groups: people born in Italy
(n = 14,328), people born in one of the countries of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (n = 301) and a residual group com-
posed of respondents coming from countries where income per capita is below
the poverty threshold fixed at 60% of the average income per capita among
OECD countries (n = 799). ANOVA results show significant differences be-
tween, on the one hand, people born in Italy and those born outside the country
and, on the other, countries with income per capita either above or below the
established threshold. Italian residents are more concerned about disorder in the neighbourhood \( (F = 44.97; \text{df} = 2; p < .001) \) and tend to assess community cohesion more positively \( (F = 24.708; \text{df} = 2; p < .001) \). On the other hand, those born outside the country, especially those coming from poorer countries in terms of income per capita, are more likely to report feeling excluded from society \( (F = 63.482; \text{df} = 2; p < .001) \). As a final remark, it should be noted that Italian residents tend to register higher levels of subjective insecurity than foreign-born residents \( (F = 5.791; \text{df} = 2; p = .003) \).

Educational levels have been proved to serve as a determinant of fear of crime, especially when a deficit in educational attainment is associated with poor material conditions and social vulnerability (Hummelsheim et al., 2011; Covington – Taylor, 1991). In our case, the results reveal statistically significant differences among respondents with different educational backgrounds. In particular, less educated people showed higher levels of self-perceived social exclusion \( (F = 11.889; \text{df} = 4; p < .001) \), future-oriented anxieties \( (F = 37.351; \text{df} = 4; p < .001) \) and subjective insecurity \( (F = 14.099; \text{df} = 4; p < .001) \). At the opposite end of the scale, higher educational levels are associated with lower levels of concern about physical and social disorder in the neighbourhood \( (F = 20.112; \text{df} = 4; p < .001) \) as well as to higher levels of community cohesion \( (F = 25.427; \text{df} = 4; p < .001) \).

The relationship between working conditions, income and perceived insecurity is perhaps the least explored in the criminological literature, or at least is a topic with less empirical evidence. Among the few exceptions, the work of Vieno, Roccato and Russo (2013) is worth mentioning. The results obtained in the context of this survey revealed statistically significant differences depending on the employment status of the respondents and which are in line with the social vulnerability thesis of Will and McGrath (1995). Respondents with precarious positions in the labour market were more inclined to assess their levels of (in)security negatively. The unemployed, for instance, expressed higher levels of anxiety towards the future evolution of their health or financial status than those who were employed \( (F = 66.658; \text{df} = 7; p < .001) \). Looking at the difference in terms of subjective insecurity, the results show that housekeepers, the unemployed and part-time workers significantly differ from respondents included in the other labour-related categories \( (F = 13.677; \text{df} = 7; p < .001) \). Finally, respondents with less income were more worried about physical and
social disorder within neighbourhood ($r = .131; p < .001$); they show higher levels of self-perceived social exclusion ($r = .162; p < .001$), and higher levels of anxiety towards the future ($r = .160; p < .001$) as well as higher levels of subjective insecurity ($r = -.145; p < .001$).

Scholars have shown that victimisation experiences are one of the main factors explaining variations in fear of crime, although there is also general agreement on the idea that fear of crime is a consequence of a much broader number of factors and is not limited to victimisation (Tseloni – Zarafonitou, 2008; Skogan – Maxfield, 1981). The analysis of the large-scale survey conducted in Italy has shown that victimisation experiences have the potential to have a negative impact on one’s general perception of insecurity. Indeed, there are statistically significant differences in the values of ranked factors depending on the experience of direct victimization. Consequently, victimised people reported feeling more unsafe than those who had not been victimised ($t = 13.930; df = 10154; p < .001$). In addition, compared to non-victimised people, those who had been the victim of a crime tended to perceive themselves as less socially integrated ($t = -7.040; df = 1058.614; p < .001$), more anxious about the future evolution of their health and financial status ($t = -5.086; df = 10154; p < .001$), more concerned about neighbourhood disorder ($t = -9.333; df = 10154; p < .001$) and more likely to report that they lived in a place with poor community cohesion ($t = -4.156; df = 1115.923; p < .001$).

Data gathered through the survey in Italy were also analysed by using Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Structural Equation Modelling. The results obtained confirm the complexity of explicative models on perceived insecurity and point to the emergence of an ontological dimension in the fear of crime and perceived insecurity (Valente – Valera, 2018). Several studies had already shown that fear of crime is comparatively higher among people who consider themselves socially marginalised (Vieno – Roccato – Russo, 2013) and among people who believe that they are living in a country with unsatisfactory welfare provisions (Hummelsheim et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the results of our analysis appear to go further and sustain a conceptualisation of the perception of insecurity where socially constructed anxieties (due to health and financial precariousness) and self-perceived stigmatisation play a prominent role in determining people’s feeling of insecurity. As such, insecurity appears to be increasingly associated with the “umbrella sentiment people develop to disguise their high levels of social
and economic insecurity” (Bauman, 1999 as reported by Vieno et al., 2013: 521). A multi-dimensional conceptualisation of the social phenomenon of insecurity thus arises from our analysis, offering a more convincing explanation for the mismatch between the drop in crime and increases in the perception of insecurity, which was the starting point of the MARGIN project when it first began in 2015 (an assumption based on the arguments of De Wever, 2011). As a matter of fact, it becomes easy to agree with Hirtenlehner (2008: 134) when he sustains that ‘it is not always crime that is meant when crime is spoken about’.

Anthropological dimension of insecurity

In order to improve and strengthen the focus on the anthropological dimension of insecurity, the MARGIN project widened its perspective, including specific concepts and categories developed in the field of anthropology. Garland defines crime as “a collective cultural experience, one that weaves its threads of meaning into every individual encounters, and is, in turn, inflected and revised by the thousands of such encounters that take place every day” (Garland, 2001: 147). Social and cultural anthropology have shown how the same concepts of violence and danger may change in different contexts, interlacing with different concepts of subjectivity (Jackson – Gray, 2010; Penglase, 2009; Appadurai, 2006; Low, 2003). At the same time, different cultural understandings shape the sense of space and place, as well as the way in which we experience them in everyday life (San Juan – Vozmediano – Vergara, 2012). The perception of living in an insecure area can be a consequence of such deviant actions as incivility, urban degradation, transgression of legitimate community rules, crime, etc. All these factors may be interpreted by citizens (and, in particular, from the most socially vulnerable people) as a sign of the weakening of the social order and result in a lack of confidence in institutions.

In an attempt to offer a more comprehensive approach to the cultural and anthropological dimensions of insecurity, the research project has been designed to provide an understanding of fear of crime “as an entity symbolically loaded with general anxieties and social and economic fears, which can be framed in the context of the radical transformation of our societies” (Vieno – Roccato – Russo, 2013: 521). With this in mind, the project involved a process of qualitative data collection in 10 selected neighbourhoods of five cities and
the corresponding analysis of 50 in-depth interviews, six months of participant observation and 10 focus groups (see Table 1). In parallel, quantitative data have also been gathered through small-scale surveys in the same neighbourhoods. By directly involving citizens in the project, the objective of the fieldwork was to analyse the social construction of crime-related issues so as to offer a deeper understanding of fear of crime and the perception of insecurity in five European cities (Barcelona, Budapest, London, Milan and Paris).

Table 1: MARGIN triangulation procedure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Topics</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Expected outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. In-depth interviews</td>
<td>Key informants’ understanding of security issues in the neighbourhood.</td>
<td>Preliminary definition of security issues according to the three different profiles of key informants.</td>
<td>Identify main factors affecting insecurity; Select smaller areas within the neighbourhood for participant observation (qualitative GIS); Gather information about potential gatekeepers in the field;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Participant observation</td>
<td>Relationship between people and space.</td>
<td>Analyse the cultural dimension of the phenomenon of insecurity.</td>
<td>Explore lifestyles and their relation to insecurity; Inform the design of focus groups (i.e., identify the needs and expectations of residents regarding public and personal insecurity);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Focus groups</td>
<td>Possible intervention with a view to reducing insecurity.</td>
<td>Provide an external validation.</td>
<td>Discuss and (where possible) agree on solutions allowing for the reduction of insecurity; Transfer results of the project.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The prelude to the fieldwork was focused on the design and validation of the data collection instruments and procedures that were recalled in the framework of a dedicated training session in Barcelona involving the researchers responsible for the data collection and analysis. After the training, each national team was responsible for carrying out the fieldwork in their respective cities/neighbourhoods. Building further on the broad definition of insecurity addressed
by the MARGIN project, three domains were used to select a sample of neighbourhoods in which subsequent analysis and the implementation of qualitative research has been focused: (1) the incidence rate of residential burglary as the measure for the objective dimension of insecurity; (2) the educational attainment as the proxy measure for perceived insecurity; (3) the measures of socio-geographic insecurity were selected by implementing an \textit{ad hoc} procedure in each specific city. \textit{Table 2} provides the final list of neighbourhoods where the subsequent analysis was carried out.

\textit{Table 2: Neighbourhood sample selection}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Affluent areas</th>
<th>Marginalized areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>Vila Olímpica del Poblenou</td>
<td>Marina del Prat Vermell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budapest</td>
<td>Országút</td>
<td>Laposdűlő</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London</td>
<td>Primrose Hill</td>
<td>Harlesden and Stonebridge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milan</td>
<td>Rogoredo</td>
<td>Gratosoglio – Ticinello</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Danube – Solidarité</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the definition adopted in the framework of the original project proposal, the socio-geographic dimension of insecurity refers to neighbourhood characteristics that have effects on the perception of insecurity. The analysis of what have been called neighbourhood effects in the literature was intended to be threefold. First, the objective was to analyse the physical characteristics of spaces or areas that could have an impact on residents and drive them to adopt a restricted range of behaviours. Second, we aimed at considering the interaction between people and the space in which they live through an analysis of individual lifestyles and their consequences for risk perception. Third, we stressed a further dimension that refers to the presence or absence of strong social capital that helps citizens deal with their everyday life in the neighbourhood.

Building further on this broad definition, our approach to socio-geographic determinants of subjective insecurity incorporated a difference between physical and social disorder, according to the definition of Skogan (1995), where the former is drawn upon the theory of ‘broken windows’ (Hinkle, 2015; Wilson – Kelling, 1982) and the latter is related to antisocial behaviour or “incivilities” (Swatt et al., 2013; Boyd, 2006; Fyfe – Bannister – Kearns, 2006; Phillips – Smith, 2006). In line with the conclusions reached by previous studies, we
assumed that the perception of living in a neighbourhood affected by visual signs of physical disorder (vandalized properties and urban furniture, dirty streets, graffiti, etc.) and social anomie (drug and/or alcohol consumption in public spaces, noise nuisance, intimidation, abusive language, offensive behaviour, etc.) could in turn engender higher levels of perceived insecurity.

The research material produced during the fieldwork highlights the incompleteness of a strictly criminological definition of urban insecurity. The constant and noteworthy renewal of the socio-demographic composition of the neighbourhoods, the transformation of the economy and local businesses, and the conflicts among people who have different access to public spaces are all intertwined. They generate a diffuse sensation of lack of control over one’s own daily life in urban settings. The concept of urban safety is actually more complex than typically understood, both theoretically and politically. Not only does it strictly pertain to public order, law enforcement and crime control, but it also includes elements increasingly related to people’s wellbeing.

By way of conclusion: knowledge-based initiatives to reduce insecurity

The desk-based review of up-to-date sources in the field of criminology performed at the time of writing the project’s proposal showed that, despite a decreasing trend in crime at the EU level, people are concerned with crime-related issues. Even though this situation may appear paradoxical, as researchers we were well-placed to formulate some hypotheses that could help explain this trend. It was already known, for instance, that insecurity is affected by several factors that go beyond actual crime rates. Several studies underline the impact of media on fear as well as the influence that non-criminal episodes, such as anti-social behaviours, can have on people’s perceptions of crime. Another argument adduced by criminologists is that the crimes that the police are aware of do not include all the crimes that effectively take place in a given society. Some typologies of offences are clearly underreported (for example, gender and domestic violence), which may generate what is called the ‘dark figure’ of crime (i.e. the difference between the crimes that actually occur and those that are reported to the police). As a matter of fact, studying insecurity by solely taking crime reported to the police into account actually reduces the focus to a small portion of the problem.
With that in mind, if we look at the mismatch between crime reality and people’s perception of it from the point of view of policymakers, the perspective radically changes, as a declaration by Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel in 2013 seems to suggest. During a press release on Chicago’s 2013 violence reduction, he said: ‘We are not going to rest until people feel the reality of these numbers’. Paraphrasing these words, what policymakers can do is to try to convince citizens that they are doing a good job in reducing crime and that crime has actually decreased. Though understandable, this attitude is still controversial for at least two reasons: first, in most cases policymakers do not have good or sufficient measures of crime rates, which means that they cannot declare with certainty that crime has decreased and second, even though crime may have eventually decreased, this does not automatically imply that people will feel safer.

Apart from these different approaches, one aspect remains unchanged: in Western societies, where crime and victimization are relatively uncommon events (compared to other parts of the world), fear of crime and the perception of insecurity have become pressing issues as urgent as crime itself. With this in mind, the MARGIN project was designed in to produce well-grounded knowledge, allowing those factors that are associated with high levels of insecurity to be identified, to transfer this knowledge to policymakers to inform the design of policies aimed at reducing insecurity and to relay this information to citizens in order to enhance resilience practices.

Notwithstanding the above, the aim of the MARGIN project in particular, and knowledge-based initiatives to reduce insecurity in general, cannot be reduced to the mere production of new knowledge on the topic of (in)security. In fact, the effort produced in the framework of the project was specifically oriented towards the design and implementation of policies ‘targeting fear’ (Cordner, 2010: 10) through an in-depth measurement and analysis of the determinants of insecurity. Identifying and analysing factors that may determine variations in terms of perceived insecurity among citizens does not simply mean gathering new knowledge but, more importantly, recognising a number of risk factors that could be addressed by policymakers in order to tackle insecurity more effectively. Knowledge-based initiatives to reduce insecurity are supported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as stated in the Roadmap to improve the quality and availability of crime statistics at the national and international levels (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2012). The report jointly written
by UNODC in collaboration with National Institute of Statistics and Geography of Mexico (INEGI) encourages, among others measures, ‘the promotion of a wider implementation of victimisation surveys within the scope of official statistics to enhance the knowledge base on crime for the design of effective crime and criminal justice policies and better targeting of crime prevention measures’ (United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2012: 16).

By deepening the understanding of the social phenomenon of insecurity, MARGIN fostered the creation of community resilience practices empowering citizens (especially those at risk of exclusion) by producing a better understanding of the root causes of the (real or perceived) risks that affect their daily life. As such, the direct involvement of citizens in MARGIN (and in security research in general) was crucial to achieving this objective. Citizens are a fundamental source of information and were encouraged during the anthropological fieldwork to give feedback on the work undertaken by public authorities to reduce insecurity in their neighbourhoods. Since citizenship is not monolithic, great emphasis has been put on trying to gather the varying opinions that may emerge in a given urban area. This was the specific objective of the in-depth interviews aimed at collecting information on the problems that affect the selected neighbourhoods, the know-how that citizens deploy in dealing with these problems and their assessment of public intervention. Then, when conducting the six-month participant observation, the research team contrasted the information previously gathered through the interviews by interacting with people in the real-life environments in which they live. As a result of the qualitative data collection, it was possible to identify the needs and expectations of residents with regard to public and personal insecurity.

The added value of the research design implemented in the framework of the MARGIN project lay in the belief that the analysis of the social phenomenon of insecurity has to be integrated with information on the physical, economic and socio-relational characteristics of specific areas. The direct involvement of citizens in the project offers a deeper understanding of victimisation in contemporary society and, what is more, permits a close observation and description of the practices and the daily life of people in a number of selected scenarios (i.e. neighbourhoods). Addressing the finest geographic level possible seems essential in order to describe the ways that public spaces are used by different groups of people, and to understand the differences – if any – between differ-
ent social groups and their perceptions of insecurity. Here again, this approach was not exclusively intended to produce knowledge for the sake of knowledge. On the contrary, we consider that targeting neighbourhoods and small places (which are the physical spaces in which people live and where the determinants of insecurity take place) is a privileged way to develop targeted policies that could generate effective, long-lasting and sustainable results to reduce the risk factors that negatively affect people’s perceptions of security.

References


CHAPTER 3

DETECTING AND TACKLING THE DIFFERENT LEVELS OF SUBJECTIVE SECURITY

Francesc Guillén Lasierra

Insecurity, population and territory

Research and academia have evidenced that, despite the quite generalised tendency of falling crime levels, people feel unsafe (even more than before) in most of countries in our context (Bauman, 2007; Feltes – Guillén, 2018; Maffei – Markopoulou, 2013).

The perception of security is a core factor in public tranquillity (from now on, we will use the term “subjective security” to refer to it). It usually goes further than criminality, offences and any other objective criterion. This is at the moment nothing new, because criminology has already shown this during the second half of the past century. Communities’ physical and social disorders, individual factors, mass media, personal experiences of crime and other individual and/or contextual factors may intensively influence subjective security (Guillén, 2012). Even the level of health may affect subjective security (Jackson – Stafford, 2009). The radical change in the conceptualisation of (in)security (Curbet, 2009) that occurred in the last few decades pushed scholars to approach the study of this social phenomenon by considering two different sources (crime statistics and victimisation surveys), enabling a comparison between the objective (crime-related) and the subjective (perceived) dimensions of insecurity.

Crime Victimisation Surveys constituted a step forward in ascertaining the general perceptions of security. Nevertheless, they showed some insufficiencies in detecting the level of subjective security in the case of particular social groups, because some of them were difficult to reach, could not be reached in a representative way or their personal or social peculiarities had not been sufficiently considered when designing the questionnaire.

Because of this, special surveys addressing particular groups were developed (women, seniors, youngsters, minorities...) later on. That was an aim of the MARGIN Project, to identify current tools and to explore new ones in order to improve the results concerning vulnerable groups.

On the other hand, diagnosis is not an aim in itself. In fact, from the point of view of policy makers, an audit using a scientific methodology only deserves close attention if it provides evidence-based input for future policies and strategies designed to tackle the identified problems. It is not at all evident that a good diagnosis must result in an effective policy and, in contrast, even the knowledge acquired from unsuccessful practices may be useful if the reasons for their failure are known and shared (Efus, 2016). It is thus extremely valuable to provide public actors with tools that will assist them in designing and implementing proper policies and strategies targeted at the reduction of feelings of insecurity among the citizenship. That was a paramount objective within the MARGIN project and all of its partners were very sensitive to this issue. Under the scope of the overarching objective of implementing a knowledge-based initiative aimed at targeting fear of crime through an in-depth measurement of the root causes that might generate insecurity among the citizens, the creation of an agenda of good practices was a cornerstone.

Throughout the whole process, carried out under the leadership of the Department of the Interior of Catalonia, efforts were made to detect good practices that were mainly focused towards specific social groups and those exploring subjective security in specific territories (cities, neighbourhoods or even smaller areas within a given neighbourhood). However, sometimes it is very hard to distin-

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2 The partners were three universities (University of Barcelona, UCL in London and Milano-Bicocca), three institutions from the policy making side (Department of the Interior of Catalonia, Institut National des Hautes Études de la Sécurité et de la Justice and the Hungarian National Institute of Criminology) and a think tank called EuroCrime.
guish whether a practice addresses groups or territories, because some groups tend to live in a particular territory (for instance, it is not rare to see immigrants of similar nationalities being grouped in the same neighbourhoods), which is why Bottoms (2012) talks about “socio-spatial criminology”. The grounds for deciding which practice category a certain example belongs to is whether the formal target of it was a group of people or the territory itself.

The complexity of subjective security. Tools to measure it. The need for a combined approach

The subjective perception of security is not only an individual but also and mainly a socially constructed phenomenon, as has been evidenced by several authors such as Bauman (2007), Gazzola and Longoni (2001), Guillén (2012) and Kessler (2009). Even though it is undeniable that the social construction of security depends on the peculiarities of individuals and their lifestyles, the fact of sharing common characteristics and living in the same place may in turn lead to a common perspective as to what is meant by security. Consequently, a survey that informs there is a sense of security of 7 (out of 10) in a particular city or region doesn’t provide enough information for policy decision makers who need to know the territorial and social distribution of this statistic. For instance, it is important to know the different levels of security among seniors, youngsters, women and immigrants and how people perceive different spaces in the city (Doran – Burgess, 2012). In terms of designing public policies, it is important to know whether the same citizens may feel a different level of security in different public spaces depending on contextual factors. That will allow public actors to work in those spaces in order to modify their conditions and make them safer in the eyes of the public. This differential perception of insecurity implies the development of targeted practices, which represent the only way to design effective security policies.

There are different kinds of tools that can be used to get a picture that is sufficient for drafting public policies that can strengthen security.

First of all, there exist quantitative approaches, which are the most prevalent in the criminological field and that tend to use police statistics as a way of understanding security issues. Second, crime victimisation surveys (and other equivalent
instruments) are also a relatively consolidated data source, especially in western countries, and allow us to pick up direct information on perceptions of insecurity and public opinion on security, the police and other public actors and on crimes that were not reported to the police as well. Among the quantitative sources, it should also be taken into account that Public registers and statistics concerning households, incomes, social services and economic activities, among others, may assist the aim of detecting special groups or special territories to be taken into account.

There are also qualitative approaches that may provide us with very useful information in this field such as focus and experts groups or the Delphi method (Herzog, 2016). Some of them are experimental techniques such as exploratory walks. Detailed and proven methodologies to be used already exist and there are established criteria for interpreting the information we get through these methods.

Finally, there are combined approaches that try to get the benefits from different type of tools, whether quantitative or qualitative, because all of them provide complementary information that completes the picture.

The first step in any process of diagnosis should be to look for the available sources. Does any instrument that provides us with information about security exist? Does it provide with enough information to know how safe people feel? Both questions are not necessarily linked, since there may be, for instance, police statistics available, but they don’t provide valuable information about citizens’ subjective security, assuming there is quite a high “black” figure, because a lot of victims of crime don’t report it for various reasons (Van den Steen, 2010)³. Crime Victimisation Surveys detect many more crimes, but still fail to identity crimes with diffuse victims (economic and environmental crime, crimes related to drug trafficking and consumption), and they fail to detect the special needs of particular groups (women, immigrants and seniors). If the aim is to focus on the different levels of security of various social groups and territories, the aim should be to look for all possible sources and methodologies or to direct those methodologies on the desired group. In other words, no matter if we consider a source or instrument as preferred, we should also use complementary ones, (provided we can afford it). In any case, when a source or instrument fails and

³ Vid. also https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/vnrp0610.pdf
doesn’t provide us with the expected information, it is obvious that something else should be tried; alternatives should be sought out.

The process to follow is shown in the following figure:

**Figure 1**

The MARGIN project practices

The MARGIN database, set up during the project, represents a good practice within knowledge-based initiatives for crime prevention. Its scope is the
comparison between sources of information covering two different dimensions of the social phenomenon of insecurity. The first one, *victimisation*, can be measured through two sources: police recorded crime data and responses to questions regarding victimisation in a crime victimisation survey. This dimension of insecurity is known in the MARGIN project as the *objective dimension*, as it attempts to capture individuals’ actual experiences with crime. The second one, *perceived insecurity*, relates to questions in the crime victimisation survey surrounding respondents’ thoughts on crime, safety and how their perceptions of crime alter their habits. This aspect is known as the *subjective dimension*.4

Police recorded crime data (hereinafter PRC) and crime victimisation surveys (hereinafter CVS) are two data sources that enable a measurement of the amount of crime in a particular area over a period of time. PRC data contains all crimes that are reported to and recorded by the police. However, the police have different reporting and recording practices in different countries, as well as different definitions of particular crimes, making an international comparison of PRC data difficult. CVS, on the other hand, do not depend on how the police define and record crime in different countries and instead rely on respondent experience.5

Concerning PRC data, the information gathered focused on offences against personal safety or property, with or without violence, which are the most likely to influence perceptions of insecurity according to the literature. The sources of PRC data were the databases of the police forces responsible for public safety in the five countries involved in the Consortium, with a focus on the local police in five cities: London, Milan, Paris, Barcelona and Budapest.

A difficulty to be faced was that each of the five surveys addressed has specific concepts and definitions of insecurity (for instance, feeling of safety at home or in the neighbourhood, fear of being the victim of a crime, risk assessment, worry about criminality in general, fear of walking alone at night etc.). In the case of the PRC data, there was a similar concern, as some data are too general while other data are very detailed (vehicle theft versus bicycle theft, motorcycle

4 For a detailed description of the dimension of insecurity and research methods of the MARGIN project, see Riccardo Valente’s chapter.
5 For a detailed description of the data collecting of the MARGIN project see chapter of Hugo d’Arbois de Jubainville.
theft, car theft etc.). Accordingly, when it came to gathering data, the approach chosen was expected to be as broad as possible, in order to counterbalance data heterogeneity and the different national traditions in assessing insecurity. It was therefore deemed necessary not to limit the data collection to common CVS and PRC data, but instead to gather a wider scope of data. In other words, while the common questions/indicators have been outlined, the data collection was not restricted to them but oriented to the collection of a wider scope of data.

Data was collected at a national level as well as an urban level (whole municipality, districts and, where available, neighbourhoods). The database focuses on five years (2010–2014). Data for 2015 has also been collected where available. Nevertheless, there were two exceptions, since the last available CVS in Hungary and Italy go back to 2005 and 2009, respectively.

The process that led to the creation of the MARGIN database, as well as the database itself, represents a rigorous contribution towards unlocking the full potential of objective and subjective measures of crime-related issues as a tool for developing evidence-based public policies. This approach is clearly endorsed by the aforementioned Handbook of the UNODC (2010), which considers the exploitation of data sources on crime (PRC) and related problems (CVS) as essential in order to implement a knowledge-based approach to the reduction of insecurity. As stated by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime report (ICPC, 2014: 28), knowledge-based crime prevention initiatives “encompass a number of concepts, but principally entail the application of good research principles and theory, and well-constructed evaluation methods”.

The MARGIN database has the added value of disclosing a huge amount of information that is usually not available to the general public. Furthermore, by comparing the PRC data to the CVS data, it enables the investigation of the so-called ‘dark figure’ of crime, identifying the amount of crime that exists in the general population but is not reported to or recorded by the police and therefore is not reflected in official police statistics. At the same time, the cross-country comparison of questions asked in CVS allowed potential gaps in existing surveys to be identified.

CVS are considered an important resource for the integration and supplementation of police recorded crime but they only interest policymakers if they help to understand differences and trends in terms of crime, victimisation and the
The perception of insecurity (Killias, 2010). Under this perspective, the gaps identified during the creation of the MARGIN database represent solid ground for going further with a process of standardisation that will allow the conceptualisation of analytical definitions of the perception of insecurity. In particular, the results obtained have been used to inform a participatory design of a set of items to be included in a new thematic survey called the MARGIN survey. The final draft of this survey consisted of a module including a set of items enabling the assessment of how demographic, socio-economic and socio-geographic variables might influence public and personal perceptions of insecurity. A further module includes standardised questions on victimisation and perceptions of insecurity derived from existing CVS. Finally, the exploitation of the MARGIN database enhances substantial progress in terms of knowledge on the perception of insecurity by collecting information on the quality of life and social cohesion, the assessment of police work and citizens’ expectations in relation to public security policies and carrying out a survey specifically targeted to specific social groups and, particularly, those most at risk of social exclusion.

Groups, territories and the approach to their security

As we have already seen in Part 1, it is sometimes difficult to treat groups and territories separately because there are specific groups of people who tend to cluster in the same territory, with which we are dealing with groups and territories at the same time.

Crime and insecurity are usually not only related to special groups of people but also to particular characteristics of situations within the territory. Projects that have not taken into account the characteristics of the territory or the places where incidents take place are quite often bound to fail. Infrastructure (roads, railways, buildings and equipment), activities carried out in the territory (industry, commerce, agriculture, leisure, sport and culture) and mobility have paramount relevance to security and perceptions of security. The fact of having or not having a motorway, railway station, school, theatre, or more or less industry is going to draft quite a different landscape with completely diverse worries and problems. Environment is so important that it is quite common in criminology to talk about the ecology of crime (Vozmediano – San Juan, 2010). From this point of view, crime would be determined by the context, type of population,
activities, social resources and urban spaces. Although quite similar environments exist, no two exactly identical ones exist; it is crucial to take the special characteristics of each one into account in order to get a diagnosis that corresponds to every particular reality.

One of the problems of the territorial approach of some public administrations is that they tend to focus on administrative divisions, such as districts or ‘official’ neighbourhoods. Sometimes the areas are too large, and it is even difficult to draft a deep diagnosis to that level or a diagnosis that allows for useful particular strategies and policies. Quite often, the parts of the territory that should be identified are much more concrete (and normally smaller) than an ‘official’ neighbourhood (Bottoms, 2012), because the unsafe and degraded areas do not always coincide with a whole district or neighbourhood (Medina, 2011). The point is to detect the problematic spaces (those considered as ‘non go’ areas), no matter in which administrative areas they are situated. Sometimes the territory we take into account might be quite special or discontinuous, as when we deal with the transport network, its itineraries, stops, connections and so on.

Since the need to identify the different levels of security of several groups has been particularly evident in recent years, there have been attempts to use several tools only with members of those groups. The first obstacle to overcome is the definition itself of a relevant group. First of all, there are groups defined according to biological traits. Thus research has showed that women have a different perception of security, both because they face risks that men don’t and because they experience things differently (Naredo and Praxágora Cooperativa, 2010). Youngsters also share a different perspective of life, society and risk; a more positive one due to their reserves of strength, resourcefulness and optimism. It’s quite usual that youngsters tend to feel quite safe, although they suffer from quite high victimisation (Clais, 2016; Gondra, 2010). On the contrary, seniors detect risk and danger well in advance, because in some cases they feel weak and are afraid of the consequences that any incident can have for them. Their more limited activities (compared to youngsters) carried out make them less likely to be victims of a crime (Clais, 2016; Guillén, 2012). Actually their level of victimisation is basically low. However, their vulnerability due to their progressive loss of capabilities makes them very aware of any risk that can harm or injure them (as happens to people with health problems, Jackson – Stafford, 2012).

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The dimensions of insecurity in urban areas

The results of a crime would have much more serious consequences than in the case of youngsters. The fact that they have a smaller social network (they tend to live in greater isolation) weakens their subjective security. People who share the same skin colour or external appearance can also be subject to similar treatment by their co-citizens and/or the police and can tend to share a common vision of security and police.

Second, there are groups that are defined by material conditions and so those with a similar income tend to share some perspectives on security. For instance, for some people being robbed means only the burden to cancel all credit cards and to apply for new ones, whereas for others it means not having enough money to reach the end of the month. Their perspectives on what should be considered as disorder may also vary, since they normally live and work in contexts with very different external order. The conditions of lighting, the kind of streets, shops and leisure areas are common for all of them. As such, a common urban environment can influence people’s perception in a common direction.

Third, people who carry out similar activities or have similar hobbies tend to share some needs and, consequently, perceptions of security. Football supporters, for example, share activities (support their club even when they play away) and precise needs for security (in stadiums, on their way to them, etc.); tourists in general also tend to carry out similar activities and have coinciding interests (visiting museums and special places, having fun, walking along the streets, buying souvenirs, not being tricked or robbed). Drug users also face particular risks by buying or consuming drugs. In all those cases, people who live in the areas where these groups carry out their activities are also affected in their daily life. It is not strange, for example, that they may be disturbed because of noise and some incivilities, which may influence their quality of life and, consequently, their feeling of security. Commuters or, in general, public transport users coincide in their needs and worries. Since mobility is growing enormously, the importance of travellers’ security should be an important point within security policies. Football fans used to make trouble quite often in stadiums and their surroundings. A deeper knowledge of their perspective and problem areas allowed for better security policies in this area, which made a huge contribution.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design Associations has worked a lot in this direction. Vid. http://www.cpted.net
to tranquillity in stadiums\(^8\). Drug users are quite a unique group as, depending on the country, part of their activity may constitute an offence or even a crime, but they also face risks to their health and may also be victims themselves. A proper policy can facilitate former drug addicts in giving up drugs or, at least, to reduce the damage that drugs cause to them\(^9\).

People with a similar background (culture, religion, nationality) are bound to have quite close perceptions of security (Griffiths – Brooks, 2012). This means that what can be considered dangerous in Western Europe may seem very safe in Nigeria or Vietnam.

In the same way, leisure activities in public or private spaces quite often gather thousands of people who potentially may disturb the peace and tranquillity of people living in the area or be dangerous for bystanders or public equipment. In order to be able to influence the conduct of people who attend these events it is necessary to know them and what their common traits are.

Consequently, it is crucial to gather knowledge of how this information related to these groups and territories can be collected, the more precisely the better. The foundations of public policies to tackle security issues in those areas and groups should be grounded on a deep knowledge of their points of view and needs.

*The agenda of good practices within the MARGIN project* collected quite a complete array of experiences that use several different sources and methodologies, such as *the National plan of combating sexual harassment and sexual violence on public transport in France*\(^{10}\), *The Crime Audit and Community Safety Strategy* carried out in 1999 by the North Tyneside Council (United Kingdom), the assessment of the DADA\(^{11}\) programme for police prevention at schools carried out by the Hungarian Institute of Criminology (OKRI) and the Ministry of

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\(^8\) Vid. Efus (2012)
\(^9\) As it is the case in several European countries. Vid. http://drogues.gencat.cat/ca/professionals/reduccio_de_dany/serveis_de_reduccio_de_dany/ or http://www.pnsd.msssi.gob.es/profesionales/publicaciones/catalogo/bibliotecaDigital/publicaciones/BRReduccioDeDanos.htm
\(^{10}\) http://stop-violences-femmes.gouv.fr/Le-plan-national-de-lutte-contre.html
\(^{11}\) DADA was a project carried out by the Hungarian police to promote crime prevention at school.
Interior or the evaluation of the New Deal for Communities (NDC) programme carried out by the Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research, Sheffield Hallam University (United Kingdom).

Furthermore, a collection of very powerful instruments to measure the subjective security of particular vulnerable groups was also included. As mentioned above, there are instruments that, depending on the circumstances of any case, can offer enough information to form an adequate idea about how to tackle a particular security problem.

The ESCAPAD survey carried out by the French Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug addiction (OFDT) addressed teenagers. They take advantage of the la journée d'appel et de preparation à la défense, in which all 17 year old French individuals are obliged to participate so as to deliver a questionnaire on the use of psychoactive substances among teenagers. The sample is composed of 26,000 teenagers and the response rate is practically 100%, with an extremely accurate degree of representation. The only gap is that young people who reside in France but don’t hold French nationality don’t participate in it. The cost is reduced because the target group has been gathered by somebody else.

Exploratory walks have been considered as very helpful in understanding women’s feelings of insecurity and will be used with other special vulnerable groups such as seniors and youngsters. From the first experiences in the nineties in Canada, where they were introduced, the methodology used has evolved and been consolidated. Nowadays there are at least two quite relevant documents available:
- The Guide méthodologique des marches exploratoires published by the French Ministry of Interior provides us with guidelines on the items to be taken into account when using this tool.

To sum up, once a group with special needs and particular perceptions of security in public spaces has been identified, you take a small sample of them and

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12 Vid. Annex III
go together to visit the places where they carry out their routine activities and see where, when and why they feel unsafe. The fact of being in the field allows the organiser to put further questions to the participants in order to get the best possible information about the factors that favour their feeling of insecurity. Obviously it is advisable that the participants represent different segments or subgroups of the target group (for example, healthy and wealthy seniors are not likely to articulate the same feelings of insecurity of those seniors with few resources and poor health).

The School Victimisation Survey in Catalonia is a good example of a single tool aimed at getting information on a specific age-group of the population. The last edition (2016) involved about 9,000 computer-assisted web interviews to youths aged 12 to 18\(^{16}\). It is aimed at detecting negative actions, such as harassment, victimisation, bullying, loutish behaviour and use of drugs and alcohol. Opinions on security are also included. If the sample of chosen schools is properly selected, quite a representative panorama of violent incidents at school can be obtained at quite an affordable price. The students and the computers are already there; all that is needed is to design the questionnaire, organise the online survey to enable the youngsters to answer it and then to process the results. In this case, the survey has been repeated every five years since 2000, with which the trends are clearly visible. Other similar tools are the “Encuesta Nacional de Violencia en el ámbito escolar” in Chile and the “Cuestionario de Convivencia 2015” in Galicia (a Region in the north-west of Spain).

The editions of the Public Security Survey devoted to violence against women in Catalonia\(^{17}\) are also a good example of how just one unique yet well-designed instrument can provide an accurate landscape in a sensitive field. So far there have been two waves with about 15,000 and 10,000 computer assisted telephone interviews. About 90% of the interviews are with women and 10% with men who are asked about female victimisation from any man, their partners and ex-partners and if they suffered violence even before being 15 years old. Although there are certain aspects regarding the interviewee’s voices that question whether or not telephone interviews are the most appropriate instrument

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\(^{16}\) Public information of previous surveys is available on the website of Ministry of Interior. Information from the current survey has not yet been published (it is still in process).

\(^{17}\) Vid. http://interior.gencat.cat/ca/el_departament/publicacions/seguretat/estudis_i_enquestes/enquesta_de_violencia_masclista/
to ask about an issue as sensitive as violence against women, the results show
that the fact of not having personal contact between the interviewer and the
interviewee may make it easier to talk about such private and sensitive issues.

In the field of racism and discrimination, the Police of the Generalitat/Mossos
d’Esquadra introduced a Specific Police Data Collection in their registers to
relate any common crime (assault, battery, homicide, injuries) with racist motives.
Police officers should not only include the type of crime but also whether there
is evidence to confirm that it was committed on racist grounds. In this way,
the, Police are now able to identify the number of crimes committed with the
intention of humiliating people due to their gender, race, nationality, age or on
any other grounds, otherwise this information would be lost. NGOs, private
associations and other public and private agencies have been involved in this
programme.

Criteria to turn diagnosis into policies and strategies.
Some valuable experiences

As mentioned previously in different chapters, it is important to know which
criteria should be followed in order to translate an appropriate diagnosis into a
workable action plan. Even research has proved the difficulty of what some call
“mainstreaming knowledge into application” (Ekblom, 2011). There are sev-
eral documents that provide good guidance for this purpose. We could quote,
among others:

– The Beccaria Standards\textsuperscript{18} was published by the State Prevention Council of
  Lower Saxony (Lower Saxony Ministry of Justice) in the framework of the
  AGIS program and the ISECS program of the EU. They include measures
  and requirements for quality planning, implementation and assessment of
  crime prevention programmes and projects.

  the European Forum for Urban Security in 2016\textsuperscript{19}.

\textsuperscript{18} Vid. http://www.beccaria.de/nano.cms/en/Beccaria_Standards/Page/1
\textsuperscript{19} Vid. Bibliography at the end of the Agenda.
They coincide on the need to:

a. Establish priorities. It is not that strange that all detected problems cannot be tackled at the same time, since resources are always limited.

b. Design clear and specific objectives that focus on the problems that are defined as priorities. Objectives are the final goals to be achieved and they should be detailed in a way that makes them measurable, not in an abstract or generic way. For instance, not “reducing traffic accidents”, but “reducing traffic accidents with casualties by 20%”. They should also be affordable (realistic) given the available resources. A determined time framework (deadline) to reach them (a year, two years, eighteen months) is also necessary.

c. Include concrete actions that are appropriate for achieving the proposed goals (Wikström, 2007). Actions are not ends by themselves, just means to reach them. For instance, making bars close earlier, or sending police patrols to school entrances are actions that can try to reduce the noise pollution for neighbours who live in the area where there are lots of bars and the security of children who attend the school. It is important that the action can assist in reaching the objective. A good example: random police patrols are not likely to reduce any sort of crime (although they may have other beneficial effects). Hence, when the aim is to reduce crime in particular hot spots police patrols should be focused (smart policing). Consequently, it is also research-based knowledge that is required in order to know which actions are likely to be effective in achieving different goals.

d. It is important to specify who will be responsible for every action. Every action should be correlated with an entity, otherwise it will not be possible to mobilise or to make the foreseen entities accountable for the success or the failure.

e. Evaluation should be planned for in order to know whether it worked or failed. There should be two different areas of evaluation: activity (whether the foreseen actions have been carried out as they were designed); and impact (whether the established goals were or not achieved and to what degree), the

20 Vid. http://interior.gencat.cat/ca/arees_dactuacio/policia/coordinacio_de_la_policia_de_catalunya/guia_per_a_l_elaboracio_de_plans_de_seguretat

21 Vid. https://notesdeseguretat.blog.gencat.cat/category/english
latter being the more important, provided that actions are only relevant to the extent that they serve to achieve the goals that had been planned.

A quite small and simple example of how tight diagnosis and strategies should go is the creation of the *Listening and grievances unit (Cellule d'écoute et de traitement des doléances)* set up within the Police Headquarters for the 19th district (arrondissement) of Paris (now extended to the 20th district). They created a group to deal with all complaints from citizens and District City Hall coming through different ways (phone calls, letters or e-mails) in order to draft a weekly strategy to tackle the underlying problems that emerged from the complaints. They analysed the grievances of every week on Fridays and drafted an operational answer for the following one. The link between diagnosis and strategies is very clear in this case.

Much wider experiences worth taking into account are *Local Security Contracts*, set up at the end of the nineties and which are quite well-known in France. They required, as a first step, a local security diagnosis to determine the problems to be dealt with, for which a local security plan should be drafted. The improvement of the security diagnosis is one of the crucial aims of these “contracts”. However the importance of the contracts goes further than the diagnosis: they should also contain the proposed measures to tackle the detected gaps or deficiencies.

Another current relevant instrument was the *Safety Index* carried out in Rotterdam, which included police statistical data and crime victimisation data. Those sources allowed them to quantify the degree of insecurity in every neighbourhood. However, over the years the importance of an integral approach – and with it an integral monitor – has become increasingly clear. It is evident that the safety issues cannot be tackled by simply focusing on safety. Social and psychological indicators should be taken into account in order to get a more comprehensive picture of the environment and the roots of the problems. It was from this perspective that the new integral tool *Wijkprofiel (neighbourhood profile)* was developed and introduced in 2014. *Wijkprofiel* combines the Safety Index,

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Social Index and Physical Index. It’s a bi-annual flagging tool that monitors the safety, social and physical situation in every neighbourhood of the city of Rotterdam. Neighbourhoods are classified depending on what those three indicators say and the results are published on the municipality website\textsuperscript{24}. The sources used to draft the neighbourhood profile are multiple: two large surveys among the citizens of Rotterdam with 15,000 respondents per survey, police statistics, fire department statistics, unemployment statistics, schooling statistics, welfare statistics etc.

The municipality of Rotterdam works with universities in order to analyse the underlying data further. For instance, in order to investigate the discrepancy between objective and subjective safety, the Erasmus University Rotterdam has carried out quantitative analysis of data from the Wijkprofiel. The aim of the analysis is to determine what factors (social or infrastructural) from the neighbourhood profile are related to feelings of insecurity.

Once all information has been gathered, they define what should be done in order to tackle the detected deficiencies; the \textit{Rotterdam City Marines (stadsmariniers) take over}. To avoid the usual gaps between the different actors that intervene in order to improve the situation, the City of Rotterdam has set up the \textit{city marines} structures\textsuperscript{25}. They are single persons (eight at the moment), appointed by the Mayor, responsible for particular problems or neighbourhoods. They report directly to the mayor and can mobilise as many public resources as necessary, no matter under which municipal department they are placed. They should also deal with and involve entrepreneurs, citizens or associations in order to get to the root of the problems and make them take the necessary actions to improve the neighbourhoods and, consequently, the city. They can set up very different measures depending on the nature of the problem. These measures may be:

\begin{itemize}
\item Demolishing problematic buildings,
\item Improving street lighting,
\item Promoting citizen participation through mobile apps that facilitate communicating about dirty places.
\item Installing CCTV systems.
\item Courses for young ethnic Rotterdammers.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{24} Vid. www.wijkprofiel.rotterdam.nl
\textsuperscript{25} Vid. http://www.rotterdam.nl/stadsmariniers
f. Campaigns to discover talents.
g. The exclusion of rack renters.
h. Screening newcomers.

Every measure should be taken by the one who is in the best position to carry it out successfully. In the case of municipality actors, the city marine has the power to order it. In the case of private actors, he/she should convince them and facilitate things in order for them to take the correct measures.

City marines should be aware of the evolution of the problems they are in charge of tackling at any moment, so they should always keep an eye on how everything is evolving. So far, after 14 years of city marines’ work, the results show a certain efficacy, since there are no unsafe neighbourhoods (under 3.9 in the Index), Security levels have been increased, the number of dirty places has been reduced significantly and drug trafficking in the street has practically disappeared.

If we consider the territory as the space that surrounds us when we carry out our activities, we should pay attention to the possibilities of creating and modifying those spaces in order to make them safer, both in terms of subjective (perception) and objective security. There exists a lot of experience in this field. An international association exists that promotes the safe design of urban spaces, the International “Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design” (CPTED) Association. Their goal is to promote safer environments and improve the quality of life through urban design. They do that in different ways: certifying experts on CPTED’s principles, publishing white papers on how CPTED’s principles should be applied in different fields (for instance, the last one is related to CPTED’s principles in the framework of homelessness), and organising seminars and conferences on the topic. They also publish a newsletter, periodical journals and E-Guidebooks. They base their approach on the framework of the routine activities theory, although they have some divergences. According to this theory, crime takes place because of the coincidence of basically three elements: a suitable target for crime (appealing object and a vulnerable victim),

26 Vid. http://www.cpted.net/
28 Vid. http://www.cpted.net/newsletters
a motivated criminal and the lack of any effective guardian\textsuperscript{30}. The main idea behind it is to make the target unsuitable through diverse ways: making the object unappealing (because it will be difficult to get money from them later), making the victim less vulnerable in the eyes of the potential criminal and/or providing effective guardians, which can be achieved by making the potential criminal’s actions very visible through urban design. That is the first generation of CPTED’s measures, which focus on situational prevention. They also deal with a second level of measures that are mainly addressed at looking for the roots of criminals’ motivation. If there are environments (not only physical, but also social ones) that pave the way to delinquency then those should be transformed into more positive ones.

To conclude, being able not only to draft proper and accurate diagnosis, which is complex in the field of subjective security, but also (we should say “mainly”) having the necessary knowledge and resources to put it into practice in order to improve citizens’ perception of security, which will cause a dramatic increase in their quality of life, is extremely relevant.

\textbf{References}


\textsuperscript{30} Vid. https://webfiles.uci.edu/ckubrin/Branic_Routine_Activities_Theory_Entry.pdf


http://interior.gencat.cat/ca/el_departament/publicacions/seguretat/guia-per-a-lelaboracio-de-diagnostics-de-seguretat-amb-visio-de-genere-a-lambit-rural-i-urba/


The Margin project was developed and conducted in Europe in order to analyse the multiple dimensions of insecurity (i.e., objective, subjective, social, and socio-geographic). Another objective of the project was to provide policy-makers, researchers, and citizens with relevant tools for assessing and reducing these dimensions of insecurity.

At the beginning of the project, Working Package 2 (WP2) aimed at collecting data from the partners in preparation for cross-national statistical analysis of crime and perceived insecurity. This process resulted in two deliverables, on the one hand, aggregated databases\(^1\) ready for statistical analysis; and on the other hand, a state-of-the-art report\(^2\) of sources and tools used to assess insecurity among the project partners. These tasks were crucial as they would serve later for cross-national comparison (WP3) and the development of a shared questionnaire on perceived insecurity (WP4).

The French Observatory of Crime and Criminal Justice (ONDRP) was the leading partner in this process, thus having the responsibility to manage data selection and to create the databases. The ONDRP worked with University College

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\(^1\) It was initially expected to create a single database, which would have aggregated data from all the partners. However, given the nature of data and the time available for WP2 completion, several harmonised databases were created instead.

London, the leading partner in WP3, as data collection and analysis were closely related.

The present study recounts the process of WP2. First we summarise the use of police-recorded crime statistics and crime victimisation surveys in Europe. We then give an overview of these tools among the project partners, and present the ‘templates’ that were created to identify their structure and content. The selection of criteria for data collection is eventually detailed. We conclude this study by highlighting the need for shared quantitative criminological tools, in order to overcome data heterogeneity.

**Police-recorded crime statistics (PRC) and crime victimisation surveys (CVS)**

Various quantitative and qualitative tools can be used to assess crime and perceptions of insecurity. WP2 focused on the main statistical sources traditionally used for this purpose, police-recorded crime statistics (PRC data) on the one hand, and crime victimisation surveys (CVS data) on the other hand. It should be noted that PRC and CVS data cannot be combined into a single measure of crime or insecurity, but should be considered as unique sources and analysed accordingly (Murrià, 2010).

As administrative statistics, PRC data have been consistently used for analysing crime over a given period of time, at the national level or in a particular area. This source usually measures offences that are reported to and recorded by police services. Consequently, PRC data do not include offences that are unreported or undetected by these services, resulting in the so-called ‘dark figure’ of crime (Killias, 2010). It is therefore argued that this source reflects the activity of police services rather than the actual volume of crime (Soullez, 2013). For instance, an increase in PRC data may reflect an increase in reporting and/or police activity, rather than crime trends themselves. Police services also have different recording practices and offences definitions from one country to another, which makes cross-national comparison difficult to varying extents (Baudains et al., 2015).
Concurrently, the use of CVS data developed throughout Europe since the 1980s in order to provide another measure of crime (Bellit et al., 2015). This source is considered as a relevant and reliable alternative to PRC data, because surveys do not rely on police practices but respondents’ personal experiences. These surveys can therefore assess the volume of crime that is unreported to or undetected by police services, revealing the ‘dark figure’ of crime (Killias, 2010). For instance, the analysis of French CVS data reveals that only 19% of rape victims actually report this offence to the police, and that only 13% of them formally file a complaint (Vanier, 2017). Nevertheless, surveys remain statistical tools and are therefore limited. On the one hand, respondents may have different interpretations of a particular crime or victimisation experience (Baudains et al., 2015). On the other hand, surveys cannot measure crimes for which victims are no longer alive (e.g., homicides, terrorist attacks) or ‘victim-less’ crimes (e.g., drug-related offences).

CVS data also prove useful for measuring respondents’ perceptions of insecurity (e.g., emotions, cognitions, moral values) and how these perceptions affect their behaviours and daily life. Surveys have recently been used to determine if perceived insecurity is ‘functional’ of ‘dysfunctional’ (Gray et al., 2011). In the first case, individuals who feel unsafe take precautions that reassure them efficiently; in the second case, these precautions are not reassuring and actually undermine individuals’ quality of life (Gray et al., 2011). As with PRC data, several issues must be taken into account when using CVS data to assess perceptions of insecurity. These perceptions are an on-going and dynamic phenomenon that cannot be perfectly captured by surveys, which are but snapshots of this phenomenon (Bowling, 1993). Like PRC data, surveys may have different conceptual bases and methodologies, thus producing different results that are to some extent difficult to compare (Baudains et al., 2015; Farrall et al., 1997).

Creating tools to collect PRC and CVS data from the Margin partners

The first priority of WP2 was to identify and select the relevant PRC and CVS tools among the Margin partners. The second priority of WP2 was to create tools in order to identify the structure and content of these sources. Indeed, given the issues mentioned above, it was assumed that police practices and surveys were likely to be different from one country to another. It was therefore impera-
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tive to know precisely which data could be used for cross-national analysis, and which could not. In order to do so, the ONDRP created two ‘templates’ and sent them to the other partners, which completed them with information about their respective PRC and CVS tools.

**Overview of the Margin partners’ PRC and CVS data**

Concerning PRC data, sources selected for data collection were the following:
- Catalonia: data recorded by the police of the *Generalitat de Catalunya* – *Mossos d’Esquadra*
- France: ‘*État 4001*’
- Hungary: ‘*Egységes Nyomozóhatósági és Ügyészségi Bűnügyi Statisztika*’
- Italy: ‘*Statistiche della dellituosità*’
- United Kingdom: data recorded by the Home Office

Similarly, the crime victimisation surveys selected for data collection were the following:
- Catalonia: ‘*Encuesta de seguridad publica de Catalunya*’
- France: ‘*Cadre de vie et sécurité*’ survey
- Hungary: ‘*Áldozatok és vélemények*’ survey
- Italy: ‘*Sicurezza dei cittadini*’ survey
- United Kingdom: ‘*Crime survey for England and Wales*’

The complete description of these sources is included in the state-of-the-art report, which is publicly available online.³

**Template for PRC data collection**

As mentioned above, PRC data usually measure offences reported to or detected by police services. For instance, the ‘*État 4001*’ used by the French police and gendarmerie provides information on more than a hundred types of offences. The template created by the ONDRP focused on three broad classifications: crime against property without violence, crime against property with violence, and violent crime against the person. The template included a category for each of these classifications, with detailed information on how offences are defined.

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and counted (Table 1). Other categories referred to detection and clearance definitions, victims’ and offenders’ characteristics, as well as technical information. An example of a completed template is publicly available online.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRC 1.1</td>
<td>Technical information about police-recorded crime statistics</td>
<td>List of the main characteristics of the tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC 1.2</td>
<td>Overview of crime classification</td>
<td>List of all type of crimes recorded by police services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC 1.3</td>
<td>Classification of property crime without violence</td>
<td>List of property crimes without violence recorded by police services, including their definitions (e.g., inclusions, exclusions...) and counting rules (e.g., unit of measurement, most serious offence rules...).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC 1.4</td>
<td>Classification of property crime with violence</td>
<td>List of property crimes with violence recorded by police services, including their definitions (e.g., inclusions, exclusions...) and counting rules (e.g., unit of measurement, most serious offence rules...).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC 1.5</td>
<td>Classification of violent crime</td>
<td>List of violent crimes recorded by police services, including their definitions (e.g., inclusions, exclusions...) and counting rules (e.g., unit of measurement, most serious offence rules...).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PRC 1.6 Detection and clearance

List of conditions for a case to be considered ‘detected’ and ‘cleared’ by police services, as well as the method for calculating detection and clearance rates.

### PRC 1.7 Victims’ and offenders’ characteristics

List of conditions for a person to be considered a ‘victim’ or an ‘offender’, as well as their individual characteristics.

### PRC 1.8 Geographic availability

List of the different geographic levels at which data are available, especially for the cities where the following fieldwork (WP5) would be conducted (i.e., Barcelona, Budapest, London, Milan, Paris).

### PRC 1.9 Other information relevant for the purpose of data collection

List of relevant information that cannot be included in previous categories.

**Note:** This table summarises the categories used to analyse the structure and content of PRC tools from the Margin partners. For more information and examples, see the project website.

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**Template for CVS data collection**

Crime victimisation surveys include a large variety of questions on experiences of victimisation and perceptions of insecurity. Surveys also include individual and household characteristics, in order to assess how these experiences and perceptions change from one respondent to another. The template created by the ONDRP encompassed the main types of questions included in such surveys (*Table 2*). Another category of this template referred to technical information about the survey. An example of a completed template is publicly available online.\(^5\)

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Table 2: Template for CVS data collection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CVS 1.1</td>
<td>Technical information about the</td>
<td>List of the main characteristics of the survey (e.g., frequency, sample,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>characteristics of the crime</td>
<td>interviewing methods, study period, weighting process...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>survey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS 1.2</td>
<td>Questions about perceptions of</td>
<td>List of questions about perceptions of insecurity (e.g., fear of crime,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>insecurity</td>
<td>concern for crime as a social issue, perceptions of crime trends, perceptions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of victimisation risk...).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS 1.3</td>
<td>Questions about criminal justice</td>
<td>List of questions about criminal justice institutions (e.g., confidence in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>institutions</td>
<td>police, justice, and other institutions, perceptions of police performance,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>satisfaction with police in general and after encounters...)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS 1.4</td>
<td>General questions about victimisation</td>
<td>List of questions about offences respondents or their households have been a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>victim of during the study period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS 1.5</td>
<td>Specific questions about victimisation</td>
<td>List of questions asked to respondents about their experiences of victimisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(e.g., context, consequences, offender(s), reporting to police services...).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS 1.6</td>
<td>Questions about neighbourhood issues</td>
<td>List of questions about security-related issues and other issues in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>neighbourhood (e.g., crime, incivilities, public equipment, social cohesion,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>neighbourhood culture...).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS 1.7</td>
<td>Other questions relevant for the purpose of data collection</td>
<td>List of questions that are relevant for data collection but cannot be included in previous categories (e.g., avoidance and protection behaviours, security-related equipment, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS 1.8</td>
<td>Individuals’ and households’ characteristics</td>
<td>List of questions about respondents’ individual and household characteristics (e.g., gender, age, income, marital status, household size, years spent living in the neighbourhood...).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVS 1.9</td>
<td>Other information relevant for the purpose of data collection</td>
<td>List of relevant information that cannot be included in previous categories.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* This table summarises the categories used to analyse the structure and content of CVS data from the Margin partners. For more information and examples, see the project website.

### Selection of criteria for data collection

Once the project partners completed the templates with information about the PRC and CVS sources, the ONDRP was able to analyse their structure and content more easily. With the support of University College London, relevant data were selected and collected in preparation of statistical analysis.

The main issue related to PRC data was the variation in the degree of specificity. For instance, one source records vehicle thefts, while another records car, motorcycle, and bicycle thefts. It was nevertheless possible to collect data for eight types of crime, the definitions of which were consistent and suitable for statistical analysis: violence against the person, harassment and threats, street robbery, theft from the person, burglary in a dwelling, vehicle-related theft, bicycle theft, and criminal damage. Another reason for selecting these offences was that PRC and CVS definitions matched relatively well (Chainey, 2015).

There was a similar issue with CVS data, as surveys had very specific ways of conceptualising and operationalising some perceptions of insecurity. For instance, all surveys include questions related to the feeling of safety in the neighbourhood,
but these questions change from one survey to another (Table 3). The British, Hungarian, and Italian surveys measure the intensity of this feeling in specific contexts. On the contrary, the Catalan survey assesses its intensity in general. Finally, the French survey measures the frequency of this feeling in general. The scales used for these variables are also different from one survey to another.

Table 3: Feeling of safety in the neighbourhood measured in the Margin partners’ surveys

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survey</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Scale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Crime survey for England and Wales’</td>
<td>How safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?</td>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>1 – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Sicurezza dei cittadini’</td>
<td>How safe do you feel when you walk alone at night in your neighbour-</td>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>1 – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>hood?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Áldozatok és vélemények’</td>
<td>How safe do you feel when you are alone in your local street during the day?</td>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>1 – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Encuesta de seguridad publica de Catalunya’</td>
<td>How safe do you feel in your neighbourhood / municipality?</td>
<td>Intensity</td>
<td>1 – 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Cadre de vie et sécurité’</td>
<td>Do you personally feel unsafe in your neighbourhood or village?</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>1 – 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: This table shows how the feeling of safety in the neighbourhood is operationalised in the Margin partners’ surveys. For more information and examples, see the project website.

Baudains and colleagues consider that such differences between questions and responses make direct comparison difficult. However, these surveys mostly use ordinal scales to measure perceptions of insecurity. It is therefore possible to analyse the characteristics of respondents who are likely to respond at the extremes of the scale (Baudains et al., 2015). This issue led to a change of paradigm in the process data selection and collection. Indeed, it was initially expected to collect PRC and CVS data that were very similar. However, such data were scarce for the reasons mentioned above. It was eventually decided to collect a wider scope of data, even when variables were operationalised more or less differently, in order to counterbalance data heterogeneity. After this selection, data collection itself was relatively swift. PRC and CVS data were collected at the national, but also at the local level (i.e., Barcelona, Budapest,
The Dimensions of Insecurity in Urban Areas

London, Milan, and Paris) in order to ensure continuity with the following anthropological fieldwork (WP5). The time period for data collection was five years before the Margin project (i.e., 2010–2014). It should be noted that data collected from the Hungarian and Italian surveys were older, as these surveys were conducted for the last time before this time period.

After the collection and centralisation of data by the ONDRP, a database was created for each partner. These databases have the same structure as the templates (e.g., a category for questions about perceived insecurity, a category for questions about criminal justice institutions...). Variables were renamed accordingly, and harmonised metadata were created for each database. As previously, the ONDRP was in close contact with University College London in order to facilitate statistical analysis. Results of the cross-national comparison of databases are publicly available online.6

Conclusion

At the end of the Margin project, WP2 was considered successful in achieving its objectives. In a few months, it was possible to identify the structure and content of PRC and CVS tools from five European partners. Despite issues of data heterogeneity, this process allowed data collection in preparation for cross-national statistical analysis (WP3). The whole process confirmed the diversity of police practices and survey traditions across Europe, which highlighted the need for shared quantitative tools. This need was later addressed by the development of the Margin questionnaire on perceptions of insecurity (WP4).

The templates designed by the ONDRP for analysing the structure and content of police recorded-crime statistics and crime victimisation surveys are publicly available. This means they can be used in other countries, in order to replicate the process of data selection and collection. This could be relevant to further cross-national analysis of objective and subjective insecurity in Europe and elsewhere.

References


CHAPTER 5

PERCEIVED INSECURITY IN AFFLUENT VS MARGINALISED COMMUNITIES ACROSS FIVE EU COUNTRIES1

Sonia Stefanizzi – Valeria Verdolini

Introduction

The MARGIN project addresses the topic of insecurity by taking four key dimensions into account:
1. objective dimension, mainly referring to any illegal action that directly violates or threatens the physical integrity of individuals and/or their right to property;
2. subjective dimension, which refers to a continuum including emotional and cognitive factors affecting perceived insecurity, involving three components that share a complex relationship with each other: affective (fear of crime/fear of being victimised), cognitive (perceived risk) and behavioural (restricted behaviours);
3. socio-geographic dimension, referring to neighbourhood characteristics that have effects on the perception of insecurity, also known as “neighbourhood effects”;
4. socio-economic dimension or social insecurity, referring to the social consequences of poverty and deprived living conditions on ontological security.

1 This study is mostly previous published see: Stefanizzi, S. & Verdolini, “Bordered communities: the perception of insecurity in five European cities” in Quality & Quantity (2018). https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11135-018-0810-x Springer Netherlands. (with the permission of the authors)
These four dimensions are not conceived as *a priori* concepts set out for analytical convenience; the project goal has been defined by them, taking specific historical and social experiences based on real-life examples into account. Methodologically speaking, that has meant implementing a combination of methodologies as an essential instrument for bottom-up theory building, in order to provide a subsequent definition of insecurity at the end of the MARGIN research activities.

In the project, one specific working package (WP5: Anthropological dimension of insecurity) was entirely devoted to a process of qualitative data collection in 10 selected neighbourhoods and the corresponding analysis of 50 in-depth interviews, 6 months of participant observation and 10 focus groups. In parallel, quantitative data have also been gathered through small-scale surveys in the same neighbourhoods. By directly involving citizens in the project, the objective of the fieldwork was to analyse the social construction of crime-related issues in order to offer a deeper understanding of fear of crime and the perception of insecurity in five European cities (Barcelona, Budapest, London, Milan and Paris). Building further on the broad definition of insecurity addressed by the MARGIN project, three domains were used to select a sample of neighbourhoods in which subsequent analysis and the implementation of qualitative research has been focused: (1) the incidence rate of residential burglary as the measure of the objective dimension of insecurity; (2) the educational attainment as the proxy measure for perceived insecurity; (3) the measures of socio-geographic insecurity were selected by implementing an ad hoc procedure in each specific city.
### La Vila Olímpica (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective dimension</th>
<th>Subjective dimension</th>
<th>Socio-economic dimension</th>
<th>Socio-geographic dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scamming</td>
<td>The mobility of the pedestrians</td>
<td>Incurable levels of alcoholism</td>
<td>Misuse of services for overcrowding/tourism – shelters for homeless – feeling of “invasion” (tourists, homeless)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few violent crimes</td>
<td>Indirect victimisation</td>
<td>Empty spaces and the problem of social occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home burglary</td>
<td>Civility and coexistence issues</td>
<td>Homelessness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### La Marina del Prat Vermell (M)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective dimension</th>
<th>Subjective dimension</th>
<th>Socio-economic dimension</th>
<th>Socio-geographic dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scamming</td>
<td>The mobility of the pedestrians</td>
<td>Incurable levels of alcoholism</td>
<td>Misuse of services for overcrowding/tourism – shelters for homeless – feeling of “invasion” (tourists, homeless)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A few violent crimes</td>
<td>Indirect victimisation</td>
<td>Empty spaces and the problem of social occupation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home burglary</td>
<td>Civility and coexistence issues</td>
<td>Homelessness</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Országút (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective dimension</th>
<th>Subjective dimension</th>
<th>Socio-economic dimension</th>
<th>Socio-geographic dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House burglary</td>
<td>Tense situations</td>
<td>Increasing presence of homelessness</td>
<td>Local slumification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car theft</td>
<td>Absence of the police</td>
<td>Vulnerable position of the elderly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>Fear of victimisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fight and assaults</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scamming of old people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bagging</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### THE DIMENSIONS OF INSECURITY IN URBAN AREAS

#### Laposdúló (M)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective dimension</th>
<th>Subjective dimension</th>
<th>Socio-economic dimension</th>
<th>Socio-geographic dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High crime rate</td>
<td>Fear of staying in the neighbourhood (Hős utca)</td>
<td>Insecurity of living day to day</td>
<td>Segregated Hős utca</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Substance abuse</td>
<td>Avoidance of the streets</td>
<td>Low social position</td>
<td>Half-closed Pongrác settlement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prostitution</td>
<td>Conflict between groups in the block</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property crimes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Primrose Hill (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective dimension</th>
<th>Subjective dimension</th>
<th>Socio-economic dimension</th>
<th>Socio-geographic dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Small burglaries</td>
<td>Fear of thefts</td>
<td>Socio-economic security</td>
<td>Drunk people in the park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cannabis consumption</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Touristic area</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Harlesden and Church End (M)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective dimension</th>
<th>Subjective dimension</th>
<th>Socio-economic dimension</th>
<th>Socio-geographic dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gangs and violence (linking to crime)</td>
<td>Fear of the gangs</td>
<td>Uncertain changing within the neighbourhood i.e. rising house prices- the effect of this on current residents</td>
<td>Littering and fly tipping Abandoned buildings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Litter and fly tipping (general appearance of the neighbourhood)</td>
<td>Fear of violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Rogoredo (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective dimension</th>
<th>Subjective dimension</th>
<th>Socio-economic dimension</th>
<th>Socio-geographic dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglaries</td>
<td>Insecurity</td>
<td>Presence of lower classes in Rogoredo</td>
<td>Proximity to the station and to the wood of via Sant’Arialdo (geographical isolation of an empty area)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug dealing</td>
<td>Fear of victimisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking</td>
<td>Coexistence issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micro criminality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Gratosoglio (M)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective dimension</th>
<th>Subjective dimension</th>
<th>Socio-economic dimension</th>
<th>Socio-geographic dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burglaries</td>
<td>Fear of victimisation</td>
<td>Housing conditions</td>
<td>Closeness to Roma camp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminality (organised crime)</td>
<td>Unsafe during the night</td>
<td>Social housing Poverty</td>
<td>Presence of detention centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>House squats</td>
<td>Coexistence issues</td>
<td>Deprivation</td>
<td>Isolated area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug trafficking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Europe (A)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective dimension</th>
<th>Subjective dimension</th>
<th>Socio-economic dimension</th>
<th>Socio-geographic dimension</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Property crime</td>
<td>Fear of victimisation</td>
<td>Socio-economic insecurity</td>
<td>Gatherings of people generating insecurity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trafficking issues</td>
<td>Restricted behaviours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Concerns about physical decay have been recorded across all the 10 neighbourhoods involved in the analysis, even though, as expected, worry about the poor conditions of the neighbourhood was much more pressing in those areas selected as “marginalized” rather than in “affluent” areas. Nevertheless, the results also show that, although residents in well-off areas are generally likely to define their neighbourhood as a nice-looking area, this impression does not prevent them from being occasionally concerned about physical disorder. One possible explanation of such apparently paradoxical positions is that concerns about physical decay affect every person to a different extent. In fact, the analysis of the results indicated that residents living in affluent areas have set standards that are much higher than those accepted by neighbours living in deprived areas. The most common signs of physical degradation reported by residents of affluent neighbourhoods were generally related to dirtiness and lack of services, while the problems faced by residents of deprived areas seem to be directly related to the structural gaps affecting the architectural space of the neighbourhood. In other words, the demands of the neighbours living in affluent areas were usually focused on the improvement of already existing spaces and services, while the residents in marginalised areas called for a significant reconfiguration of the urban landscape with the objective of “cleaning up” the image of the neighbourhood.

**Socio-economic divisions and subjective insecurity**

During fieldwork, many of these socially fragile circumstances emerged and revealed a kaleidoscopic vision of the socio-economic dimension that can be seen through the multiple forms of inequality. In agreement with Bourdieu and
his pioneering essay on ‘social capital’ in 1986, the economic crisis had implications for all forms of accumulation; after almost ten years, in the different European contexts analysed, it is possible to see this gap in all the manifestations of inequality witnessed by the observers.

Starting from the most classic form, i.e. the inequality of economic capital, especially in the marginal neighbourhoods, characterized by forms of spatial segregation linked to capital segregation itself (as in the case of social housing and regulated tenancy), this dimension appears convincing as a cause of insecurity and urban fragility. The uncertainty brought by the economic crisis on the sources of income, whether public (pensions) or private (salaries) is also expressed as a source of worry and insecurity. Economic potential/capacity is considered a reassuring factor, one to aspire to in order to obtain peace of mind.

Finally, in Milan’s affluent Rogoredo-Santa Giulia neighbourhood, some of the well-off residents attribute their economic potential to having ‘healthy’ families, unlike those that are seen to be present and held to be the basic causes of problems in the neighbourhood.

A reading of the different forms of capital proposed by Bourdieu, concerning France and linked to access to power through school and social relations, allow us to see social capital as one of the keys to living together and fundamental to agency and consequently a central element of socio-economic security. If, before the crisis, disappointment compared to the expectations and social goals could be defined as ‘stagnation’, today the risk is that of a ‘recession’: we do not know what to expect, if the near future will mean a return to pre-crisis conditions, an improvement or an irreversible decline. Uncertainty about tomorrow and the inevitability of events and their constant risk tends to generate feelings of insecurity and a weakness of the social system, producing what has been defined as a “society of resentment” (Bonomi, 2008).

The hypothesis of Bonomi (2008) is reflected in the literature on ‘risk’. As claimed by Sennett (2004), constant risk-taking is experienced by subjects as a factor of concern, especially at the lower levels, where the chances of finding a solution are perceived as the most unlikely; people focus more on what needs to be lost than on what can be earned and workers feel like playthings, not players.
The difficulties of conducting social programmes in segregated neighbourhoods are illustrated in this extract from the focus group in La Marina del Prat Vermell.

At Danube-Solidarité, safety concerns linked to forms of social capital are seen as introversion with respect to groups of people who are not seen as ‘similar’, based on religious variables.

In the Vila Olímpica, social ties are positively valued in terms of feeling safe.

Interestingly, in both London neighbourhoods, interviewees and focus group participants reported a high sense of community in their area which contributes to feeling safe. Particularly in Primrose Hill, it was emphasised that the more people you know in the area, the more secure you feel:

It was mentioned in both neighbourhoods that participants feel safe walking around their neighbourhood even late at night, but they highlighted one or two specific areas that they would avoid. Participants were more detailed about this in the affluent neighbourhood.

The third form of capital identified by Bourdieu is that of cultural capital, based on the idea that culture and education are triggers of social mobility. On the contrary, in the cases encountered, the low educational level in the marginal neighbourhoods has a greater effect on the forms of stagnation that increase a sense of insecurity.

One of the main causes of this problem is connected to dropping out of school, which we also see in Marina del Prat Vermell, Danube-Solidarité and in Gratosoglio. The same findings were observed in Harlesden, where it was argued that the lack of education of youths in the area led to the increase in unemployment and consequent loitering of groups of youths around the neighbourhood. Another conditioning factor, often variable and connected to cultural capital, is that of age, as seen in the marginalised Milanese neighbourhood of Gratosoglio. Education, job prospects and the instruments of change are a few of the variables that are missing in the marginal neighbourhoods and that have a greater influence on the precarious situation of those areas.
Similarly, in the marginalised neighbourhood in London, focus group participants discussed how the differences observed in young people in different parts of London (education, motivation, careers etc.) are caused by the lack of government funding towards youth and community services. It was argued that this contributes to feelings of insecurity as it results in youths having little to do, providing the opportunity for them to loiter outdoors, either intimidating locals or committing crimes.

**Identity inequality and the construction of the other**

What we know is that while integration has taken place in the labour market (beyond the many documented forms of discrimination), from the social and cultural side, the shadows remain numerous. The loud alarm that, in recent months, has developed around the theme of the stranger is an important sign of the difficulties that still exist in this land (Magatti, 2009: 49). Speech is a rather more complex one, which concerns the vulnerability of migrants.

Job insecurity, the crisis areas in the traditional use of migrants (care work, domestic activities), and the reduction of regulatory contracts used are some of the problems that the crisis highlighted and radicalised.

The crisis causes great suffering to those most vulnerable, who, at the same time, represent the most proactive part of the population: young people who see their expectations greatly reduced and realise the uselessness of all their efforts at training courses; women who try to defend their own path of emancipation; migrants seeking to complete and fulfil their migration project. Those structural factors connected to social mobility are combined with these elements of specificity to each group and worsened by the effects of the economic crisis. As a consequence, such a combination significantly reduces their chances of recovery. The sense of cultural roots and defence of cultural identity have pushed the boundaries of what was considered to be personal to become a problem of national and international security. They affect specific political issues, such as immigration legislation, rules of conduct of everyday life, the by-laws of an orthodoxy and the legitimisation of violence and/or insurrection. This “identity” battle, of course, is “ideally” conducted by white, young working men, and this ideal representation excludes and creates vulnerable areas in society.
According to the construction of identity, the new kind of criminal behaviour that has been brought to the attention of the European public in the last twenty years as a source of major insecurity has been criminal behaviour associated with migration, and particularly migrations from outside the European Union. Whereas migration has been linked to criminal behaviour through a host of different kinds of crime – some new, some others fairly traditional – what has been thoroughly novel to the perception of Europeans and the organisation of a European response (that has been less than adequate), has been the characterisation of a multifaceted array of criminal behaviours connected to migrations. The processes by which criminal behaviour by migrants has been perceived and dealt with have come to be the centrepiece of public discussion in many European countries. The emergence of this altogether new type of crime conundrum is downright inseparable from consideration profound re-evaluation of migration policies, and social and economic policies.

The processes of criminalising immigrants constitute, if possible, the single major obstacle to the smooth development of a social process, which is probably the most significant in the Europe of the next fifty years. The issue of the criminalisation of migrants does not only have to do with the study of criminal behaviour or the means to counter criminal behaviour – and therefore criminal policies – but also with migration policies, economic and welfare policies, education and cultural politics, and politics per se (Calavita, 2005; Franko – Bosworth, 2013).

The Chicago School of sociology produced a more balanced and “normalised” view of the relationship between migration processes and deviance (Park, 1928; Park et al., 1925; Shaw – McKay, 1942). At this point, public preoccupations started to shift toward the issue of the generations successive to the immigrant ones, their integration, and their possible contribution to the phenomena of deviance and crime. Not very differently, but within a much-changed scenario, later on, between the 1950s and 1960s, public discussion about migration flows from southern and eastern Europe toward the centre and the north of Europe followed a roughly similar pattern (Ferracuti, 1968). The question of “migration and crime” once again came to the centre of attention in the 1990s in Europe (Tonry, 1997; Marshall, 1997), but this time also in Southern Europe, which, after the economic slowdown of the early 1970s linked to the so-called “oil crisis” and the transition from a “Fordist” to a “post-Fordist” type of economy,
also became a place of attraction for migratory in-flows from other continents (Calavita, 2005; De Giorgi, 2002).

In many countries, studies have shown that foreigners’ contribution to crime rates – measured by reports to the police – are very close to native’ rates, especially if one takes into consideration the demographic profile of the two groups. If, by immigrants, one therefore means “documented” immigrants, European anxiety over their contribution to crime is certainly exaggerated. And as to the undocumented ones, the majority are in fact people who entered legally (for instance on a tourist visa) or who acquired the proper documents for work, but subsequently lost the requirements to stay – a particularly critical problem now with the current situation of economic crisis, given that work is one of the premises for maintaining the permit to stay legally in the EU. The problem is of course that the condition of being without documents places the foreign citizen within a set of conditions and constrictions that enormously increase all the risk factors for criminal behaviour (besides making them more visible to official agencies of control).

Furthermore, the problem of the relationship between documented status and the risk of deviant behaviour is first of all a legislative and more generally normative one, which concerns the various member states of the EU and the EU itself – as far as its role in the harmonisation process is concerned – because of the cumbersome nature of entry procedures. The hunger of European societies for labour was such in fact that, sooner or later, some kind of individual or collective amnesty provision would be enacted– thereby recognising the rational, albeit unlawful, strategy of the migrants, not to mention the importance of their contribution to the welfare of the country. However, obviously, this situation was such as to create a sort of “gap” in the migrant’s biography, when he or she had no chance of working legally and therefore made them prey to a variety of illegal or downright criminal “occupations”.

These issues are present in the five cities and 10 contexts in which each community identifies an ‘other’ to fight against or to drive away. In any event, someone who is not seen as part of the territory or its inhabitants. The situation is present also in the affluent Rogoredo neighbourhood: considering the different situations, there is always, in the common perception, an ‘other’ to stigmatise because he/she is believed to be unequal. However, partly because of the number
of exogenous factors listed above (in particular, the legitimacy crisis of the state form and a drastic decline in political participation), the crisis, in part due to the idea that the responsibility for the crisis is still frustration and the adverse emotion generated by it, cannot find an outlet in public social conflict, but erodes claims to membership and the political and geographic spaces of citizenship.

Similar to these points, an interviewee from Harlesden, London, highlighted the tension observed between different racial gangs in the neighbourhood. Upon stating this, the interviewee also mentioned that this does not make him feel unsafe or insecure, as he knows that he will not be a target of any of their crimes.

**The Margin: exclusion, lumpen exploitation, excess**

Lumpen refers to the condition of vulnerability, oppression and suffering that goes beyond the classic meaning of lumpenproletariat, and it ties the suffering caused by the abuse to the dimension of power. Violence is therefore, situated on a continuum, including structural (economic capital), symbolic (membership), daily and intimate dimensions.

Accounts like this from those at the margins of society also emerged in this research. It happens in Paris, among the residents of Danube-Solidarité and among the junkies and homeless in Europe. It happens in the empty spaces of Vila Olímpica and among the residents of La Marina del Prat Vermell. The words of the residents of Santa Giulia and Rogoredo and Országút reveal the same thing. Lumpen abuse becomes more structural in Harlesden and Gratosoglio and Laposdúlő.

It was reported by field researchers in Harlesden that groups of males, often of Somali, Afro-Caribbean, and Eastern European ethnicity, would hang around along Church Road. These groups would segregate in their own ethnic groups and, although doing nothing apparently illegal, this would appear intimidating. Participants in focus groups and in-depth interviews confirmed this. They also suggested that those who would often hang around outside in groups are linked to drug dealing.
It is even mentioned in first-hand accounts by drug users in Rogoredo. These accounts that give voice to inequality allow us to have a privileged observation point from two aspects; first, the way in which insecurity is equally felt by those who are marginalised and those who marginalise; and second, the way in which there is a growing suffering that should enter into urban and metropolitan policies, which should be more social in content than just being concerned with safety.

Perceived insecurity and social cohesion

The analysis of the qualitative data gathered during the fieldwork confirmed how the administrative definition of a neighbourhood barely coincides with people’s understanding of what actually is their neighbourhood. We were of course aware of this issue well before the beginning of the research. Researchers in sociology, criminology and social psychology already showed how neighbourhoods might refer to mental constructions rather than physical boundaries established for the sake of public administration. The qualitative approach implemented in the research provides additional support to the idea of “ego-hoods”, yet further research is needed to deepen our understanding of this challenging notion. The results obtained showed in particular how people’s use and interpretation of the space they call “neighbourhood” do not match at all with the official definition of neighbourhood. This was evident for the fieldworkers immediately after they entered their respective fields. They entered an area that was supposed to be “affluent” but that, actually, contained a far more complex social reality: all the affluent neighbourhoods involved in the analysis included deprived areas. It is the case of Europe in Paris, where residents stigmatize the area surrounding Rue de Bucarest, Országút (Budapest) where the predominantly pleasant-looking environment is altered by an important process of slumification, and Rogoredo (Milan) where the well-off area of Santa Giulia coexists with the “drug woods”. The reverse was also true: deprived areas are sometimes hugely diverse and may be separated by one single street from well-off areas. Perhaps the most remarkable case is Danube-Solidarité in Paris where Rue David d’Angers acts a frontier between the Cité Blanche and the Mozaïa, one of the most exclusive areas in one the most affluent cities in Europe. Further examples are the coexistence between Hős utca and the Pongrác housing estate in the Laposdűlő neighbourhood in Budapest or, to a lesser extent, the
geographical closeness of Primrose Hill to Camden in London. As such, the research definitively helped us to overcome any manicheistic view opposing well-off and worst-off areas as unconnected social monoliths.

The research material produced during the fieldwork highlights the incompleteness of a strictly criminological definition of urban insecurity. Hence, it is necessary to lessen the importance of the criminal dimension for, as the two neighbourhoods of each European city reveal, the relation between objective risks (deviant actions and incivility) and the subjective worries of the citizens becomes very complex and controversial. In particular, the need to extend the semantic scope of the “safety” concept to a series of aspects pertaining to the quality of urban life (hence the urban connotation of the concept), especially the social and economic dimensions. Even though the perception of insecurity is related to occurrences of deviant and delinquent phenomena, it is, actually, more directly related to changes pertaining to urban and architectural aspects (transformation and/or decaying of structures) as well as the social morphology of the city. The constant and noteworthy renewal of the socio-demographic composition of the neighbourhoods, the transformation of the economy and the local businesses and the conflicts between people who have different access to public spaces are all intertwined. They generate a diffuse sensation of lack of control over one’s own daily life in the urban settings. The urban space turns out to be perceived unsafe by its users because it changes more rapidly, both socially and physically. It is such rapidity in transformation that makes neighbourhoods more distant, anonymous and unsafe. Cities represent the concrete expression of various processes: urbanisation, individualisation and social and economic changes. It is from these rapid changes, such as the transformation of the morphology of neighbourhoods, new incoming residents, competition toward the use of public spaces and so forth, that urban conflict may arise. It may seem puzzling, but the emerging conflict could spring from the need to regain control over an urban setting that is becoming less familiar.

Such conflicts are increasingly loaded with security issues. In general, the old residents of the neighbourhoods demand police intervention as a repressive measure to restore the social order that cannot be reinstated by endogenous and informal social processes. Public institutions are thus encouraged to intervene through police enforcement (local and national) in order to settle conflicts and lend a guise of social control in the neighbourhood, “neutralising” those who
from time to time undermine everyone’s safety. The foregone conclusion of the confrontation between asymmetric groups is the worsening of those at a relative disadvantage, who experience further social exclusion.

The concept of urban safety is actually more complex than typically understood, either theoretically or politically. Not only does it strictly pertain to public order, law enforcement and crime control, but it also includes notions such as urban, physical and social quality; in other words, wellbeing in the city and in social relations. The literature on urban insecurity has shown that, in various local and national areas, the concept of social cohesion has been interpreted as a response to the problems that emerged in the social, cultural, and political spheres of global societies. In particular, the link to insecurity has been thematised with the crisis of social solidarity and, in general, with social ties. The focus has been on the reduced strength of important social ties and of the various forms of solidarity, in the face of the crisis of traditional networks of protection (family, local community, neighbourhood), weakened by consumerism, by geographic and professional mobility and by the fragmentation of social relations.

In the current social system, the old structures of social protection seem to be in crisis or unable to cope with the complexity generated by new conflicts, intergenerational and ethnic, caused by global migration processes. In this context, the concept of social cohesion is especially used as a response to the consequences of the structural changes affecting the strength of social ties and society as a whole. The concept of social cohesion comprehends the micro and the macro levels of analysis (the city, the neighbourhood, the local community) and describes the strength and the ability of the primary ties (family, neighbourly relations, friends) and secondary ties (associations, civic organizations, third sector) to regenerate (Lockwood, 1999).

It is interesting to note that the majority of studies in the last twenty years concerned with the definition and operationalisation of the notion of social cohesion have focused on the macro-structural dimension of the concept (Schiefer – Van der Noll, 2016). For example, in the well-known study by Chan et al. (2006), social cohesion is defined as an attribute (not as a process) of the whole society through its (vertical-horizontal and objective-subjective) relational dimension. In this perspective, the main unit of analysis is the nation, a geographically and politically defined entity (even though the use of social cohesion may be
extended to the city and the neighbourhood), in which the State is considered the most appropriate institutional level to observe and study social cohesion.

The tendency to discuss cohesion in macro terms, rather than in terms of generative processes stemming from within specific local contexts, also emerges from the documents produced by national governments and international institutions. Here the concept of social cohesion almost totally leaves the analysis of socially problematic contexts requiring various forms of intervention out of consideration (Alietti, 2013: 10). The European Council (2005: 23) defines Social Cohesion as the capacity of a society to ensure the well-being of all its members – minimising disparities and avoiding marginalisation – to manage differences and divisions and ensure the means of achieving welfare for all members. Equal access to social rights, available resources, and respect for human dignity and personal autonomy must be ensured. Analysing this definition we can infer that cohesion is framed within a top-down perspective, centred on the assumption that the State shall be in charge of creating a socio-political environment supporting freedom of expression, better access to services, and ultimately a better quality of life for its own European citizens. In this context, the generative processes being activated in different local contexts are completely overlooked. By the same token, the different actors potentially involved in these processes and the positive consequences arising from those contexts for the creation of inclusive and exclusive initiatives are equally neglected.

The macro-structural dimension of social cohesion seems to leave out of consideration several important elements: the problems generated by the social disorganization of the neighbourhood or of the local community, the crisis of social ties and above all the difficulty of activating generative processes at the social and civic level.

In this research, social cohesion has been discussed within a multidimensional perspective, because cohesion concerns both the whole society (macro level) and the relationships between individuals (micro level), encompassing the structural and the cultural sphere. The information collected in the neighbourhoods of five European cities through different methods of research allows us to provide a new meaning to the notion of social cohesion. Being in agreement with Boltanski and Chiapello (2014) and Bauman (2007) regarding the interpretation of modernity, we can
affirm that we are facing a “rediscovery of the subject”. Such a subject should not be understood as part of a historical process, namely a theoretical construction, but rather as a single individual. The individualistic approach is self-centred and the subject is viewed as a monad, unwilling to establish social connections, concerned with his own self-fulfilment, therefore incapable of creating instrumental ties and relations to ensure a peaceful coexistence of communities (Bauman, 2007). The resulting consequence is a true deconstruction of social wholes, namely social classes, political parties and trade unions (Boltanski – Chiapello, 2014). At the level of social cohesion, this process is important because the aforementioned deconstruction diminishes trust and the capability of pursuing the common good, which, according to our research, is becoming increasingly nebulous.

The dissolution of common points/places/systems of reference fosters what Sennett (1976) and Lasch (1981) have termed “the fall of the public man”. The level of decomposition is so high that these places have nothing else to offer other than sceptical indifference and lack of willingness to face other subjects. The sense of insecurity derives, therefore, from the perception of losing control of events; this condition, then, generates more distrust, isolation, and neglect. The quest for solidity is apparently being replaced by something more fluid, in which the price to pay is the instability and temporariness of social ties. Inside such “liquid modernity”, the only actual form of freedom is the mobility of financial capital and global élites, to the detriment of the majority of the population, forced to sedentarism and condemned to be stuck in one place (Bauman, 2007). Between these two life conditions, there lies a paradox: the apology for the empowerment of the individual, a self-determined subject in control of his or her life project. This constitutes the leading Weltanschauung of the individualising society. Hence, there is a bottomless pit between individuality as a form of personal achievement and the limited means to control the social context in which one’s own self-determination should be attained (Bauman, 2007). This issue can be found in the research material collected in the vulnerable neighbourhood.

The obsessive search for maximum security that can protect residents from crime and criminals in a vulnerable and socially fragile context, where the individuals are no longer capable of relying on their own “natural” ties, but are continually reminded that they have to take care of themselves (Bauman, 2005),
provides the social backdrop for building walls, setting territorial demarcations and identifying scapegoats. The empirical material shows that, in the neighbourhoods of the five cities selected, migrants as well as those living at the “margins” (homeless, drug addicts, etc.) represent the worst nightmare for local residents, because they embody the precariousness and the frailty of human condition. To a certain extent, they incorporate the idea of being redundant, a condition that anyone could experience resulting from the pressures of an economic system always in precarious equilibrium, although we are oblivious of it. For a number of reasons, migrants have become the main bearers of those differences of which people are fearful and consequently erect defensive borders. Paradoxically however, such borders are not erected to separate, but the preclusion of space and the creation of demarcations encourage differences to surface. Since borders are traced, differences ensue and in the end they have the functional of legitimising those very borders (Barth, 1969).

In other respects, poverty too, in times of capital globalisation, becomes strategic and functional to the market because it represents, so to speak, the living proof of what freedom from uncertainty means. As Bauman puts it, “the sight of the poor keeps the non-poor at bay and in step. [...] They do not dare to imagine a different world” (Bauman, 2002: 123). The poor are often criminalised together with foreign migrants and typically treated as scapegoats (Girard, 1987). The sociality characterising our society may turn objects of pity and compassion into objects of resentment and anger (Bauman, 2002: 82). The collective anxiety, while waiting for a tangible threat to fight against, is mobilised against an undefined enemy, who is typically the migrant, closely associated with a criminal who threatens the personal security of the citizens. Politicians are always quick to exploit this situation for electoral aims.

As Bauman explains, modernity is characterised by the absence of solid ties and by fuzzy boundaries; the individual reacts by seeking her own identity in traditional and familiar forms of memberships, limited to what can be defined as Gemeinschaft. The rediscovery of the community implies the need for an identity-making process that is shielded in the closed circle of an exclusive Gemeinschaft, the guarantor of an axiomatic and reciprocal recognition. “We” becomes a socially and politically loaded pronoun with a dangerous leaning. In the affluent neighbourhoods of Milan, Barcelona, Budapest and Paris self-defensive and protectionist forms of aggregations are often supported and strength-
ened by the deliberate exclusion of the “other” (the foreigner, the stranger, the drug addict). The in-depth interviews, the participant observation, and the focus groups as a whole evoke, for example, Bauman’s segregating “community of fear” (Bauman, 2005) or Beck’s “community of danger” (Beck, 2000), backed by the mere sharing of anxiety.

The sense of insecurity seems to derive from a sort of ambivalence. On the one hand, the crisis of the traditional networks of protection (family, local community, neighbourhoods), transformed by consumerism, by processes of geographic and professional mobility, and by the fragmentation of social relations has contributed to weaken the networks involved in identity making processes. On the other hand, there is a regressive return to violent and destructive forms of identity among citizens. It is as if the lack of existential and cognitive security caused by the transformation of the economic and social system would transfer the fear and anxiety of social actors onto another aspect of security, namely personal safety, the only aspect that individuals and institutions are still capable of keeping under control (Bauman, 2000).

The subjective perception of living in an unsafe place may be induced by the citizen’s relationship with the surrounding environment. Signs of vandalism, the systematic violation of shared behavioural norms and media coverage focused on urban decay and on the presence of criminality over a specific territory are all examples of situations that citizens, and in particular, the most vulnerable of them, may interpret as signs of public administration disengagement and a weak social order. These signs are perceived as threats transcending the subjective psychological dimension and thus generating collective perceptions of danger linked to urban insecurity. For example, we may cite the self-segregation case of fragile individuals who would choose not to leave their domestic sphere from fear that the neighbourhood is unsafe. We should also add that the lack of sociality in the community can dangerously expose the same community to potential episodes of deviancy and criminal behaviour.
Policy recommendations

Drawing from the empirical material collected, urban security emerges as a complex matter that requires multifarious actions and tools in order to address the countless number of factors involved. The most important are the geography of the place, the urban model, the population (residents, commuters, city users, business community), the demographic changes, cultural and religious differences, community membership and civic-mindedness, the role of associations, the concrete opportunity of local policies and the situations that cause discomfort and intolerance. All these elements should be taken into consideration prior to planning and structuring social policies.

In general terms, enforcing policies inspired by criminal prosecution – either for prevention or repression – and requiring the reorganisation of the methods for controlling the territory cannot remove the original causes that feed and sustain citizens’ insecurity. In fact, they could produce two equally dangerous effects: the legitimisation of the criminal justice system within a purely symbolic dimension, and the privatisation of the instruments guaranteeing the defence of security. Considering security merely in terms of threats emerging from a criminal milieu and consequently implementing policies accordingly is repressive and may have negative consequences such as, in particular, worsening social exclusion. They favour the citizens’ security by protecting the “good” citizens (the included) from the potential threats stemming from the weak segments of society, namely the excluded. These kinds of policies are technocratic means de facto aiming at the status quo of society. The demand for security is merely limited to keeping criminality at bay and privatising the protection of a collective good. By way of examples, we mention the growing business of private security and citizens’ participation in patrols, and the spread of neighbourhood watch schemes. These kinds of policies, moreover, undermine rights and freedom in two ways: by limiting access to “militarised” public spaces, and by erecting gated communities; through processes of victimisation and criminalisation due to the perpetuation of social exclusion within the weak segment of the population.

Addressing these social problems is more urgent than coping with the sense of insecurity that obsesses one part of the population. The government should enact political, social and cultural strategies of intervention, rather than just enforcing criminal prosecution. The former meet the needs of citizens’ security
better that the latter. They deal with security in a multidimensional and complex perspective by acting on the objective causes and aim at empowering the weak groups, which face marginalisation and more exclusion. Moreover, they should be concerned with the specificities of each local context to activate forms of social participation.

The revitalisation of the neighbourhoods and their social life should take place along with reclaiming endogenous and community-based forms of social control and reclaiming public spaces. An investment in cultural policies should contribute to lessening the population’s demand for criminal repression. Considering criminal repression as an auxiliary means to a wider and more integrated public policy implies the inversion of the approach: police officers are turned into citizens, equality becomes a value to pursue, and public spaces must be put to good use and made available to everybody.

References


Introduction

According to the point of departure of the MARGIN project, attitudes of fear frequently contradict criminal statistics trends and are inappropriate: despite the decrease in criminality, fear of crime will typically not decrease to a similar degree, and the difference between the subjective and objective situation is even seen to increase (Ambrey et al., 2014). It is the task of social sciences to examine what social, economical, psychological and criminological factors contribute to the development of the feeling of insecurity characteristic of modern man. As such, it was obvious right from the outset of the project that an extensive examination of insecurity using a comprehensive methodology is needed. The goal of the MARGIN project was to develop a comprehensive set of instruments to facilitate the recognition and management of local problems that determine the feeling of insecurity. In this paper we wish to present the results of the project in Hungary and the background to it.

Researching the dimensions of insecurity in Hungary

In Hungary, police data concerning the objective dimension of insecurity have been collected in the ‘Unified Criminal Statistics of Investigation Authorities and Public Prosecution’ since 1964. It is an advantage of such police databases that they make it possible to examine criminal offences that victimisation surveys are unable to examine (e.g. homicide), as well as to include detailed information on the victims and offenders (gender, age, occupation, residence – and, with regard to the offenders, also the circumstances of the criminal offence,
any recidivism), even if they are sometimes inaccurate. Furthermore they make it possible for example to conduct desk research covering specific fields on the basis of the databases, which is primarily performed in Hungary by researchers from the National Institute of Criminology (OKRI). Their drawbacks, among others, are that they only include such acts that are defined by legislation as criminal offences; one might say they are better indicators of police activity than of real criminal trends. This can be said in terms of time as well, since annual databases are created according to the date of registration and not the time of perpetration.

Starting from the 1980s, besides the data obtained from the analysis of police statistics, there have been efforts to capture the subjective dimension of insecurity by means of large-sample crime victimisation survey research as well. In Hungary the last such research took place in 2002–2003 under the title *Victims and Opinions*¹, with the leadership of the National Institute of Criminology. The representative sample of 10,000 included people more than 18 years of age, and asked questions about 19 different types of victimisation situations. The questionnaire also covered the circumstances of victimisation (time, place), and also investigated the extent and causes of latency. With the help of the data, the national and local trends in the fear of crime, the probability of victimisation, the scale and nature of criminal offences that remain concealed, and the social problems of the residential area were assessed.

The researchers from OKRI also examined, in the scope of a 2001 research project entitled *Insecurities in European Cities (InSec)*² what kind of global, urban and living environmental problems concern people the most, and to what causes these might be related. As far as Hungary is concerned, the research was carried out in District 9 and 22 of Budapest. It was followed in 2005 by the European Union project *Crime Prevention Carousel*³, which was carried out in

¹ *Victims, Offenders and Opinions of Crime* project with the help of the funds of the National Research Development Programmes NFKP-5/0100/2002 (contract number: OM-00120/2002.)
² *Insecurities in European Cities. Crime-Related Fear Within the Context of New Anxieties and Community-Based Crime Prevention (InSec, HPSE-CT-2002-00052).* http://www.insec.uni-hamburg.de
³ According to the Hungarian research, victimisation is more frequent among the young, because they go out and meet strangers more often, whereas for example the members of families with small children are less likely to become victims, as they spend more time at home (Kerezsi, 2005).
three districts of Budapest. In the scope of this, 1,500 people were asked about victimisation, the fear of crime and the evaluation of the work of the police.

**Personal and demographic factors affecting insecurity**

One of the most important issues of the strategies aimed at decreasing insecurity is *who are victimised, and* whether they have any identifiable demographic and socio-cultural characteristics. According to the theory of victimisation, persons who have been victimised previously typically have a lower threshold of fear than those who have not been victimised (Korinek, 2016).

Besides experiences of victimisation, there are other personal factors as well that affect the feeling of insecurity. *Health status* also affects the level of crime-related fear, as well as the person’s judgment on the public security-related work of the authorities (Kerezsi, 2005; Dunavölgyi, 2005). Poor health influences the individual’s feeling of insecurity through the associated feelings of vulnerability, generalised anxiety and social isolation (Jackson, 2009; Lorenc et al., 2012).

The *image broadcast by the media*, suggesting ongoing violence and the spread of crime, may also have a significant impact on the individual. *Certain statements by public actors* promising to combat spreading crime and at the same time presenting crime as an already intolerable phenomenon, particularly in connection with events that raise public alarm, may also have a negative effect (Barabás, 2014).

Among demographic variables, *gender* and the *level of education* proved significant factors determining insecurity. In Hungary, it is mostly women with a low level of education who are afraid of being victimised (Kó, 2004a). In the case of specific types of criminal offences (for example sexual harassment), women are more acutely endangered and, due to their weaker physical condition, are less able to defend themselves. Higher levels of education as social capital enable the individual to tackle insecurity, whereas lower levels of education are accompanied by higher levels of fear (Barabás et al., 2004).

*Age* and *marital status* also affect the measure of insecurity; it is primarily elderly people who are afraid of crime and anxious about social processes that intensify their feeling of insecurity. Paradoxically, despite their higher level of
fear, women and elderly people are less likely to be victimised or have personal experiences of crime (Korinek, 1988).

**Territorial characteristics of insecurity**

On the basis of the results of Hungarian studies, it can be said that there is no correlation, even at county level, between victimisation rates and the level of fear, irrespective of whether the affective or cognitive approach was used in the research (Kó, 2005; Kerezsi, 2005). According to the results of the research project titled *Insecurities in European Cities (InSec)*, in Budafok, a much safer neighbourhood, respondents are much more afraid of being victimised than in Ferencváros, a neighbourhood highly infected with crime. The research explained this phenomenon with the fact that citizens who are forced to live together with more frequent crime are better used to the feeling of being exposed, whereas in a district that is just ‘getting acquainted’ with crime and is objectively in a better situation security-wise, increasing crime associated with shopping centres – despite its relatively low volume – significantly worsened the inhabitants’ mental state and feeling of security (Barabás et al., 2004). At the same time, according to Kerezsi, despite the higher crime rates of socially deprived areas, members of high-income social groups are more frequently victimised (especially with regard to opportunistic thefts and car thefts) (Kerezsi, 2005).

The research titled *Victims and Opinions* shed light on the phenomenon of *distancing*, according to which respondents tend to think of their living environment (the town or village where they live) as rather safe, compared with other territorial units (Kó, 2004b). Another investigation carried out earlier by OKRI’s researchers in three districts of Budapest (District 5, 9 and 22) showed that citizens typically name crime in the first or second place among the major problems in their environment, the other major problems in their district being the unsatisfactory traffic situation and disorder and untidiness in the streets (Kerezsi et al., 2003).

There have been relatively little Hungarian research dealing with the regional characteristics of insecurity. On the basis of the available studies, a correlation can be seen between the size of settlement and the level of fear: the proportion of respondents reporting fear was the highest in Budapest, and the incidence of people experiencing fear also decreased in proportion to the decrease of settlement size (Kó, 2005). Furthermore, just as the *image of public security* in
the minds of the people is more than anything else influenced by the level of development of the given regional unit (region, county, settlement) (Dunavölgyi, 2005), the feeling of insecurity is also shaped by other factors in a prosperous region than in a region or county having territorial and infrastructural deficiencies (Kerezsi, 2005). In such ‘lagging regions’, more people feel an increasing discomfort, whereas in ‘prosperous regions’ an increasing comfort is felt by more of the people (Kerezsi, 2005). Crime is named more typically as a major day-to-day local problem in Budapest than in the other counties (Kó, 2004b; Kerezsi, 2005), just as the number of people thinking of themselves as victims decreases in proportion to settlement size (Kó, 2005).

The degree of differentiation among the regions as regards insecurity and the fear of crime can therefore primarily be traced back not to the different levels of exposure to crime, but to opinion on the direct living environment of the inhabitants and social inequalities. As regards Hungary, due to the time of publication and narrow range of the relevant research, we can only point out the general differences between marginalised and less marginalised areas; revealing the causes in detail shall be the task of further studies.

The MARGIN project in Hungary

In the scope of the MARGIN project, as opposed to the general criminological trend to examine insecurity primarily using quantitative tools (e.g. crime victimisation survey), qualitative research tools were also developed in order to explore the problem in full detail. The quantitative methods were combined with the methods of in-depth interviews, participant observation and focus group interviews. In our opinion, the elaboration of such alternative approaches has key importance in identifying the roots of insecurity. In the qualitative research phase, emphasis was placed on the security issues identified as the most acute problems as far as the feeling of insecurity among the inhabitants of the two areas under review was concerned. These problems were defined on the basis of interviews with the representatives of the local civil society and institutions and the members of marginalised groups, and the results of participant observation. In the course of fieldwork, we tried to develop a comprehensive

4 For a detailed description of the research methods of the MARGIN project, see Riccardo Valente’s chapter.
picture of the spatial, temporal and cultural context of security problems. In the focus group discussions, the representatives of the local civil society and institutions were asked to conduct a discourse on the potential solutions.

**Selection of the research areas**

When selecting the research areas for the MARGIN project, we divided the neighbourhoods of the cities involved on the basis of the dimension of insecurity as outlined in Riccardo Valente’s paper, then made the selection on the basis of the available quantitative and qualitative data.\(^5\)

The Hungarian research was conducted in two selected neighbourhoods of the capital city. By 2017, the population of Hungary had fallen below 9.8 million, of which the population of Budapest, the capital, amounted to 1.75 million, about 18 percent of the total population.\(^6\) By contrast, of the 226,452 criminal offences registered in Hungary in 2017, about 29 percent (65,081) were perpetrated in Budapest\(^7\), which presumably derives from the economic, labour market, political and other key functional roles of the capital, but at any rate further corroborates the rationale for conducting the research here.

In the MARGIN project, data broken down by neighbourhoods for all researched dimensions of insecurity were not available to us in respect of Budapest; therefore, in phase one of the selection, we worked with district-level data, then the decision concerning the neighbourhoods was made on the basis of quantitative and qualitative data available at neighbourhood level, also taking into account the feasibility criteria of the research. The dimension of crime was measured using a ratio comparing the number of burglaries to dwelling relative to the number of households. When selecting the indicator, we sought a crime, the victims of which are obviously local residents. This criterion was best satisfied by burglary. The indicator of subjective insecurity was the *level of education*.\(^8\) The theoretical basis for this was provided by the results of the analysis of victim

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\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Dissemination Database: Calculated population according to settlements from 2015.


\(^8\) For the calculation, the proportion within the population of persons aged 25 or more and having a university education was used.
research data examined at an earlier stage of the MARGIN project, according to which level of education is a consistent indicator of how secure people feel about their living environment and home.\(^9\) The social geographical and the social economical dimensions were represented by *average house prices*, showing not only the quality of real estate but the character of the neighbourhood as well.\(^10\) In the course of the selection—based on the common decision of the researchers—neighbourhoods where high crime rates prevailed were preferred. We sought areas meeting two of the four possible combinations of level of education and house prices (as we could only examine two neighbourhoods).

Of the two districts within Budapest that are characterised by a relatively high crime rate, high insecurity and high deprivation (District 23 and 10), we selected District 10 (called Kőbánya)—a neighbourhood constituting a more integral part of the city—as the *marginalised* area of the research. The quantitative reason for selecting *Laposdűlő* within the district was a high crime rate and relatively (even within the district) low house prices. As regards this neighbourhood, we also had level of education data that were below, as well as unemployment rate data that surpassed, the Budapest average.\(^11\) The qualitative reason for the selection was provided by Hős utca, which was already notoriously problematic at the time of selection.

High crime rate, low insecurity and low deprivation were again characteristic of two districts (2 and 5) of the capital city. Of these, District 2—a district notorious for its high house prices—was selected for its higher residential density. Within this latter district, on the basis of qualitative criteria (the history of Széll Kálmán tér, the concentrated presence of NGOs, etc.) the *Országút* neighbourhood was selected.

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\(^9\) The measure of security people feel about their living environment and home was more consistently present in the victim research in the countries under review than the fear of crime or questions concerning people’s trust in the police.

\(^10\) As regards the provincial regions, a deprivation index (Koós, 2015) has been fully developed: although its transposition to Budapest has been proposed, we did not have sufficient time for this in the scope of the MARGIN project.

The research phase of the MARGIN project was thus carried out in two neighbourhoods selected within the capital city. Országút is one of the 33 neighbourhoods of District 2. It has a key infrastructural role, as through Széll Kálmán tér it connects the outer parts of the district – lying in the Buda Hills – with the downtown traffic network. In the participant observation phase of the research, Széll Kálmán tér, as the busy infrastructure centre of the neighbourhood, had a key role. Besides Széll Kálmán tér, further observations were made in Millenáris park and the Fény utca market. As the market is primarily where the social interactions of the older generation take place, the majority of the interviews with elderly people were recorded here. Although lying outside the borders of the neighbourhood, Városmajor and Vérmező, which serve as occasional living spaces for the homeless, were also included in the research.

The Laposdűlő neighbourhood and the Hős utca ghetto

Laposdűlő is one of the eleven neighbourhoods of District 10 (Kőbánya). Public transport facilities – the easy accessibility primarily of metro line 2 and tram-line No. 1, and numerous bus lines – have a decisive influence on the life of the neighbourhood. Institutions that have key importance in the internal life of the neighbourhood are Pongrác Közösségi Ház, functioning as a community and cultural centre; Bárák Kőbányai Humánszolgáltató Központ, the social care organisation of the local government; Emberbarát Alapítvány Addiktológiai Gondozója (addictology care centre); Kontúr Egyesület, an association operating in Hős utca; and the ‘Utcafront’ Institution of the Hungarian Baptist Aid to Kőbánya, dealing with the homeless and addicted.

In the participant observation phase of our research, special attention was paid to the apartment houses under Hős utca 15/A and 15/B, and the Hős utca stop of tramline No. 1. Thanks to the research by the Angelusz Róbert College for Advanced Studies in Social Sciences at ELTE University (ELTE ARTSZ, 2016), we have detailed quantitative and qualitative information on the composition of the ‘ghetto’. The four-storey residential buildings were raised in as part of an emergency housing project to alleviate the grave housing crisis between the

Full name: Utcafront Menedék Hajléktalan Személyek és Szenvedélybetegek Integrált Intézménye (Street Front Shelter–Integrated Institution for Homeless and Addicted People)
two world wars. At that time, the residents of the slums then developing around the city (for example Mária Valéria-telep, Auguszta-telep, Zita-telep, etc.) were allowed to move here; however, the Hős utca environment and the privation accompanying the small apartment sizes did not alleviate the social standing or exclusion of the inhabitants at all. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Roma families coming from the more backward regions of the country settled here, making the quarter increasingly ethnically homogeneous. Since then, Hős utca has served as a kind of transitional space for the migration from the provincial regions to Budapest, and for the poor who were being squeezed out of the capital. Currently economic and social differences can be seen between the buildings under Hős utca 15/A and 15/B (one of the factors to be emphasised for example being that – contrary to the principles of situational crime prevention – there is no public lighting in building 15/B). The tenants’ employment in the labour market is low, and in many cases they are excluded from health care (due to missing social security cards or the circumstantiality of the ambulance service: according to certain information, an ambulance will only come if escorted by the police, although in the course of our own participant observation we saw ambulance cars as well as fire engines without police accompaniment in front of the houses). There are many apartments in the houses without a bath or lavatory; bath and lavatory facilities are shared between two apartments, or are located on the corridor; in some apartments there is no hot water, gas or flush toilet and internet coverage is also low. The majority of the inhabitants do not feel Hős utca to be safe at all, and the public spaces belonging to the buildings are also thought to be dangerous—the apartments and the hanging corridors, however, are deemed secure in comparison. The age tree of the inhabitants of the ghetto is fairly young, and the children have connections with many pedagogical and educational institutions (including many not located in Kőbánya). Family relations have a key role among the inhabitants as well as in the organisation of the life of the community; however, a significant part of the inhabitants have moved here in the recent years, and high turnover hinders the development of a stable residential community (ELTE ARTSZ, 2016).

**Results of the small-scale survey**

The aim of making a survey to be used in the course of the MARGIN project was to enable a comprehensive examination of the factors affecting insecurity. The structure of the measuring device reflected the four dimensions consti-
tuting the focus of the research. Besides demographic indicators (age, gender, level of education, marital and health status, income, etc.) questions measuring the subjective and social economy dimension of insecurity, as well as those related to victimisation, had a key role. As in Hungary the questionnaire surveys supported only the Italian telephone inquiries – conducted on a sample of 15,000 people – for validation purposes, we did not aim at any representative, large-sample data collection. Therefore the sample included 50 people from each of the areas under review; when setting up the sample, we were trying to achieve an even distribution as regards gender and age. The sample eventually included altogether 40 men (Országút: 23, Laposdűlő: 17) and 60 women (Országút: 27, Laposdűlő: 33), and the balance of the members of the different age groups was as follows: people between 18 and 35 years of age: 29; between 36 and 60 years of age: 34; older than 60 years: 37. In the case of Laposdűlő, no questionnaires were administered in the Hős utca ‘ghetto’, as in our opinion the couple of questionnaires due here could have disrupted participant observation, which was still at an early stage then.

Although the fundamental objectives of the MARGIN research did not include any comparison of the two neighbourhoods, a comparison of the results may demonstrate the effect on the feeling of insecurity of living environments having different social economy and social geography characteristics.

Sense of belonging to the neighbourhood and community cohesion were measured using 10-degree attitude scales in relation to the following statements: “I like living in my neighbourhood”; “We all know each other in this neighbourhood”; “If I am in trouble, I could get help from people who live here”. In the case of all three statements, the average of the answers of the people living in Országút was higher than the answers of the inhabitants of Laposdűlő. The difference is most conspicuous in respect of the sense of belonging to the neighbourhood (Question 1) (9.10–6.60). For the questions measuring community cohesion, the difference between the averages was smaller (Question 2: 4.82–4.53; Question 3: 5.79–4.81). It can therefore be said, in respect of the people included in the sample, that for those living in a marginalised environment – in accordance with those explained in the theoretical chapter – a lower level of social cohesion and a weaker sense of belonging to the living environment is typical when compared with people living in a more affluent environment.
Table 1: Concerns about problems in the residential neighbourhood

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighbourhood under review</th>
<th>How worried are you about the following problems in your neighbourhood?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poverty and economic difficulties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Országút</td>
<td>M 3.69 2.98 4.68 1.64 3.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N 49 40 50 50 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD 2.27 2.26 3.22 1.16 2.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laposdűlő</td>
<td>M 7.05 7.09 6.96 3.13 4.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N 42 43 49 47 49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD 2.70 2.77 2.95 2.68 3.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>M 5.24 5.11 5.81 2.36 4.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N 91 83 99 97 98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD 2.98 3.26 3.28 2.17 2.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We asked the people involved in the research to indicate on a ten-point scale how concerned they are about certain issues associated with insecurity. The topic of poverty and economic difficulties relates to the social economy dimension of insecurity. The lack of infrastructure (health, education, leisure activities, transport, etc.) and the poor condition of urban furniture (lack of public lighting, vandalised buildings and cars, etc.) is intended to measure the social geography dimension of insecurity. Labelled minor infringements in the theoretical part, the different forms of offensive behaviour significantly affect subjective insecurity. In a marginalised living environment, social economy and macro social problems mostly occur in a concentrated manner. As it can be seen from Table 1, all insecurity issues were evaluated to be graver on average by the people living in Laposdűlő than by those living in the Országút neighbourhood.
The difference is most conspicuous with regard to poverty and drug trafficking. As it is revealed in other chapters as well, drug consumption and trafficking is one of the most important criminology and social problems in our marginalised area of research, which is primarily associated with the Hős utca ‘ghetto’. The lack of infrastructure and the poor condition of urban furniture is again more serious problem in Laposdűlő; however, the difference in this case is smaller. Of course these issues may be manifested at completely different levels of severity in an affluent or a marginalised living environment, even if they are perceived as problems by the inhabitants of both neighbourhoods.

**Table 2: Questions concerning the subjective dimension of insecurity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subjective dimension of insecurity</th>
<th>Neighbourhood under review</th>
<th>Országút</th>
<th>Laposdűlő</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. How worried are you about you or someone close to you being victimised/being victim of a crime?</td>
<td></td>
<td>3.60 50 2.42</td>
<td>6.47 49 3.19</td>
<td>5.02 99 3.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How often do you usually walk alone in your neighbourhood after dark?</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.58 50 1.67</td>
<td>4.90 49 2.96</td>
<td>3.73 99 2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. How safe do you feel walking alone in your neighbourhood after dark?</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.20 50 3.11</td>
<td>4.22 49 3.72</td>
<td>4.72 99 3.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. How often do you feel unsafe in your neighbourhood?</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.53 49 2.60</td>
<td>3.67 45 3.09</td>
<td>5.16 94 3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. How often do you change your plans and/or routine to avoid situations that make you feel unsafe?</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.94 50 2.33</td>
<td>4.28 47 2.71</td>
<td>3.59 97 2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. How confident are you that the police are effective at preventing and tackling crime?</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.97 39 2.70</td>
<td>4.98 45 3.07</td>
<td>5.44 84 2.93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
With the block of questions shown in Table 2, the subjective dimension of insecurity was examined. Questions 1 and 4 (fear of victimisation and emotions associated with the lack of security) are linked to the affective dimension of insecurity. Questions 3 and 6 relate to the cognitive aspect of insecurity (danger and evaluation of the work of the police), whereas Questions 2 and 5 to the behavioural component (avoidance behaviours). The people living in Laposdúlő are more concerned about themselves or their family members becoming the victim of crime, at the same time, paradoxically, they tend to feel less unsafe in the neighbourhood when compared with the inhabitants of Országút. The people living in Országút judge walking alone after dark to be somewhat safer, and their average evaluation of the work of the police is also higher than in the case of those living in Laposdúlő. This finding is consistent with the earlier research results of the InSec investigation. When asking people about avoidance behaviours, we found that the people living in Laposdúlő tend to walk alone after dark more often on average; however, they also tend more to avoid the places perceived to be dangerous.

Thus, in our small-sample research, we found insecurity to be altogether higher in Laposdúlő, a neighbourhood identified as marginalised, which may be explained, not primarily by the objective number of criminal offences, but by social economy and social geography factors, as well as a day-to-day confrontation with social disorganisation (litter, noise, drunkards, aggressive groups).

**Insecurity issues in Országút**

On the basis of in-depth interviews with and the participant observation of players in institutional and civil society, three issues were identified as problems that significantly affect the life of the inhabitants of the Országút neighbourhood: the homeless problem, burglaries, and scams against elderly individuals.

**The homeless problem**

The existence of homelessness in Országút is a complex social problem that significantly influences the inhabitants’ feeling of security. Homelessness is not a recent issue; the area around Széll Kálmán tér has been the gathering place and living space for homeless groups of various sizes since the late 1980s. Besides the dense transit traffic (potential opportunities for panhandling), it
is also largely due to the fact that from the 1990s until quite recently a sort of black labour market operated in the square. According to a social worker working in the neighbourhood, at daybreak every morning, mostly homeless men of Hungarian and Romanian origin used to wait here for odd jobs; their employers engaged them primarily to work illegally on house constructions. Minor criminal offences – fighting, stabbings, thefts – frequently occurred among the people waiting for work. At night sometimes more serious crimes – for example robberies – were also perpetrated in the zigzag passageways in and around Moszkva tér (the old name for Széll Kálmán tér).

The recent transformation of the square is an excellent example of how the social geography dimension of insecurity can be shaped by changing the physical environment. Due to the demolition of the old shops – which has made the space more transparent – and the enhanced lighting in the square, the crime rate has decreased significantly in the opinion of the homeless, as well as that of local residents, and the black market has also ceased to exist. According to social workers, this latter change hit the homeless population rather hard, as they lost almost their only opportunity to find work. After the transformation, the homeless were forced to move to the periphery of the residential quarter (primarily to the parks, Vérmező and Városmajor, and to Retek utca), and only a minority returned to the square.

The problem of homelessness – which is of course not restricted to Országút, but exists throughout the capital city – primarily originates from the deficiencies of the homeless care system. Homeless shelters are overcrowded; often there are 16 or 18 people accommodated in a single room. They do not have anywhere to lock away their valuables, also fights and thefts are frequent. For these reasons, most homeless people do not want to go to a shelter at all. There is no opportunity either for couples to go to the same place, or to take their dog with them to the shelter. The majority therefore try to make it on the street, living from begging or petty thefts. This marginalised group – besides evoking fear in the population – is exposed day by day to being socially excluded and stigmatised by other people. Having lived from panhandling for a decade, an interviewee of ours reported that people react to him with an attitude of increasing rejection and aggression, and he frequently has to face the total indifference of the locals. Homeless people can also easily become the victims of physical violence: the employee of a local NGO reported several instances where youth gangs gathering
in the neighbouring parks attacked homeless people, and they are assaulted by the local population as well.

From the above, one can sense the hopelessness of homeless existence, as well as the complexity of the issue. The exclusionary attitude and mistrust of the population, the dysfunction of the homeless care system and of the social institutions, and social economy processes in the wider sense are all responsible for the persistence of the problem. In our focus group discussion, we asked the participants to outline a possible alternative that might lead to the alleviation of the problem in the long term. In the first place the interviewees mentioned the improvement of the care system; a larger financial investment would be needed, safe deposit boxes should be installed in the shelters, and furthermore homeless people should be allowed to take their dogs with them for the night. The idea of providing social housing facilities emerged; however, one of the participants called attention to the fact that similar earlier attempts by the local government met the resistance of the local population. In the course of the conversation, it could be seen that opinion on homeless people largely depends on how much the behaviour of the person in question remains within the accepted social norms; homeless people who behave peacefully are often tolerated, or even helped by the locals. By the end of the discourse, the participants agreed that the problem cannot be solved by the instruments of law enforcement, and people living in the street should be ‘shepherded’ in some way into the care system. The fact, however, that a part of the homeless population is unable or unwilling to change its way of life certainly does not help. According to the outlined proposals, for the solution of the problem of homelessness at a macroeconomic level, the change of the social economy processes sustaining the phenomenon, and at local level the development of the care system, and a more intense cooperation among the local government, the police, the local civil guard and NGOs would be needed.

Burglaries

In the early phases of the research, on the basis of the interviews made with the representatives of institutional and civil society, as well as participant observation, we identified the high number of burglaries as one of the major problems of the Országút neighbourhood. An interviewee of ours working in a high position in the police also emphasised that while violent crimes are not typical at
all in the neighbourhood, the handling of break-ins, burglaries and car thefts makes up the majority of the law enforcement and criminal work of the police service.

To what extent do break-ins and walk-in burglaries affect the subjective feeling of security of the inhabitants of the Országút neighbourhood? In the course of participant observation, walking around the neighbourhood we found that using iron bars and security cameras was widespread, particularly in the case of ground-floor apartments and shops – obviously the tenants are afraid of burglaries. Although security systems might be meaningful as target hardening for the burglars, bars occasionally might also constitute a security problem in themselves, insofar as they block escape routes in the corridors, and when installed on balconies they might serve as a kind of ladder to an upper-floor neighbour.

Of course the fear of the residents is not unfounded; as it was formulated in an interview with a policeman as well, the people living in the neighbourhood are particularly exposed to the risk of burglary. This risk increases significantly at the time of construction works, when, due to the increased amount of noise, it is easier to break into an apartment unnoticed by the community. The employees of local NGOs assisting the homeless also reported cases of break-ins and walk-in burglaries committed against their institutions.

In the context of the problem of burglaries again, we asked the participants in the focus group to conduct a discourse on the possible ways of solution. The interviewees emphasised the responsibility of the population. Working in the neighbourhood, the invited experts frequently experienced the negligence of the locals as far as security precautions are concerned, with garages, houses and offices left unlocked or wide open. The improvement and extension of the surveillance camera system, and the use of security bars and doors emerged as possible solutions. In the course of the conversation, the role of community crime prevention was also mentioned; upon perceiving any suspicious movement or noise, reporting it immediately to the police is the best means of preventing a criminal offence.

The problem of burglaries could therefore be alleviated through the appropriate use of state-of-the-art security equipment (bars, camera systems), a more
intense cooperation between the population and the police, and people paying more attention to each other, increasing cohesion within the community.

*Scams against elderly individuals*

In the Országút neighbourhood, scams and rip-offs – committed against elderly people in particular – constitute a significant problem. The perpetrators in most cases get into the victim’s apartment under some false pretence. Most often they work in pairs, and while one of them diverts the attention of the victim the other searches for valuables (cash, jewellery) around the house or apartment. In order to get into the victim’s apartment, the cheaters frequently pretend to be employees of a utility service provider, or to sell some product, or behave as if they needed help from the – mostly elderly – victim (for example as if they been injured in an accident, or had to use the bathroom). According to the employees of the local NGOs, their organisation’s name has also been misused several times in the neighbourhood. Another form of scam is where the concern the victims feel about their immediate family members is exploited, and money is squeezed out of the elderly people, for example under the pretext that their grandchild is in hospital, and money is needed urgently for the treatment.

The latest form of scam affecting mainly elderly people is product presentations, where the swindlers try to sell valuables or household objects to the victims for far more than their market value. There are increasingly more enterprises built on such schemes. This is what one of our interviewees told us about this method of perpetration:

“They also pull us into this, trying to get into apartments in the name of the local government, or inviting people on behalf of the local government for a blood pressure test, then comes the magnetic duvet for 450 thousand forints, paid from a loan taken on the spot. This is a serious problem. [...] Or the ‘doctor’ selling a substance one can only hope is not too harmful; we have no idea what it actually is. He sells a set of capsules for 90 thousand forints, but after all this is not a crime precisely. The only thing we can do is that whoever calls us asking whether they should buy it or not, we tell them don’t buy, God forbid.”
Despite the increasingly frequent lectures held for elderly people, and information sessions held by the civil guard and policemen, many elderly people are still victimised. Those who live isolated from the people around them, have no family relations or contact with their neighbours and are no part of any community are in a particularly vulnerable situation.

We asked our focus group interviewees to outline possible solutions for the scams and rip-offs committed against elderly people. The participants primarily emphasised the importance of informing people. The police – together with the civil guard, the local government and the Council of Seniors – tries to supply the older generation with information related to the issue at pensioners’ clubs and forums, as well as in local periodicals. The interviewees thought this technique is appropriate to combat scams. The participants also emphasised the role of the district commissioner, the person who can be called if someone is uncertain about the identity of someone who wants to enter the apartment on some official-sounding pretext. The opportunity to have electric meters installed outside the apartment and their annual reading instead of a monthly frequency was mentioned as a good practice.

The participants agreed that it is impossible to find a final solution for this problem, as the perpetrators will always find newer ways of deception, just as the earlier forms of scams are being increasingly replaced by product presentations and rip-offs on account of relatives or family members. Sustaining the attention of the population, and with cooperation from the authorities, NGOs and the population, the number of incidents can still be significantly reduced.

**Insecurity issues in Laposdűlő**

After the in-depth interviews and participant observation conducted in the Laposdűlő neighbourhood of District 10, we identified burglaries, drug consumption and distribution, and housing problems as the local problems that mainly determine insecurity.

**Burglaries**

In the in-depth interview phase of our research, burglary – one of the reasons that we selected the Laposdűlő neighbourhood as our research area – was men-
tioned by one single local resident only, and the other participants did not mention this type of criminal offence at all, which we then thought was due to the low number of interviewees. In the course of participant observation, we saw plenty of instruments in the area that might serve to protect against break-in or burglary, including surveillance cameras and bars on the residential buildings of Pongráctelep, fences and cameras around the Honvéd housing complex, and apartments protected with iron bars in Hős utca. At Hős utca we also heard rumours about people drilling passageways from adjacent apartments into certain apartments walled off by the local government, and storing drugs or growing marijuana in the vacant apartment. In connection with the fences surrounding the Honvéd housing complex, it was mentioned that these must have been installed on account of the fear of burglary and that the orderly environment might deter potential burglars. One of our focus group interviewees also referred to the replacement of the entrance doors at Pongráctelep as a result of complaints about burglaries.

All in all, however, the participants did not confirm the importance of the issue, and rather talked about it as a problem affecting the feeling of security of elderly inhabitants. Or, to put it more precisely, even if the existence of burglaries and the fear of burglaries can be confirmed then, according to the participants, it is not a special local problem – which otherwise is consistent with that written about the Országút neighbourhood.

The participants in the focus group came up with the classic solution for the problem, i.e. that more police patrols and surveillance cameras would be needed. Solutions relying on social cohesion (for example, neighbourhood watch) did not emerge at all. In connection with Hős utca, the need for the installation of surveillance cameras was particularly emphasised by the participants, as there is no such equipment there to protect the apartment houses at present.

Drug consumption and distribution

The qualitative reasons for the selection of the research area included the drug consumption and distribution associated with Hős utca and its vicinity, as well as the related anti-social behaviour in the public spaces, as there have been plenty of reports and articles on the phenomenon, also including sociological literature (Alacsony – Földesi, 2016).
The in-depth interviews completely confirmed our hypothesis that the problem is indeed present, and is linked to Hős utca: “…the area of Hős utca obviously has a role in this […] after all, it is not a misconception that the drug problem is present here. Hard drugs are also present”, a social worker working in Pongráctelep told us, which was confirmed by another local expert as well: “There are many addicts, many substance users – this can also be seen at a daily level. There are dealers as well; many people go to Hős utca to buy drugs.”

All information confirmed the chaotic nature of the situation and the helplessness of the police. For example, one of our interviewees said the following in the focus group session about the current situation: “There are regular inspections, seizures, people are sent to jail, things work, but still everything remains the same.” The existence of the problem could be seen in the course of the participant observation as well: waiting for ten minutes at the Hős utca tramway stop generally proved sufficient to witness some related activity, despite the fact that the venue was overseen by surveillance cameras and police patrols, and frequently during the time of the fieldwork by armed soldiers as well, due to a terror alert. One of our focus group interviewees also mentioned the law enforcement and military complex surrounding the ghetto, which clearly does not improve the situation: “It is pretty ironic, by the way, and a rather strange coincidence, that here is the National Defence University [i.e. National University of Public Service – Faculty of Military Sciences and Officer Training], here is the TEK [Counter Terrorism Centre], here is the KR [Special Police] – and here is Hős utca. It means they are surrounded, enclosed, and still there is one thing on this side of the street, and another thing on the other side.”

The dealers move about quite visibly in the Hős utca apartment houses, and one can frequently see the arrival of the buyers as well, who soon after their arrival leave the scene. So-called designer drugs are also a significant problem in Hős utca: we could witness the use of ‘bio weed’ on the spot, during a football game a juvenile left for two peers of his to ‘smoke bio’. In the street as well as at the tramway stop, one can frequently see people who are given away by their walk or way of speech that they are presumably under the influence of drugs. The participants of the focus group discussion also emphasised – apart from the overt nature of the problem – the impact of the phenomenon on the socialisation environment; a social worker active in the neighbourhood for example said:
“Basically Hős utca itself is like an open drug market. Little kids say to the dude – just like that – don’t shoot up here, go away. What is most terrible in this is that kids grow up so that when you see them first, they cannot talk yet, and when you see them the second time, they say ‘are you collecting the needles?’ [...] All this looks like as if it were a part of town where everything is legal.”

And the majority of the children obviously spend lots of time in the streets and the hanging corridors of the houses; due to the presence of very large families, and the small-sized apartments that are unsuitable for spending leisure time; the yard and the area between the two buildings is the number one venue for socialisation. All in all, it seems that Hős utca itself is not only the nucleus of the phenomenon, but also the number one environment where its impact is manifested, its victims being the inhabitants, particularly the children.

In their proposals for solution, the participants of the focus group primarily called attention to the importance of prevention programmes aimed at young people. In their opinion, continuing the already ongoing programmes is extremely important (they acknowledged Kontúr Egyesület’s community space and educational courses for children), but also they would like to see more of these to be organised (for example, the idea of creating a service directed at the maintenance or improvement of the mental health of the inhabitants of Hős utca was raised). For all this, primarily NGOs should be supplied with sufficient resources, but more social workers would also be needed. The participants of the focus group frequently referred to housing problems in the course of the discussion concerning drug crimes, and eventually concluded that management of the housing situation would be one of the most important steps towards the solution of this problem as well.

**Housing problems**

Our interviewees, as well as the participants in our focus group, had already raised the problems surrounding the housing situation at Hős utca, mostly before being asked concrete questions about this. Apart from the fact that the phenomenon is indirectly related to other security problems, the lack of a satisfactory solution in itself may evoke the feeling of insecurity in the inhabitants.
The situation is complicated as it can be seen that the local government – even if it fails to communicate its activities adequately – in the long run is obviously planning to demolish the two apartment houses: the families who are indebted to the operator of the buildings will be evicted, and vacant apartments will be walled up.\(^{13}\) One of our interviewees was of the opinion that, apart from the demolition itself, the local government does not have any further plans for the apartments at Hős utca or their inhabitants. Demolition is impeded by the fact that about half of the apartments are private property and, according to the tenants, the local government wants to buy these flats at prices that are too low.

The phenomenon of squatting and the house mafia emerged several times in the course of the research. The system of so-called protection money was mentioned; for example, where certain inhabitants pay in order to get protection and ensure that people will not break into their homes. In the course of participant observation we also heard about a house mafia that breaks into vacant apartments and rents them to tenants.

The territorial segregation described earlier is further enhanced by the presence of territorial stigmatisation. In the course of the college research mentioned above, “several interviewees reported that, when hearing they lived in Hős utca, the employers immediately refused to employ them” (Alacsony – Földe, 2016: 48). In the course of our research we were told several times that for someone living in Hős utca, it is more difficult to find a job or another apartment.

\[\text{“It will show you how much it is a stigma to live in Hős utca: When we started the renovation, ten entrepreneurs said no upon hearing the Hős utca address. And we did have money, and had all the necessary funds, and still it was simply the eleventh man who just came to see the apartment and said all right, he was ready to start the renovation. [And what was the reason for this?] Well, write Hős utca in Google, and you will see what it means to be a resident of this neighbourhood”, one of our interviewees thus illustrated the phenomenon in the context of the renovation of the rental apartment of Kontúr Egyesület in Hős utca.}\]

\(^{13}\) After our research, at the time of writing of this paper, the local government of Kőbánya received government aid of HUF 2.1 billion with a view to a solution for the Hős utca situation. Kőbánya to Get 2 Billion from Government to Clean up Hős utca. https://mno.hu/belfold/ketmilliardot-kap-a-kormanytol-kobanya-hogy-rendbe-tegye-a-hos-utcat-2436437
It also shows the importance of the topic that the participants of the focus group discussion already wanted to talk about their proposals for the solution when our question was still merely about the phenomenon itself. In their opinion, the basis for the solution of housing problems is communication and cooperation between the local institutions and NGOs. The participants thought that, in the development and implementation of the solution, the local government could make use of the social network developed by the NGOs; this, however, would require more social workers and experts to be employed in the area, and the NGOs would need more resources.

Conclusions

When the MARGIN project was launched, it was evident that there is an acute need for designing, testing and using research tools that, besides victimisation, will measure the feeling of insecurity as well. Using the comprehensive set of instruments of the project we tried to fill this gap. Our quantitative and qualitative research results – consistently with the aggregate results of the MARGIN project – corroborate the assumption that, besides victimisation and the fear of victimisation, social economical and social geographical factors have a key role in the insecurity of people. Although urban insecurity is obviously linked to the appearance of crime and anti-social behaviours, it is perhaps even more associated with social exclusion and the lack of community cohesion, and the deprived, marginalised situation of the given environment and population.
The Dimensions of Insecurity in Urban Areas

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Chapter 7

Unsafe Feeling on French Public Transport: Anxiety-Provoking Situations and Avoidance Strategies

Camille Vanier – Hugo d’Arbois de Jubainville

Unsafe feeling in French transportation

Fear of crime as a social concern

Transit environment is a public space with specific characteristics, insofar as users can travel as they please, but must, for all that, follow certain social rules in terms of their interactions. Although they have different values, users are required to interact in the same place. Furthermore, the way in which this space is organised is also special, as the environment is enclosed and sometimes underground, which can increase the level of fear. This makes it a particularly interesting environment for criminological research (Ceccato – Newton, 2015; Noble, 2015; Yavuz – Welch, 2010). Moreover, some researchers have shown that the perception of the risk of crime can be higher in certain types of public places, such as car parks, wooded areas, underground passageways and public transport (Koskela – Pain, 2000).

The question of fear of crime on public transport has also caught the eye of the public authorities in France. Particularly related to sexual harassment, which women suffer more than men, the perceived risk of victimisation seems to suggest that men and women do not occupy public space evenly. Although women do not suffer from physical assaults as much as men do, their fear of crime on public transport is higher than it is for men (Ondt – Cipc, 2015). Several researchers have put forward explanations for this phenomenon. Violence towards women seems to be underestimated by official statistics, insofar as
many types of behaviour that can be described as intimidating or sexist are not included in the census of victimisations (Condon et al., 2007; Lieber, 2008; Smith – Torstensson, 1997). Even so, behaviours such as staring or excessive attempts at seduction would seem to increase women’s fear of crime.

To denounce this violence suffered by women on public transport, in the autumn of 2014 the association *Osez le Féminisme!* launched an awareness campaign called ‘*Take back the metro!*’ – named after the ‘*Take back the night*’ marches initiated in the United States in the 1970s, with the aim of women reclaiming public spaces without fear of suffering sexual harassment or assault. One of the ways the association *Osez le Féminisme!* took action was to display awareness messages by adopting the style of those used by the Parisian transport operator RATP to prevent pickpocketing, danger or suspicious packages.

A year later, a government plan was set in motion to tackle this violence, defined as sexist harassment and sexual violence, following a document written by the High Council for Gender Equality (HCEfh).¹ Twelve commitments were made through this plan, grouped together under three overarching priorities: prevent, act, and support. These commitments included launching an awareness campaign and the development of new digital tools for warning and reporting. Local-level measures were carried out in this context, such as the possibility of on-demand stops for night buses, which was trialled in the city of Nantes. This scheme allows users to get off when they want to, between two bus stops, after 10.30 pm. The idea is to take users closer to their destination, by reducing the distance they still have to walk once they get off the bus. After a six-month trial period, the scheme is now in operational.

More generally, transport operators are now aware of the interest they have in paying attention to the issue of the perception of risk on public transport. Increasing passengers’ perceived safety helps to improve travel conditions and, as such, encourages more people to use public transport. On the other hand, a high level of fear undermines users’ travel conditions, which deters them from using public transport and thus reduces the numbers of passengers. Accordingly, one transport operator asked some 6,000 passengers about how the way stations are laid out affects their sense of security and tranquillity (Baromètre

¹ HCEfh, ‘*Se mobiliser pour dire stop sur toute la ligne au harcèlement sexiste et aux violences sexuelles dans les transports*’, 2015.
The findings from this survey show that the more ‘spacious, clean, accessible and lively’ stations are, the safer travellers feel. On the other hand, when areas are cramped, dark, unpleasant-smelling or isolated, the more fearful passengers feel. On the basis of these results, the operator has been able to draw up a set of specifications for designing future stations: more colourful and bright, giving precedence to large windows, and containing urban gardens.

However, despite these local and national initiatives, the fear of crime on public transport is still a reality among all categories of users, men and women alike, living in or outside the Parisian region, and across all age groups (D’Arbois de Jubainville – Vanier, 2016; Noble, 2015).

**Estimation of feeling on French public transport**

To estimate users’ levels of fear on public transport, this study draws from the French national victimisation surveys called ‘Cadre de vie et sécurité’ (Living environment and security). These surveys have been conducted jointly by the National Observatory of Crime and Criminal Justice (ONDRP) and the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (Insee) since 2007. Every year, more than 15,000 individuals are asked about any crime they may have been a victim of, and their opinions of personal safety. This sample is then weighted so as to be representative of the French population. Up until 2013, an extra module in the survey was devoted to public transport, but changes in the questionnaires compel us to limit our study to surveys carried out between 2010 and 2013.

From the survey responses, it is estimated that 54% of users who completed the survey claim they always feel safe on public transport; 29% of them claim to feel safe most of the time but 16% of users claim to feel sometimes or never safe on public transport (Graph 1).

2 Respondents considered to be users are those who state they had taken at least one type of public transport (e.g., bus, coach, tube, train, etc.) over the two years before the survey (41,134 individuals, which represents 63% of respondents).
Graph 1: Perceived safety on public transport. This graph shows how often users claim to feel safe on public transport

- Always feel safe
- Most of the time
- Sometimes
- Never
- NA

N = 41,134

Scope: Public transport users aged 14 years and over living in Mainland France. Source: 2010-2013 ‘Living environment and security’ surveys, Insee-ONDRP.

Women feel less safe

Over half of female users feel unsafe on public transport, while 61% of men always feel safe using it. Seven percent of women using public transport never feel safe, compared with 4% of men.3 These findings are consistent with previous research on the subject (Bérardier – Rizk, 2009; Ceccato, 2013; D’Arbois de Jubainville – Vanier, 2016; Lieber, 2008; Valentine, 1989). They are also consistent with the results of the Margin project, according to which women are more likely to feel unsafe (Baudains et al., 2015; Bellit – D’Arbois de Jubainville, 2017). The higher level of fear among women is often considered entirely

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3 The link between gender and feelings of insecurity is significant according to a chi-square (X²) test (p-value < 0.0001), and Cramer’s V – estimating how strongly these variables are associated – is measured at 0.14.
normal, as if they were naturally more fearful than men (Condon et al., 2007). Going by sexist prejudices, this hypothesis considers that women are more sensitive and more easily affected. Recent research has sought to understand this difference by looking beyond the assumed characteristics attributed to women. It has shown that certain behaviours, which can in principle be considered harmless or inoffensive, are perceived by women as insulting or even aggressive. Typically, certain compliments or attempts at seduction are seen as a form of harassment and increase women’s sense of vulnerability (Condon et al., 2007). Furthermore, sexual violence is perceived as gender-specific violence. Even if not all women have been victimised, they keep in mind that the likelihood of their being a victim is higher than for men, which also heightens their level of fear (Jackson, 2009).

**Older users tend to feel the safest**

The user’s age also has a bearing on his or her perception of crime.⁴ The findings of some studies suggest that older people feel the safest (Duguay et al., 2014; Pain, 1997). This contradicts the results of the Margin project, showing the elderly are more likely to feel unsafe (Baudains et al., 2015; Bellit – D’Arbois de Jubainville, 2017). More than two-thirds of users over 65 years of age always feel safe on public transport, compared with 54% on average. The age group that feels least safe is 26-45 year-old users, since less than half of them claim to always feel safe on public transport.

**Familiarity with public transport increases the feeling of safety**

How often public transport is used has a significant bearing on the level of perceived safety, since people who take public transport the least often seem to feel the least safe.⁵ Indeed, people who do not use public transport very often are less familiar with their surroundings and thus feel more unsafe than daily users (Cozens et al., 2003; Mahmoud – Currie, 2010). As such, 18% of individuals who use public transport less than twice a month claim to ‘sometimes’ or ‘never’ feel safe. This proportion falls to 14% for individuals using public transport at least twice a week.

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⁴ P-value < 0.0001 and Cramer’s V = 0.07.

⁵ P-value < 0.0001 and Cramer’s V = 0.05.
The feeling of unsafety on public transport therefore varies according to certain characteristics specific to users. Exogenous factors can also have an influence on perceived safety. Consequently, we will endeavour to identify these factors so as to understand which situations provoke anxiety among users.

**Situations that provoke anxiety**

The study population has been restricted to users who state that they do not always feel safe on public transport, which was the case for 18,217 survey respondents between 2010 and 2013. These so-called ‘insecure’ users were then asked several questions to find out in which situations they feel particularly unsafe. One of the questions gives them the opportunity of selecting up to two situations where they feel unsafe among the following: when the surroundings are dirty; when they are poorly lit; when they are run-down; and when people demonstrate anti-social behaviour. A second question then asks them to select up to two situations where they feel unsafe among the following: when there are too many people; when there are no staff in sight; when there are disruptions; when there are no other passengers and when there are no CCTV cameras.

**The social environment**

*Anti-social behaviour: the leading factor of feeling unsafe*

The factor provoking the greatest perception of being unsafe is anti-social behaviour. Certain behaviours, defined by Ferraro (1995) as ‘social incivilities’, can be deliberate, such as uttering insults or smoking, or unintentional, for example talking loudly on the phone or eating food (Crime Concern, 2004; Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999; Moore, 2011; Roché, 1993). Sometimes considered thoughtless or inoffensive by those behaving in this way, such behaviour can be interpreted as disturbing or intimidating for the people having to endure it (Farrall et al., 2009). Of the users claiming to feel unsafe, 81% said that this was particularly the case when around other passengers demonstrate anti-social behaviours.⁶

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⁶ The other situations perceived as unsafe were: when the surroundings are dirty; when they are poorly lit; and when they are run-down.
In order to reduce anti-social behaviour on the part of travellers, in 2011 the Parisian public transport operator RATP ran an awareness campaign against such behaviour. Titled ‘Restons civils sur toute la ligne’ (Stay civil, all along the line), this campaign presented commonly encountered situations on public transport and replaced the faces of rude passengers with animals. Taking a humorous approach, it showed why it is important to adopt behaviour that respects other passengers and the environment. To illustrate, one of the posters showed a traveller with a buffalo head barging into other passengers so as to get into the train, and concluded that there is no point in pushing other users because the train would not leave any faster. Concurrently, RATP noticed a two-point drop in the proportion of passengers reporting anti-social behaviour between 2014 and 2015.

Level of use of public transport: isolation or overcrowding

Depending on the number of other travellers around them, public transport users can feel more or less safe (Smith – Clarke, 2000). Some travellers feel unsafe when the means of transport is crowded: among the listed situations, 31% of insecure users cited crowded transport as a situation that particularly provokes anxiety. Indeed, overcrowding on public transport at rush hour is a situation where people are more likely to be victims of theft (e.g., pickpockets) or sexual assault (Horii – Burgess, 2012; Jaspard, 2011; Loukaitou-Sideris, 1999). In addition, the imposed proximity when public transport is very busy is almost immediate among people with different values, thereby sparking discomfort and fear in travellers (Noble, 2015).

On the other hand, the feeling of being unsafe can also increase when there are not many passengers around: 58% of insecure users cited the lack of other passengers as an anxiety-provoking situation. Defined as “isolation” by Smith and Clarke (2000), this situation makes users feel unsafe insofar as it implies a lack of formal or informal surveillance (e.g., by other passengers) and, as such, of protection (Atkins, 1989).

7 Namely: when there are too many people; when there are no officials in sight; when there are disruptions; when there are no other passengers; and when there are no CCTV cameras.
Formal surveillance

Formal surveillance, via the presence of public transport staff in stations or of CCTV cameras, seems to have a lesser impact on the perception of unsafety. On average, 22% of users claiming to feel unsafe on public transport stated that this feeling is even more pronounced when there are no staff in sight. Moreover, 14% claimed that the lack of CCTV cameras is a situation that particularly provokes anxiety. An extra staff presence could reduce the perception of risk more effectively than the installation of CCTV cameras (Loukaitou-Sideris – Fink, 2009; Yavuz – Welch, 2010), especially since users are not always aware of the latter.

The temporal context

The time of the day

Feeling of unsafety can also vary depending on the time of the day (Cozens et al., 2003; Mahmoud – Currie, 2010). The French victimisation surveys highlight the influence of the time of the day on perceptions of safety in the public transport system. When completing these surveys, respondents were able to cite up to two time slots which provoke the most anxiety in them from the following: before 8.30 am; between 8.30 am and 12.00 noon; between noon and 6.30 pm; between 6.30 pm and 8.30 pm; between 8.30 pm and 10.30 pm; and after 10.30 pm. The evening (i.e., between 8.30 pm and 10.30 pm) is the time slot most often cited as sparking the highest feeling of unsafety. More than a third of users claiming to feel unsafe on public transport said that this feeling was even more pronounced at this time of the day (35%). Night-time also particularly provokes anxiety among users, since more than a quarter of users who feel unsafe said that this was particularly the case after 10.30 pm (28%).

To explain why users feel more unsafe at night, when the level of lighting in underground stations is the same as during the day, researchers such as Koskela (1999) have pinpointed the social dimension of the night. Indeed, Koskela has studied women’s fear levels in Helsinki, Finland, where winter nights are longer and darker than during the summer. Her findings did not show any difference between fear levels in winter and summer. More than the lack of light, it would thus seem to be the social perception of night-time, associated with the
perceived risk of sexual assault, which generates a concern for personal safety (Koskela, 1999; Koskela – Pain, 2000).

*The day of the week*

On average, users tend to feel less safe during the week than at the weekend: nearly a quarter of insecure users feel unsafe during the week, (i.e., from Monday to Friday), as opposed to 15% at the weekend. The other respondents stated that they did not feel unsafe on a specific day of the week.

*The surroundings*

*The place*

The way in which the space is organised has an impact in the study of fear of crime (Valentine, 1989; Vanier – D’Arbois de Jubainville, 2017). An enclosed environment increases the perceived level of risk, since it is more difficult to escape in the event of an assault.

The French victimisation surveys also yield insight into the places where respondents feel the least safe. The latter were able to cite up to two places which they particularly consider to provoke anxiety from the following: around a train or tube station; in the train or tube station; at or around bus stops; on the means of transport itself; and elsewhere. It should be noted that 13% of insecure users have stated that they feel unsafe in no one particular place.

It is thus observed that, for more than half of users who feel unsafe, this is the case on the means of transport itself (56%). Almost a third of insecure users feel particularly unsafe in train or tube stations (32%).

*The condition of premises*

The condition of public transport surroundings makes a key contribution to fear of crime. A clean, well-kept, and well-lit environment can indeed improve travellers’ perceptions of safety, while a run-down and poorly kept setting can increase their fear of crime. Poor lighting in particular sparks fear of crime: nearly a third of insecure users claimed to feel particularly unsafe in poorly lit
areas (32%). According to Loewen and her colleagues (1993), poor lighting reduces passengers’ visibility, thereby increasing their perceived risk of victimisation. Beyond the fact that users cannot see as well in dimly lit areas, they are also less visible to other passengers if they are victim of a crime.

A run-down environment will also heighten fear of crime on public transport. Almost one in five insecure travellers feels unsafe in run-down places (19%).

To a lesser extent, the cleanliness of surroundings also has an influence on perceived safety. Less than 10% of insecure users feel unsafe when the area around them is dirty (9%). Over and above the daily cleaning of carriages, operators employ several techniques to improve the cleanliness of places. In particular, SNCF Transilien, a French transport operator, enables its users to report any damage using their smartphones, which thus makes for more effective cleaning.

The lessons we can take from this section are therefore that social disorders seem to have a greater impact on fear of crime on public transport than physical disorders. The leading factor contributing to a perceived risk is anti-social behaviour on the part of other travellers: this is cited as a situation that particularly provokes anxiety in 81% of cases. On the other hand, dirty surroundings are only mentioned by 9% of insecure users.

**Avoidance behaviours in response to fear of crime**

In some cases individuals develop avoidance behaviours in reaction to perceived unsafety (Keane, 1998; Riger et al., 1982; Skogan – Maxfield, 1981). The results of the Margin project also show that fear of crime can have a significant influence on personal habits (Baudains et al., 2015). This is especially true for public transport, since fear is one of the main reasons for avoiding this means of transport (Lynch – Atkins, 1988).

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8 For the record, when answering the surveys, respondents were given the opportunity of citing up to two situations in which they feel unsafe from among the following: when the surroundings are dirty; when they are poorly lit; when they are run-down; and when people behave anti-socially.
Avoidance strategies are defined as actions taken to distance oneself from anxiety-inducing situations owing to the time, place or presence of other people perceived to be dangerous (Dubow et al., 1979; Hale, 1996). Adopting avoidance strategies is not systematic for all that; rather, it is linked to the resources at the individual’s disposal (Condon et al., 2007; Skogan – Maxfield, 1981). These strategies can end up being ‘dysfunctional’ by reducing the mobility and quality of life of the people concerned (Gray et al., 2011). In France, research has shown that women who feel unsafe in public places adopt behaviours which inhibit their freedom of movement (Condon et al., 2007; D’Arbois de Jubainville – Vanier, 2017; Jaspard, 2011; Lieber, 2008).

Instances where avoidance strategies are not adopted

People who feel unsafe do not always adopt avoidance strategies. More than half of users who feel unsafe on public transport do not consider it necessary for them to adopt avoidance behaviours (52%). Their fear does not therefore seem to affect their mobility adversely. On the other hand, other users who would like to change their travel habits do not have other options open to them (e.g., they do not own a car, or do not have the money to pay for a taxi). They consequently have no choice but to use public transport even if they feel unsafe doing so, which can take a toll on their mental health (Barjonet et al., 2010). Yu and Smith (2014) have named these users “transit captives”. Among users who feel unsafe on public transport, it is estimated that 21% would like to change their travel habits but do not have other transport options available to them.

Temporal avoidance

When users feel unsafe, they can choose to change their travel habits to protect themselves. A quarter of these insecure users thus claimed during the French victimisation surveys that they adopt avoidance behaviours.\(^9\) Usually, they avoid certain times. When a user changes his or her travel habits, he or she

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\(^9\) When completing the questionnaire, respondents were able to state that they stop using certain lines, stop going into certain places, change transport means, and/or avoid certain times or days. It should be noted they could not select these response if they declared changing travel practices was unnecessary, or if they were unable to because of the lack of transport options.
avoids using public transport at certain hours or days in 62% of cases. In other words, 15% of insecure users have resorted to temporal avoidance.

When answering the surveys, respondents are able to specify up to two time slots they avoid out of six possible options. Based on the answers given, it has been estimated that 69% of insecure users having developed temporal avoidance claim they avoid using public transport in the evening (between 8.30 pm and 10.30 pm); and 53% at night (after 10.30 pm). In other words, 11% of all insecure users avoid using public transport in the evening, and 8% avoid using it at night. The time slots avoided are therefore mainly nocturnal. As we have mentioned above, this can be linked to the fact that these times of the day particularly provoke anxiety, for several reasons: poor lighting is often a source of worry on the one hand (Loewen et al., 1993; Vanier – D’Arbois de Jubainville, 2017), and the social dimension of the night, associated with a higher perceived risk of victimisation, also provokes anxiety (Koskela, 1999; Koskela – Pain, 2000).

**Spatial avoidance**

From the surveys, we also estimate that 9% of users who feel unsafe on public transport adopt spatial avoidance strategies to protect themselves. More specifically, 6% of insecure users stop using certain lines and 4% stop going into certain places (i.e., stations or stops). In other words, when a user claims they adopt avoidance behaviours, these concern spatial avoidance in 35% of cases. These strategies might include, for example, avoiding a connection at a particular tube station, or choosing a different bus line over the one that is perceived to be dangerous (Condon et al., 2007; Lieber, 2008).

**Change in means of transport**

Changing travel practices in response to fear of crime can also involve taking a different means of transport. A user might, for example, opt to take the bus instead of the tube, tram, regional express train, or any other type of transport where there is a wide separation between drivers and passengers. The proximity

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10 The early morning (before 8.30 am), the morning (between 8.30 am and 12.00 am), the afternoon (between 12.00 am and 6.30 pm), early evening (between 6.30 pm and 8.30 pm), evening (between 8.30 pm and 10.30 pm), and night-time (after 10.30 pm).
of bus drivers may be reassuring, insofar as they can act quicker if there is a problem or assault (Lieber, 2008; Loukaitou-Sideris, 2015; Lynch – Atkins, 1988). Moreover, public transport users can also take a taxi or private vehicle for safety reasons (Condon et al., 2007; Loukaitou-Sideris, 2015; Lynch – Atkins, 1988; Stanko, 1990). It is estimated that 7% of insecure users change their means of transport to keep their fear of crime at bay. In other words, when someone develops avoidance behaviours, this involves changing the means of transport in more than a quarter of cases (26%).

**Conclusion**

This study brings to light the fact that the feeling of unsafety on public transport can vary according to a user’s sociodemographic characteristics and travel habits. Women seem to feel more unsafe on public transport, while older travellers and users who are more familiar with this means of transport feel the safest. The former result is consistent with the results of the Margin project, but the latter is not (Baudains et al., 2015; Bellit – D’Arbois de Jubainville, 2017). This may be due to the configuration of the transit environment. The relationship between old age and unsafe feeling in public transport compared to other public places should be explored further in future research.

This perception also varies depending on the dynamic situation: the presence of passengers behaving anti-socially is the factor that generates the greatest anxiety. The temporal context and the quality of infrastructure also come into the equation.

The results also suggest that the majority of users do not change their travel practices despite feeling unsafe, either because they deem this unnecessary or because they do not have any other transport options available. When insecure users develop avoidance behaviours, these usually concern temporal avoidance. Evening and night time-slots are the most avoided, probably because of their anxiety-inducing dimension. Spatial avoidance and changing means of transport are relatively less frequent.

That being said, these findings only relate to the strategies of public transport users. They do not take into account the definitive avoidance of public transport.
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Some individuals, because of their fear of crime, have completely given up using public transport altogether. The French victimisation surveys show that 1.6% of individuals who prefer other travel methods do not use public transport because they do not consider such means to be safe enough.

What is more, these findings only concern avoidance behaviours associated with public transport, and yet some users continue to take public transport but develop other strategies in response to their fear of crime. For example, users – women especially – might change their appearance so as not to draw attention, or choose to travel in the company of a man (Gardner, 1995; Gordon – Riger, 1989).

In the light of these findings, it is important to point out that users can avoid certain stations they consider to be run-down, but they are themselves unable to improve the condition of the infrastructure (e.g., cleanliness, lighting, etc.). It is therefore up to transport operators to take measures to increase their users’ perception of safety. Measures could be taken to improve the quality of surroundings, lighting in particular. Some precautions must be taken for all that, since researchers have shown that installing lighting can end up achieving the opposite to the desired effect. In particular, when bus stops are lit but their surroundings are very dark, people waiting for the bus can draw attention to themselves (Loukaitou-Sideris – Fink, 2009). This effect, dubbed the ‘fishbowl effect’, can heighten the fear level of users waiting at bus stops. Our study has also found that the presence of officials is more reassuring for users than the installation of CCTV cameras. This means that increasing staff numbers or making staff more visible could be a solution to reduce fear of crime (Loukaitou-Sideris – Fink, 2009).

Despite the solutions that can be found, some users are unable to avoid situations which make them anxious. Daily users feel relatively less safe early in the morning and on weekdays. However, these are time slots that are hard for them to avoid, since the majority of them use public transport to commute to work or their place of study. These users are not just ‘transit captives’ then, but can also be defined as ‘time captives’.
Chapter 7

References


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Appendices

Table 1: Perception of safety on public transport according to gender, age and how often it is used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Always safe</th>
<th>Most of the time</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p-value of the chi-square ($X^2$) test: p-value < 0.0001

Cramer’s V: 0.1368

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Always safe</th>
<th>Most of the time</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14-25 y/o</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-45 y/o</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0.20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-65 y/o</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 65 y/o</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

p-value of the chi-square ($X^2$) test: p-value < 0.0001

Cramer’s V: 0.0787
### The Dimensions of Insecurity in Urban Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency of use</th>
<th>Always safe</th>
<th>Most of the time</th>
<th>Seldom</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>NA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Every day or almost</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 times/week</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3 times/month</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less often</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>0.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not entered</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value of the chi-square (X²)</td>
<td>p-value &lt; 0.0001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cramer’s V</td>
<td>0.0526</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* In order to comply with the premises of the statistical tests carried out, the missing values (na) have been excluded from the Cramer and chi-square tests. Scope: Public transport users aged 14 years and over living in mainland France. Source: 2010-2013 ‘Living environment and security’ surveys, Insee-ONDRP.
Table 2: Situations cited as provoking anxiety by users who feel unsafe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journeys type</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Proportion after weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commuting</td>
<td>2,716</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other journeys</td>
<td>7,978</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No particular journey*</td>
<td>7,725</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stations surroundings</td>
<td>4,141</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train or tube station</td>
<td>5,620</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus stops or surroundings</td>
<td>2,129</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the means of transport itself</td>
<td>10,439</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No particular place*</td>
<td>2,267</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time of the day</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Early morning (before 8.30 am)</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morning (8.30am – 12.00 am)</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afternoon (12.00 am – 6.30 pm)</td>
<td>1,773</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early evening (6.30 pm – 8.30 pm)</td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evening (8.30 pm – 10.30 pm)</td>
<td>6,338</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night-time (after 10.30 pm)</td>
<td>4,979</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No particular time*</td>
<td>6,022</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day of the week</td>
<td>Number of respondents</td>
<td>Proportion after weighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday to Friday</td>
<td>4,094</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekend</td>
<td>2,657</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No particular day</td>
<td>11,686</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Situations 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Proportion after weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of cleanliness</td>
<td>1,650</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor lighting</td>
<td>5,831</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Run-down infrastructure</td>
<td>3,397</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-social behaviour by other</td>
<td>14,897</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>passengers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Situations 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Proportion after weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Too many people</td>
<td>5,937</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No officials in sight</td>
<td>4,011</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruptions</td>
<td>1,539</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No other travellers</td>
<td>10,453</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No CCTV cameras</td>
<td>2,387</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** For each question, the respondents can cite up to two situations considered to provoke anxiety from the options listed.

*These response options are exclusive.

**Scope:** Public transport users who feel unsafe, aged 14 years and over and living in Mainland France.

**Source:** 2010-2013 ‘Living environment and security’ surveys, Insee-ONDRP.
Table 3: Avoidance behaviours of users who feel unsafe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Avoidance behaviours</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
<th>Proportion after weighting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avoidance of certain lines</td>
<td>1,056</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoidance of certain places</td>
<td>811</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change in means of transport</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoidance of certain days or times</td>
<td>3,005</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No avoidance because no other transport options possible&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3,716</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No avoidance because this did not seem necessary&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>9,271</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Respondents can cite up to four avoidance behaviours from among the options listed.
<sup>a</sup> These response options are exclusive.
Scope: Public transport users who feel unsafe, aged 14 years and over and living in Mainland France.
Source: 2010-2013 ‘Living environment and security’ surveys, Insee-ONDRP.
CHAPTER 8

CITIZENS’ PERCEPTION OF SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE
RESULTS FROM THE RESPECT PROJECT

Sandra-Appleby Arnold – Noellie Brockdorff – Simon Dobrišek – Sveva Avveduto – Lucio Pisacane

Introduction

The RESPECT project – Rules, Expectations and Security through Privacy-Enhanced Convenient Technologies – was funded by the European Union under the Seventh Framework Programme, with a number of objectives in the field of security and surveillance. One of the defining aspects of the RESPECT project was its adoption of an inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary approach, which was both more diverse and more comprehensive than those used in previous studies.

The project’s overall aim was to produce, for key stakeholders, practical results capable of being deployed across and outside Europe. As such, the project addressed a very diverse target audience that included policy makers, police and security services, technology providers, data protection authorities, citizens and the media, as well as researchers and academia.

A related project aim was to produce tools that enable policy makers to understand the socio-cultural as well as the operational and economic impact of surveillance systems based on a balanced and well-rounded approach to identifying

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1 RESPECT was funded under the scheme for collaborative projects (small or medium scale focused research projects), grant agreement 285582, between February 2012 and May 2015. Project coordinator was Professor Joseph A. Cannataci, University of Groningen; it involved 20 partners (15 countries) and 1 international organisation (representing 190 countries).
the opportunities and risks inherent in the use of surveillance in a society where privacy and data protection are fundamental rights. To address this aim, the project developed a decision support tool for policy-makers assessing systems specifically designed for surveillance, taking into account legal, privacy, economic and societal implications. This tool includes a list of policy recommendations that take into account the economic and social costs, legal frameworks, and citizens’ attitudes towards surveillance, as well as a draft model law on surveillance that includes safeguards for persons who are subjects of surveillance.

**Overview of the Respect project**

The RESPECT project methodology consisted of three distinct streams: a) status quo analysis of the legal basis for surveillance; b) citizens’ attitudes towards surveillance; and c) best practices as criteria for fairness covering efficiency, proportionality, privacy and data protection.

The *status quo analysis* faced a common difficulty when setting the scene, the lack of a harmonised definition of surveillance. Considering the multitude of different surveillance technologies, it is difficult to provide definitions, especially legal definitions, that are universally applicable. However, the project identified key categories that future legislation could take into account based on possible features of the surveillance, such as smart surveillance, as opposed to non-smart surveillance, physical surveillance, and data surveillance. It is also recommended that future legislation should also take into account biometric surveillance as a sub-category of surveillance carrying particular privacy risks, while location tracking should be considered because of its particular practical relevance.

As a result of the status quo analysis, evidence was found that the use of surveillance technologies is often only partially regulated, if regulated at all. This creates a situation of inconsistencies and lacunae, e.g. regarding the transfer of data between the private and the public sector. To set up a useful and updated legislative framework to govern surveillance systems, new legislation in this area should include a clear and thorough framework for the transfer of data between the private and the public sector, in particular in the law enforcement sector.
As far as citizens’ attitudes are concerned, the project carried out two studies aimed at establishing the attitudes, feelings and perceptions of citizens regarding different forms of surveillance and privacy. The studies used quantitative and qualitative research methods via a web-based questionnaire and focus group discussions.

In the best practices stream, the project aimed at identifying criteria for privacy-friendly use of surveillance. This stream identified ‘fairness criteria’ based on the results of the status quo analysis to meet efficiency, proportionality, privacy and data protection issues. These fairness criteria were used in the development of the toolkit for policy-makers, system designers and police/security forces to implement and promote a best practice approach. The findings from this stream of the project show that oversight bodies do not always have sufficient powers and/or resources to ensure effective control over the use of surveillance measures. Moreover, modern surveillance technologies are especially suited to interoperability with other platforms and institutions, which may lead to additional privacy risks, as well as expenses.

The concrete and practical solution produced by the project, the RESPECT toolkit, is in the form of a matrix-style checklist based on operational, technical, economic, and legal criteria and designed to help policy makers, when making future decisions on the investment in and deployment of surveillance systems. The toolkit is organised as a mix of system design and operating guidelines that can be followed and implemented by the designers of surveillance systems, as well as by law enforcement agencies and security services when deploying all forms of surveillance. These guidelines contain detailed and scalable measures as appropriate to the circumstances.

In this chapter we summarise the main findings of the qualitative and quantitative studies, carried out through an EU-wide online survey, and focus groups discussions in all partner countries.
Quantitative study

Design

The quantitative study consisted of an online survey topped up with some face-to-face interviews. The design of the survey was based on the results of the first phases of the project, in particular, the classification of different surveillance systems employed in crime prevention and reduction, and the prosecution of crimes in the 27 EU Member States obtained by carrying out a status quo analysis of five key sectors: closed-circuit television (CCTV), database mining and interconnection, on-line social network analysis, RFID and geo-location sensing devices, and financial tracking. This status quo analysis did not deal solely with applications of surveillance on a sector-by-sector basis, but also mapped out the characteristics of laws governing surveillance and identified lacunae and new safeguards, as well as best practices. By combining an analysis of how, why and when surveillance may be used in multiple application sectors, and a complementary structured understanding of the legal framework that should be followed, the status quo analysis provided the prerequisite knowledge to enable the RESPECT team to develop the survey on citizen attitudes towards surveillance systems and procedures. In particular, the survey aimed to explore European citizens’ attitudes based on beliefs about the benefits – such as usefulness, convenience, efficiency and security – and economic and social costs.

The questionnaire was, therefore, structured into several sections, each one targeting in detail five key sectors (CCTV, database mining and interconnection, on-line social network analysis, RFID and geo-location/sensor devices and financial tracking):
- Citizens’ knowledge of surveillance, with the intention of exploring awareness of different types of surveillance and reasons for their application;
- Perceived usefulness and effectiveness of surveillance, aiming to explore whether a relationship exists between perceived usefulness in the reduction, detection and prosecution of crime and perceived effectiveness in protection from crime;
- Perception of surveillance in terms of feelings of security, control and trust, as well as “happiness”, exploring whether a relationship exists between security and happiness related to the 5 key surveillance applications;
- Awareness of surveillance taking place through CCTV cameras;
– Acceptability of data sharing practices by government agencies and private companies;
– Acceptability of CCTV and geolocation surveillance related to specific locations or events;
– Perceived economic costs;
– Perceived social benefits, considering both attitudes and behavioural changes resulting from surveillance.

The questionnaire was available online in all languages of the European Union between November 2013 and March 2014. Additionally, the questionnaire was administered in a number of face-to-face interviews in order to reach a sample of those citizens who do not use the internet.

**Sample characteristics**

The survey gathered a total of 5,361 responses from 28 European countries. For thirteen European countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Malta, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom), the number of respondents met the required target quota (sample of 3,115 respondents) to be representative, on age and gender, of that country’s population aged 18 years and above. The total sample shows a very even gender and age distribution; the quota sample correctly reflects the ageing population in the abovementioned countries.

Other sample characteristics collected included that 16% of respondents felt that they were living in an area with increased security risks, 53% indicated that they usually travel abroad at least twice per year, and 71% responded that they usually visit a mass event at least twice per year. Therefore, it can be assumed that the majority of respondents to this survey are frequently exposed to a variety of surveillance measures that are intended to fight crime.

**Selected results**

There was a rather large variation in citizens’ awareness of different types of surveillance technologies. Almost all respondents (90%) indicated that they had heard of CCTV surveillance, whereas only a third had heard of the surveillance of “suspicious” behaviour (e.g., automated detection of raised voices, facial or
The Dimensions of Insecurity in Urban Areas

body features). The reason for setting up surveillance that was most known about was the detection of crime (81%); the least known was the use of surveillance for crowd control (52%).

CCTV was perceived to be the most useful of the different types of surveillance, followed by surveillance of financial transactions and geolocation surveillance. Surveillance of online social networking and surveillance using databases containing personal information were perceived to be the least useful. Generally, most of the five types of surveillance were perceived to be most useful for the prosecution of crime, slightly less useful for the detection of crime, and less useful still for the reduction of crime. The same pattern of results was obtained for the perceived effectiveness of the different types of surveillance.

In this context, it is interesting to note that, even though most of the different types of surveillance were perceived as useful and effective, especially in the prosecution and detection of crime, surveillance measures appear to make more respondents feel insecure rather than secure. In particular, citizens show two distinct, and very different, reactions to surveillance. Some people feel secure in the presence of surveillance, whilst in others surveillance produces feelings of insecurity. However, overall, more citizens feel insecure in the presence of surveillance than secure with it. Moreover, citizens who consider themselves to live in an area with increased security risks also show this same pattern of results.

Exploring the relationship between citizens’ feelings of security/insecurity and the perception of the effectiveness of surveillance measures, the survey identified some interesting patterns of results. Only a minority of citizens feel that they are well informed about the laws and regulations regarding the protection of personal data gathered via surveillance, and only a small minority feel that these laws and regulations are effective. Moreover, two thirds of those who feel they are not informed about the laws and regulations regarding the protection of personal data collected through surveillance think that such laws are not effective, and only a small minority think they are effective. However, amongst those who feel informed of such laws and regulations, only one third think they are not effective, and another third think they are effective, i.e., an increased perceived knowledge of laws related to personal data collected through surveillance is linked to an increased perceived effectiveness of these laws.
As stated above, in general the majority of citizens feel insecure rather than secure in the presence of surveillance. However, amongst those citizens who perceive laws and regulations regarding the protection of personal data gathered via surveillance to be effective, the majority feel secure in the presence of surveillance. At the same time, the link between the perceived effectiveness of laws and regulations and citizens’ feeling of security/insecurity in the presence of surveillance is stronger than the link between the perceived effectiveness of surveillance measures and feelings of security/insecurity. This suggests that increasing the perceived effectiveness of data protection laws related to surveillance may increase citizens’ feelings of security in the presence of surveillance.

Furthermore, a majority of citizens feel that they have no or little control over the processing of personal information gathered via surveillance measures, and they have no or little trust that government agencies or private companies protect this personal information. This perceived lack of trust is particularly strong in relation to data handling by private companies. There is a generally strong perception of the risk of data misuse and misinterpretation. Increased perceived knowledge of laws is only weakly related to perceived control over the processing of personal information gathered via surveillance measures, but there are links to an increased trust that government agencies (or, to a lesser extent, private companies) protect personal information gathered via surveillance measures.

CCTV surveillance is clearly perceived as more acceptable than geolocation surveillance for the purposes of fighting crime in all the events and locations investigated. Acceptance rates for CCTV are typically 50% to 100% higher than those for geolocation surveillance. Both types of surveillance are seen as least acceptable in the workplace (acceptable: CCTV 28%; geolocation surveillance 19%). The highest acceptance of surveillance by CCTV is in clinics and hospitals (87%), city centres (82%) and urban spaces in general (80%); geolocation surveillance in clinics and hospitals is also seen as acceptable by a majority of respondents (53%). Acceptance of surveillance measures is not related to their perceived effectiveness, or to the perceived social benefits of surveillance (protection of the individual and/or the community). No relationships were found between acceptance of surveillance in different locations and feelings of control over personal data gathered via surveillance, trust that government or private
companies protect personal information or feelings of security or insecurity in the presence of surveillance.

Beliefs on the economic costs of surveillance were mixed. Only a small minority of respondents (12%) believe that the money allocated to government agencies for carrying out surveillance for the purpose of fighting crime in their country is “just right”. Around one in four respondents (23%) indicated that, in their opinion, there was too little or far too little money allocated; 17% believed it was too much or far too much. Overall almost half of the respondents felt that they “don’t know” whether sufficient funds are allocated to government agencies for carrying out surveillance for the purpose of fighting crime. Of those who believe that the money allocated to government agencies for carrying out surveillance to fight crime was too little or far too little, one out of three respondents indicated they would be willing to pay more taxes so more money can be allocated for this purpose, but almost half replied that they would not.

A majority of respondents perceive the protection of the community and of the individual as social benefits of surveillance, but the risks associated with surveillance are more keenly felt. The highest perceived risks are that information gathered through surveillance is intentionally misused or misinterpreted, followed by the risk of privacy invasion and the risk that surveillance may violate citizens’ right to control whether information about them is used. The risks that surveillance may cause discrimination, stigma and the limitation of citizens’ rights are also of concern, though not at the level of data misuse and misinterpretation. Few respondents have made changes to their behaviour as a result of being aware of surveillance. The only change in behaviour undertaken by just over half of respondents was to stop exchanging their personal data for discounts or vouchers. Only a minority of respondents have taken more proactive moves, such as restricting their activities, avoiding locations under surveillance or taking defensive measures. There is little evidence to support a relationship between the perceived risks of surveillance and behavioural changes as a result of surveillance.

Other key findings of the survey related to privacy issues. A majority of citizens feel that most types of surveillance, except CCTV, have a negative impact on their privacy, and they generally perceive a great risk of privacy violation. Financial compensation for greater privacy invasion through surveillance is not
acceptable to a majority of citizens. Data sharing between government agencies (including foreign governments) is accepted by a majority of citizens if the citizen concerned is suspected of wrong-doing and the surveillance is legally authorised, but data sharing between private companies is either not accepted under any circumstances or only if the citizen has given explicit consent.

Summarising the survey results considering the role of gender, it is worth noting that male respondents show a generally higher awareness and knowledge than female respondents of all different types of surveillance investigated, of the reasons for the setting of up surveillance, a higher awareness of surveillance taking place, a stronger perceptions of risks related to surveillance, and they indicated significantly more often than female respondents that they had changed their behaviour due to the risks perceived. Female respondents perceived most surveillance measures to be more useful than males; they felt less insecure in the presence of surveillance, less unhappy with most types of surveillance, and they perceived surveillance to have a less negative impact on their privacy.

The most significant differences between age groups can be found between the 65+ year old respondents and the 25-34 year olds. Respondents aged 65+ show the lowest knowledge and awareness of surveillance types and technologies, followed by the 18-24 years group; respondents aged 25-34 show the highest knowledge and awareness in most categories. The oldest age group, 65+, also perceives all types of surveillance as most useful and most effective, whilst 25-34 year olds perceive them as least useful and least effective. Respondents aged 65+ feel least insecure in the presence of surveillance, the least unhappy with the various types of surveillance; they perceive the least negative impact on their privacy, but they also feel least in control over personal data collected via surveillance. Respondents aged 25-34 feel most insecure, most unhappy, and perceive the strongest negative impact of surveillance on privacy. The youngest age group (18-24 years) feel the least lack of control over data gathered via surveillance, and the least lack of trust in government agencies or private companies adequately handling such personal data. Respondents aged 25-34 perceive the social risks related to surveillance to be significantly higher than all other age groups; the youngest respondents (aged 18-24) show the lowest perception of risks. However, 25-34 year olds are most likely to change their behaviour in response to the presence of surveillance, while respondents age 65+ show the least adaptations of behaviour.
Qualitative study

This section presents the results of a qualitative study that was carried out as part of the RESPECT project with the aim of exploring in depth citizens’ attitudes towards the cost, convenience and success of surveillance in the reduction, detection and prosecution of crimes. This study was carried out in 14 countries, namely Austria, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The results of the qualitative research presented here are based on the analyses of 42 focus group discussions that comprised 367 participants from the 14 countries mentioned above. The focus groups were organised and carried out in each of the countries in order to gauge the perceptions, preferences and attitudes of European citizens towards the convenience, usefulness, and efficiency, as well as the economic and social costs, of surveillance systems and procedures. Most of the focus groups were conducted in June and July 2014. The focus group discussions were carried out amongst the three age groups, 18-24 years, 25-44 years and 45+ years.

Method

The participants’ gender, age, educational level, and occupational status were accounted for to ensure a broad range of demographics across the focus groups. In addition to this, other behavioural variables were considered. Attention was paid to whether participants would reasonably have encountered the five surveillance technologies and procedures of interest: integrated CCTV system with smart video analytics; social network monitoring and analysis systems; financial tracking systems; and positioning and tracking technologies; as well as data storage, matching and mining technologies. For recruiting the participants, snowball techniques were applied, which means that it cannot be claimed that the compositions of the focus groups are necessarily representative of the entire European population or any of the individual countries in which the focus groups were conducted.

A recruitment questionnaire was used to determine whether potential focus group participants belonged to the desired demographic group, as well as whether they engaged in behaviour and activities that exposed them to the types of surveillance technologies and applications under consideration. The
recruitment of an equal number of males and females with a diverse educational background and occupational status was recommended. Place of residence was also considered in order to ensure, where possible, the representation of smaller towns and rural areas in the sample. In order to be recruited, the potential participant needed to be engaged in several behaviours and activities in their everyday life that might expose them to the different types of surveillance technologies and procedures relevant to this project. In order to facilitate focus group discussions, discussion guidelines and supporting material, such as the cards illustrating all the relevant surveillance technologies and applications, had been developed previously. The aim of the guidelines was to provide moderators and participants with the order and basic rules according to which the themes under study were to be discussed during the focus group session. The design of the discussion guidelines was based on a set of basic questions and discussion points raised by presenting one or more scenarios that reflect the addressed topics. The scenarios in the first part of the guidelines dealt with surveillance in everyday life. The scenarios used in the second part dealt with more hypothetical situations, which were designed to elicit the feelings, reactions, beliefs, and attitudes of participants in relation to the use of specific surveillance technologies and procedures as well as to enable an examination of the trade-off between privacy and security. The basic questions were open-ended, and did not present obvious response options; this allowed participants to answer in any way they saw fit. The discussion guidelines were organized in seven sections, each of which included a number of questions and discussion points that were raised and addressed during the focus group discussions. In order to stimulate a discussion amongst the participants, several realistic and hypothetical scenarios were presented to them. The two more extreme hypothetical scenarios that were presented to the participants are the following:

- The first of the more extreme hypothetical scenarios was a recorded telephone conversation between a distressed caller and a policeman on duty in the department of missing persons. The caller was the mother of the missing person – her daughter. Access to various databases containing extensive amounts of the daughter’s personal data enables the policeman to find her; however, the methods he uses can be seen as highly intrusive into a person’s private sphere.

- The second more extreme hypothetical scenario explored the “security vs. privacy trade-off”. As a result of increasing lawlessness in the country, security and police services are given extensive access to citizens’ personal data
and they build an electronic profile of every citizen. In addition, vulnerable groups such as children and elderly people are electronically tagged and monitored. These measures are introduced for the protection of citizens; however, again, the methods used can be seen as highly intrusive into a person’s private sphere.

**Selected results**

For the participants, CCTV surveillance was the most commonly known and most publicly visible surveillance technology and it was therefore much debated. Most commonly noted locations of CCTV surveillance were public places, such as in public transport, shopping centres, and automated teller machines (ATMs). The majority of participants did not mind this type of surveillance, as long as it was kept away from their personal spaces, such as cloakrooms, showers, and toilets. Participants distinguished between human-operated real-time surveillance, which they mostly found acceptable, and automated surveillance, which they did not feel comfortable with as they saw that no immediate action could be taken in cases of danger. There was a recurring idea across many groups that, instead of increased surveillance, more policemen or security guards should be preventing crime, especially on the street. The predominant perception was that if people see policemen then they would know that they can receive help in case of any need. Technical surveillance systems would not necessarily give people such feelings of security. Beside CCTV, financial tracking was seen as one of the most convenient methods of preventing money laundering and verifying financial transactions.

Another surveillance technology perceived by many participants as rather convenient was GPS technology that helps to locate people in an emergency. On the other hand, they saw GPS tracking as the most privacy invasive technology, because, unlike CCTV cameras, they felt that it cannot be ensured that GPS tracking can be restricted to be used only in certain circumstances. Besides, it was seen to be more ‘personal’, detailed, and practically unavoidable.

It appears that there were two distinct perspectives on the use of loyalty cards. Some participants used loyalty cards and credit cards as little as possible and preferred cash, as they felt more secure that way. Others used them more frequently and saw them as convenient for more efficient shopping (using bonuses
for example), although they were aware of being monitored and still limited the use of such cards to where they perceived ‘real’ benefits. All participants aimed to provide only minimal personal information in return for such cards.

The most emotionally involved responses were elicited during discussions of the hypothetical scenario with the missing person, where most of the groups identified with the parent (who called the missing persons department) or the daughter (the missing person), but could see both sides of the situation. On the one hand they would be happy if the missing person’s personal data could be accessed to such an extent, if their child were missing. On the other hand, one of the most problematic aspects of this scenario for the participants was that the identity of the caller was not properly verified, in order to prevent misuse or abuse of the process and to prevent putting the missing person in danger. Overall, the massive integration of surveillance systems was seen as very dangerous and prone to misuse.

An important consideration regarding the acceptance of the missing person scenario is that participants’ conclusions would be different if the scenario ended more tragically and had not ended with the daughter being found. The participants were quite open to allowing the use of their personal data, even if this meant a privacy invasion, but only in emergency cases. Generally, they perceived the scenario as technologically possible, but unlikely or not possible according to current legislation.

Another hypothetical scenario explored the concept of a security-privacy trade-off, where security and police services created a personal profile of every citizen in a situation of increasing lawlessness in the country. Some participants agreed that, in the case of an emergency or when a person’s safety is at risk, they would accept such invasive surveillance – to a certain extent and mostly on condition that consent is given. Participants aged 45+ were much more inclined to trade their privacy for improved security than younger participants. Participants had difficulties in discussing cost efficiency, as no costs associated with the surveillance measures were defined and no such information is normally publicly available. In some groups, participants perceived the use of the newly introduced surveillance measures in the scenario as an additional threat to their privacy. They did not feel that the safety level would rise as a result of these measures. On the contrary, they argued that people could feel criminalised
and their rights could be limited. Some participants felt there should be more of a focus on measures that would eliminate the causes for the change of the security climate or increased lawlessness, rather than on introducing additional surveillance measures.

Online social networks were also a popular topic, where the participants’ age appeared to be an influential factor in the responses. Many older participants showed no particular interest in them and indicated they were using online social networks very carefully or not at all. Younger participants were more interested in discussing online social network surveillance and appeared to be aware of potential risks to personal data as a result of engaging with such networks. They warned against an ever greater possibility of data integration amongst various Internet companies and the commercialisation of personal data.

Participants also observed a growing trend of state agencies demanding increased access to personal data for security purposes. They perceived surveillance of online social networks as not very useful for the purpose of fighting crime. This was due to both the voluntary and therefore selective nature of data disclosure, as well as the widespread use of fake data in such networks. Nearly all participants trusted the state more than private companies to manage their personal data collected via surveillance services. The main reasons were that private companies were perceived as complying with fewer legal requirements and that they are commercially driven rather than serving public interests. Despite trusting government agencies more than private companies, the participants perceived government agencies to be less effective in some countries and consequently, less able to efficiently process (but also potentially misuse) personal information.

Many participants believed that surveillance systems are increasingly becoming a normal part of people’s everyday lives. One of the greatest societal impacts of surveillance was seen to be a transfer of responsibility from the individual to the state. For example, a number of respondents felt that people may overlook dangerous incidents on the street or vandalism because they believe CCTV or other surveillance technologies will identify and “take care” of such situations without them having to get involved. The participants agreed that the purpose of the surveillance is important when deciding what level of privacy intrusion would be acceptable. For example, for crimes related to sexual assaults or children, surveillance should be stricter.
The participants disapproved of long and complex terms of agreements on the Internet, feeling that people do not know what they were consenting to. A number of participants believed that laws relating to data protection sometimes contradict each other and can be broadly interpreted. For many participants, therefore, data protection laws do not represent comprehensive safeguards because they depend additionally on the interpretation of judges or lawyers. This is where, some participants felt, the EU needs to do more. Having said that, they felt there would be limited benefits to improving privacy laws, if those individuals who are handling personal data are not themselves independently scrutinised and managed. Any databases containing personal data should thus be properly protected and a strict authorisation procedure should be implemented for all users of such databases.

Many participants held the view that people are not given the option of opting out of surveillance technology and services because they have become a social and technological standard. It was also perceived that there is a massive change in the way people communicate – everything is done digitally, but not everyone is aware that surveillance may be simultaneously carried out. Some participants felt that criminality cannot be combated with surveillance, but instead with education and awareness-raising. Others thought that surveillance systems help to prevent crimes as long as there are strict laws governing their use and they are effectively controlled.

Participants agreed that the biggest social change about surveillance occurred following the NSA data disclosure affair, when people started to value their privacy more. At the same time, they agreed that it is currently impossible to maintain an appropriate or satisfactory level of privacy while staying connected with others and functioning ‘normally’ in modern society (e.g., through the use of smartphones). Participants felt that the timeframe for personal data storage should be dependent on the severity of crimes committed and the importance of the data collected.

**Concluding remarks**

Participants generally showed an elevated awareness of the fact that they are under surveillance in many situations in daily life. However, mistrust and fear of data abuse was a concern for all participants. They found surveillance measures
mostly acceptable if the collected data were used for security reasons and in public spaces. CCTV was perceived as a rather convenient method of surveillance, although the majority of respondents held the opinion that only a combination of all of the mentioned surveillance technologies would give the best results. Accordingly, ‘data storage, matching and mining’ was perceived as the most cost effective surveillance approach. Due to the rapid development of communication technologies, participants felt there was a need for proper education in this context. Many older participants indicated that they used social networks very carefully or not at all, while younger participants were much more active in the discussion and were aware of the risks to personal data. They warned against ever greater possibilities of data integration among various Internet companies, as well as the commercialisation of data.

The systematic use of integrated systems for the purpose of investigating missing persons, as presented in the hypothetical scenario, was mostly perceived as unacceptable and caused strong feelings of discomfort. Although the positive side of finding the missing person was seen, the privacy intrusion was felt to be too great to justify the approach. Some participants were prepared to accept the very high security measures envisaged in the other hypothetical scenario, where increasing lawlessness meant the government gave greater access to personal data of citizens. They would only accept these measures for a short time, however, in order to eliminate the causes of unrest while other participants would not accept the increased surveillance, as they did not believe that the level of safety would rise as a consequence of such measures. The main reason for mistrust in private institutions was that their goals do not serve public interests but, instead, serve commercial interests. The idea of private-public integration of technologies for personal data processing was, therefore, predominantly perceived as an intrusion of privacy. Most participants showed little knowledge of data protection laws, but they were in favour of education and awareness campaigns in schools and public places. A small number of participants displayed some knowledge of fundamental EU laws and treaties relating to data protection, but the general perception was that, so far, there had not been any privacy invasions that were strong enough to encourage learning about such laws, related to the protection of personal information.
CHAPTER 9

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EUROPEAN FORUM FOR URBAN SECURITY (EFUS)

Carla Napolano

Introduction

Founded in 1987 under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the European Forum for Urban Security (Efus) is the only European network of local and regional authorities dedicated to urban security. It now includes almost 250 regions and cities from 16 countries.

It serves as a think-tank and a place for dialogue and discussion and provides opportunities for the exchange of positive experiences, on the basis of inter-city cooperation and aims to stimulate and orientate policies at a local, national and community level, in the areas of prevention of urban insecurity and crime management.

The European Forum works with the majority of the countries from the European Union. The European Forum has expert status within the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Commission.

Efus’ objectives are to:
– promote a balanced vision of urban security, combining prevention, sanction and social cohesion;
– support local and regional authorities in the design, implementation and evaluation of their local security policy;
– raise awareness of the key role played by European local elected officials in developing and implementing national and European policies.
Efus provides support and inspiration for locally elected officials and their teams who are convinced of the necessity of working together beyond political differences and for long-term security. In accordance with the principle of ‘cities helping cities,’ Efus fosters the exchange of experience among local authorities.

The Manifesto, the cities’ political platform

The founding values and principles of Efus’ members are expressed in the ‘Security, Democracy and Cities Manifesto’. As the roadmap of Efus’ membership, the manifesto is regularly updated in accordance with the evolution of urban security contexts and policies. This process of regular discussion and re-writing allows Efus and its members to include in the manifesto new challenges to urban security and social cohesion, as well as innovative responses and strategies. The current Manifesto of Aubervilliers and Saint-Denis (2012) is a continuation of the Naples Manifesto (2000) and the Saragossa Manifesto (2006), and will be followed in 2017 by the Manifesto of Barcelona and Catalonia.

By means of the manifesto, local elected officials affirm that choosing prevention ‘is a rational, strategic and cost-efficient option’ and an intelligent application of criminal law. Prevention must be favoured in order to ‘guarantee that the security of future generations, indispensable to the quality of life in cities, is a basic right for all’. They also call for the adoption of citizen participation as an overarching principle of security policies. They call for the full participation of young people who are ‘too often stigmatised and victims of violence’, as well as for the ‘promotion of women’s rights and sexual equality’. By joining Efus, local authorities endorse these principles.

The manifesto is reinforced by the resolutions adopted by Efus’ Executive Committee. The following resolutions have recently been adopted: ‘For a global nightlife policy’, ‘Call to the European Union and for the joint responsibility of Member States to support local authorities in welcoming and integrating migrants’, ‘Preventing reoffending’ and ‘For a local prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism’.
Chapter 9

**Action with public administrations**

One of Efus’ core missions is to represent local and regional authorities in the European debate on Justice and Freedom & Security. It has established close ties with national, European and international institutions such as the Council of Europe and the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN Habitat), thus promoting the voice of locally elected officials. By participating in Efus’ activities, local authorities can contribute to building a European project on crime prevention and urban security.

**Work topics**

Over the course of almost 30 years, Efus has worked on more than 30 topics related to urban security. In accordance with its objectives and principles, Efus promotes a vision of security as a transversal issue. Security closely relates to the values of freedom, pluralism and equal rights and is tied to other policy fields that contribute to social cohesion and peaceful coexistence. As such, security policies must be open to the participation of all members of society and can touch on a variety of topics.

The work topics Efus engages with are chosen based on requests made by members and activities are developed as part of European working groups. Over the last five years, the network has notably worked on the following topics: police, nightlife, managing large events, risky behaviours, recidivism, collective violence, violent radicalisation, mediation, technology and security, security audits, and violence against women. Some of these topics, which Efus calls “Secutopics”, have recently been of particular relevance and are described in more detail below.

**Services for local authorities**

**Collaborative projects and working groups**

Efus implements and manages cooperative projects as well as working groups. These activities aim to strengthen local authorities’ knowledge of a particu-
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lar topic through the exchange of practices, communal reflection and expert contributions. Above all, these projects enable the operational implementation of methodologies that strengthen local policies (audits, evaluations, pilot projects). These activities conclude with policy recommendations that benefit the whole network. Such projects are often partially financed by the European Commission.

Currently, Efus is coordinating projects on the following topics: fighting against violent radicalisation, nightlife management, hate crime, social inclusion through sport, and the security of senior citizens.

Information and technical assistance concerning European grants

There are a variety of financing opportunities for local policies at the European level. However, these opportunities require management and the preparation and submission of complex applications. Efus informs its members of the calls for proposals published by the EU in the domain of security and supports them in the administrative and financial follow-up of submitted proposals.

Supporting local policies

The European Forum’s technical team and external experts can support local authorities in designing their local prevention strategy, completing a security diagnosis (audit) or surveying the feeling of insecurity of the population, as well as implementing security measures (local mediation service, municipal police, etc.). These services are customised and offered at preferential rates.

Promoting local experience

Should a member city wish to organise a local event (conference, seminar) on a topic relevant to urban security, Efus can help draft a programme and propose relevant stakeholders and experts from its network. This type of event showcases local practices, promotes innovative ideas and contributes to developing a common vision of urban security.
Visits and study tours

Efus offers to organise visits or thematic study tours in the network’s cities. These visits allow members to discover on the ground the details behind the implementation of a comprehensive strategy or a specific project that has been successfully implemented in a city facing similar challenges to their own. As such, they can meet and share with local stakeholders and benefit from their feedback.

Cities can also host a delegation from another European city in order to showcase their local activities, mobilise partners and benefit from a peer review.

Training

Training is an essential tool for updating knowledge, strengthening the capacities of elected officials and their collaborators, and for supporting the development of innovative local prevention policies. Efus collaborates with universities to offer a European university degree in urban security, which allows participants to acquire a high level of expertise on issues of security policies and crime prevention.

On request, Efus can also offer customised training programmes at preferential rates. This training is designed for elected officials, managers of local services, and the municipalities’ local security partners. Participants can assimilate concepts and methods adapted to the issues faced by their local authority.

Access to Efus Network, a members-only, collaborative online platform

- direct contact and exchange with the representatives of 250 local authorities across Europe;
- access to Efus’ resource library: publications and practice sheets;
- information on the European Commission’s call for proposals;
- updates on the life of the association;
- invitation to conferences and events organised by, or in partnership with, Efus;
- free access to Efus’ publications, also available for download and in print (three free copies per member).
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Governance and organisation

Efus is led by an Executive Committee that represents the diversity of its members; a third of EC members are renewed each year. As Efus’ decision-making and political body, the Executive Committee directs the association’s activities. All Efus members may participate in the association’s governing bodies by being a candidate to the Executive Committee and by voting at the annual General Assembly.

A multilingual technical team based in Paris manages the network and coordinates all the activities of the association. Members can contact the Efus team for any question, request, or to contact other members.


Apart from the regular meetings of its Executive Committee and General Assembly, Efus organises every five to six year a major international and interdisciplinary conference. Convening in a different European city each time, this conference is an important moment in the life of the network. It brings together a large number of actors and stakeholders from the world over to discuss current topics in urban security strategies. During these conferences, a manifesto is discussed and adopted by the general assembly. Since its foundation, Efus has held five international conferences in Montreal (1989), Paris (1991), Naples (2000), Saragossa (2006), and Aubervilliers & Saint Denis (2012).

Organised by Efus in partnership with the Government of Catalonia and the City of Barcelona, the next international and interdisciplinary conference will be held in Barcelona on 15–17 November 2017 and will be dedicated to the co-production of urban security policies. In addition, this event will mark Efus’ 30th anniversary.

The overarching theme of the 2017 conference will be the co-production of security. The main topics to be discussed are the governance of security and how it is shared between the various levels of government (local, regional, national and supranational); why prevention is a priority in all the fields of
security policies and how it concerns all actors and levels of governance, and the growing involvement of private actors and citizens in local security policies.

**Recent and ongoing activities**

Efus is currently working as a priority on the following issues.

**Strengthening local authorities’ capacities to prevent and fight radicalisation**

Efus has been working for several years on this topic, which is particularly important and pressing for many member local authorities. After the attacks of January and November 2015 in Paris, Efus members repeatedly advocated prevention as a key approach to counter radicalisation and stressed the importance of respecting human rights and striving to strengthen social cohesion.

In order to improve local authorities’ capacities to prevent and fight this phenomenon, Efus organises training sessions and helps them set up pilot projects and innovative practices. It also coordinated the exchange of practices and knowledge among some 40 European localities, and produced a book and videos that include guidelines and good practices on the prevention of radicalisation at the local level.

In order to increase cooperation on this major issue, Efus has established partnerships with the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the international Strong Cities Network, the EU’s Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN), and the governments of France and Belgium.

**Countering hate crime at the local level**

Incidents motivated by hate and intolerance are increasing in number and intensity in many EU member states, according to recent EU reports. While this is a transnational phenomenon, responses must be found at all levels of governance. To increase knowledge among decision-makers and practitioners of the measures that can be taken at a local level to counter acts of discriminatory violence, Efus has been working on a collection of practices and the organisation of a seminar titled “Preventing and Countering Discriminatory Violence at the Local Level in Europe”, as well as a series of national and international events.
Efus has cooperated on this topic with a number of local partners, including the Portuguese Association for Victim Support (Associação Portuguesa de Apoio à Vítima, APAV), the Italian Forum for Urban Security (FISU), the Austrian Institute for Research on Conflicts (Institut für Konfliktforschung, IKF), the Belgian Forum for Urban Security (FBPSU), the Spanish Forum for Urban Security (FEPSU), the German association Ufuq e.v., the Jagellonian University of Krakow (Poland), and the French Forum for Urban Security (FFSU).

**Improving police-population relations**

Good relations between the police and citizens are a key requirement for enabling the police to work effectively and impartially and for the population to feel secure. However, these relations prove to be conflictual in certain European countries or cities. Because cities play a central role in local life, they can participate in bringing the police and citizens closer by acting as intermediaries. Efus has worked alongside several European cities, among them Amiens (FR), Aubervilliers (FR), Barcelona (ES), Brussels (BE), Lisbon (PT), Milan (IT), Nantes (FR), and Toulouse (FR), to develop pilot projects and collectively define a series of principles and recommendations to improve interactions between the police and citizens. It produced a publication on this theme (*Police-population relations: challenges, local practices and recommendations*) in February 2016.

**Promoting social integration through sport**

Efus launched the first European Prize for Social Integration through Sport in 2015 with the objective of identifying and promoting practices that use sport to strengthen social integration and values such as respect, tolerance and inclusion. The first prize was awarded in 2016. Some 180 applications were received from all over Europe and five practices were distinguished. The winners were: in the category “Prevention of and fight against racism”, Mondiali Antirazzisti (Italy); in the category “Promotion of gender equality”, PLAY International (France); in the category “Integration of marginalised people”, Come Together Cup (Germany); in the category “Inclusion of people at risk”, Icehearts of Finland (Finland); and in the category “Education for active citizenship or fair play”, RollerFootBall (France).
Drafting and implementing a local night-time strategy

At night, cities slow down and the hustle and bustle moves to specific areas. The potential conflict between sleep, work and play means that cities need to develop night-time policies that take the distinct aspects of nightlife into account. Efus helps its members to design their local strategy for nightlife, adapted to their local context. Efus’ support includes training on the main steps and principles of action for designing such a strategy and on the specific issues and tools related to the management of a city’s nightlife. Numerous Efus members who work on nightlife through dedicated structures or through a ‘Night Czar’ (an executive officer in charge of nightlife) can exchange experiences in the work group moderated by Efus on the Efus Network platform.

Improving local policies on senior citizens

Local policies and actions do not always take into account the specific needs of senior citizens, although there are many projects and practices of prevention, support and information that concern this group of population. Efus and the government of Catalonia set up a working group in 2014 with the aim of gathering existing practices in Europe, to further knowledge and to make a series of recommendations for a comprehensive European policy on elderly people.

Developing a strategic approach to urban security

In order to help European local policy-makers and practitioners to build and review their security policies on the basis of reliable information and data collected on the ground, Efus collects methods and tools. It works on questions such as: how to translate the results of an audit into concrete actions; how to use the new information and communication technologies; the opportunities offered by open data, and the obstacles to overcome in order to implement a strategic approach to urban security in the current climate of budgetary reductions. In the course of different projects on this topic and responding to requests by many European local authorities, Efus produced two handbooks and a video presenting a number of effective tools and methodologies to be used to conduct local security audits.
**Understanding the emerging role of social media in enhancing public security**

Efus contributes to research and project-related activities to better identify and understand the opportunities, challenges and ethical considerations linked to the use of social media for public security purposes. Through these activities, Efus wishes to draw attention to the needs and expectations of local authorities in this area so that adequate research may be conducted.

**Developing concerted local policies for security and tourism**

The tourist city, regardless of its size or type of tourism, must consider security as a major element of its development strategy. Whereas in the past security and tourism policies were often conducted separately, dialogue between these two spheres is now essential. Through thematic local audits, field observations and exchanges with experts, Efus helped eight European cities to design their local “security and tourism” strategy with three main objectives: to raise awareness among tourists on risk prevention and local customs; improve the way tourists are received and supported when they have problems; and foster peaceful coexistence between tourists and local residents.

**Recent publications**

Since its creation, Efus has published close to 60 books on a large array of themes. Focused on inter-cities cooperation programmes, they include information on methodology and practices, as well as contributions from experts.

The most recent publications are:
- (Available in English and French) https://issuu.com/efus/docs/sport_publication_eng_web
- Efus (2016): *Preventing and Fighting Radicalisation at the Local Level.*
- (Available in English, French, German, Spanish) https://efus.eu/files/2015/02/LIAISE_Publication_CPlogo_EN.pdf
- (Available in English, French, German, Italian) https://issuu.com/efus/docs/publication_a_en
  – (Available in English and French) https://issuu.com/efus/docs/publication_s_t_eng
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